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This dissertation examines rhetorical troping, specifically how students use the misfit tropes of 
metalepsis, catachresis, and enstrangement as lines of argument. I borrow the definition of 
“troping” from Richard Poirier, who argued that it evinced “the human involvement in the 
shaping of language, and it prevents language from imposing itself upon us with the force 
and indifference of a Technology.” I ask: How and why does a writer work through the 
complexities of invention processes, arguments, or conclusions with tropes that have been 
historically considered misfit or difficult? Methodologically, I read student writing in the light of 
Reuben Brower’s idea of “slow reading” and the frame of ordinary language as developed by 
philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The tropes I consider disrupt typical 
academic patterns and allow space to trope off the commonplace or cliché. Troping also works as 
a heuristic to work through writing problems or find compelling ways to move through classical 
topics. My aim is not for the student work to elucidate the tropes, but the tropes to help elucidate 
the student work. I demonstrate that writing pedagogy needs to return to a conscious use of 
rhetorical tropes and how students can trope on academic and ordinary language, fulfilling their 
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0.0 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS TROPING, AND (IF YOU KNOW WHAT IT IS) WHY 





 “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 
 “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.” 
 “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s 
all.” 
 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass 
 
“The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a reverence for 
our past act or word, because the eyes of others have no other data for computing 
our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath to disappoint them. But why should 
you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about this corpse of your 
memory, lest you contradict yourself; what then? It seems to be a rule of wisdom 
never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure memory, but to 
bring the past for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new 
day.” 
 




Quintilian was no friend of metalepsis. The ancient rhetorician dismissed metalepsis (a 
metonymy of a metonymy), claiming it is “by no means to be commended” and that “[i]t is a 
trope with which to claim acquaintance, rather than one which we are ever likely to require to 
use” (8.6.38). It was only seen fit for comedic writing, at best. Catachresis (when an 
inappropriate word is used for something which has no name) was also seen as abuse or unfit and 
(in Latin) is known as abusio. But why? Why were these particular tropes so outcast? 
 In this dissertation, I offer an examination of troping in student writing through a 
complex of three unusual rhetorical tropes (two classical, one not): metalepsis, catachresis, and 
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enstrangement. The tropes are unusual because they’re considered abusive to, and unfit for, 
proper language. These tropes pushed the boundaries of language to the point of losing sense, 
losing the point of the author, or losing the attention of the audience. And I will be referring to 
these tropes as misfit, inspired by my reading of I.A. Richards’s Practical Criticism and the 
chapter on readers’ stock responses to poetry. 
A stock response, like a stock line in shoes or hats, may be a convenience. Being ready-
made, it is available with less trouble than if it had to be specially made out of raw or 
partially prepared materials. And unless an awkward misfit is going to occur, we may 
agree that stock responses are much better than no responses at all. Indeed, an extensive 
repertory of stock responses is a necessity. (228) 
I do not agree with Richards. Stock responses (whether mine or the students’) aren’t better than 
nothing. But what’s most compelling here is the misfit. I want to know more about it and what it 
is and how to make it reoccur. I think the misfit response is a potential act of troping, a 
productive artifact in the grey mash of stock responses.  
 But before I get there, I will have to stop and ask: “What is troping?” Throughout this 
dissertation the words “trope” and “troping” are explicitly drawn from Richard Poirier’s 
explanation of the word/action as he finds it manifesting in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s work and 
elaborated upon by William James, as described in The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian 
Reflections (1988) and Poetry & Pragmatism (1992). In these books, Poirier explains, “Troping 
is the turning of a word in directions or detours it seemed destined otherwise to avoid” (Renewal 
131). Troping is a strong handling of language and “gives evidences of the human involvement 
in the shaping of language, and it prevents language from imposing itself upon us with the force 
and indifference of a Technology. It frees us from the predetermined meanings” (131). Turning 
 3 
language in the way of puns, inventive metaphor, or the shifting of a word’s meaning—these all 
fall into the realm of troping (33).  
 Poirier focused on troping as a positive, generative act in writing, because it can loosen 
“the predetermined meanings,” the implication being that predetermined meanings are, if not 
outright pernicious obstructions, then at least speed bumps to comprehension or action. 
Predetermined meanings, like preconceived ideas, are detritus in the activity of writing, 
seemingly proving themselves as sources of invention, when instead they are constantly 
becoming familiar sinkholes of thought. His comparison of language to an imposing 
“Technology” plays up the clichéd imagery of automation and rigidity settling into, or 
controlling through, our speech and writing. And while much has radically changed with 
Technology in the intervening thirty years since his book was published, I still find it appropriate 
to keep Poirier’s terms and extend their original intentions. Even if Technology is more 
intelligent and adaptive today, it still has a force; and it was this force—this unwanted force, 
benign or no—that Poirier and I are concerned with.  
 Poirier does discuss troping mostly as a part of what he terms “Literature,” capital-L. But 
while troping does happen in literature and elsewhere, I don’t think troping is so specialized or 
aristocratic as to only happen there. Poirier doesn’t discuss student writing or freshman 
composition, but I think troping is democratic and found anywhere language is.     
 Troping itself has been mentioned but barely and off-handedly among composition and 
literature articles for decades; it’s never been zeroed in on as a central idea. Not the way Poirier 
discusses it, anyway. The online database CompPile is helpful here. “Troping” brings back 3 
results, none of which focus on student writing or writing instruction in general. “Trope” brings 
back 179 results, but the majority of these discuss tropes as recurrent themes. A parallel search 
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through JSTOR finds articles like Phillip K. Arrington’s 1986 College English article “Tropes of 
the Composing Process,” which discusses the definitions of tropes from Edward P.J. Corbett to 
Giambattista Vico. What’s most found in articles that choose tropes as a subject is what they are 
or how they’re found, how they move through discourse. The articles don’t discuss how students 
trope. I wonder if that’s because troping is seen as above students’ abilities. I’m not sure. I don’t 
believe troping has been emphasized because of what Poirier claims about Emerson’s view of 
language, that it’s “impos[ing]” and “something which human power could only sporadically 
resist” (33).  
The only remedy [for Emerson] was to be found in language itself, by continuous acts of 
troping, syntactical shiftings, rhetorical fracturings of the direction set down by the 
grammar of a sentence. Even these, however, can turn into habits of conformity. (33) 
Troping is a shared action, one available to all, one that should occur cyclically and on a 
consistent basis. It’s also an action that can reach staleness just by its own enactment. In this 
sense, troping isn’t a salvation; it’s not even an answer. It’s the creation of a fund of possibilities 
for language from the refurbishment of the language currently passed around. Poirier elaborates 
that troping is “in itself an act of power over meanings already in place; it distorts ‘verbal 
solutions’” (17). In an essay on Poirier, David Bartholomae sharpens Poirier’s argument:  
His is not a trickle-down theory. Nor is it a form of the New Criticism. He argues for a 
very specific and determined form of work, with certain kinds of texts and with very local 
rewards or consequences. His attention is to the sentence and to style—and these were 
not the usual points of reference when first-year writing courses were built around a 
standard set of literary texts. (“Teacher” 34-35)1 
                                            
1 See my reference to this and “slow reading” below. 
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Bartholomae’s focus is on Poirier’s “very local rewards or consequences.” I like very much that 
phrasing. The stakes are realistic. Once again, troping and sentence-work isn’t salvation, it is, as 
we’ll see, merely salutary. A composition teacher struggles with student placement, authority, 
and approval in the teaching of first-year writers. College writers want good grades for patterned 
writing. As Poirier argues in Poetry & Pragmatism,  
when you [in this case, a student] put yourself into words on any given occasion you are 
in fact not expressing yourself. In choosing to be understood, you are to some extent 
speaking in conformity to usages and in harmony with assumptions shared by your 
auditors. At best, then, you are expressing only some part of yourself. (67)  
Poirier locates where student writing already forms itself. Students are already in a shifting 
pattern from high school to the university and they try to shed the ownership of language instead 
of harboring it and cultivating the turning of words.  
 Furthermore, Poirier writes that Emerson’s pragmatism—which includes  troping—
means skirting around solid and steadfast meanings. He lists terms that Emerson eluded nailing 
down: “action,” “turning,” “nature,” and “privacy,” among others. He goes on to claim that 
“[w]hile some delimited understanding of these [terms] is necessarily assumed as a starting 
point, the dictionary will be of little help in determining how they function…they are constantly 
troped within sentences that insist that readers, too, must involve themselves in the salutary 
activity of troping” (129). Why salutary and not a solution? Because verbal solutions are 
conventions. They are staid. They overpromise and underdeliver. They are the student’s 
misrecognizing an utterance for a justification, or worse yet, sheer enthusiasm for justification. 
The salutary aspect is the therapeutic aspect. The one that is “healthful,” so to speak. We would 
tend to think that solutions are positive, but too often solutions in language are what’s readily 
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available and not what’s forged through consideration. If just the act of troping is what matters, 
it’s because there should be a way for students to resist the conformity of language, a way for 
them to use language before it finds a way to use them.  
 In The Plural I, William E. Coles’s narrative study/account of a composition course and 
students’ responses to their own writing, Coles humorously pins down the obstacles that he, and 
all of us as writing teachers, may confront on some level: a paucity of rhetorical know-how 
within student writing, specifically metaphoricity. “Again I was facing a set of papers most of 
which were only one sentence deep. Again the problem, though I wasn’t about to talk this way in 
class, was one that involved an inadequate understanding of language as metaphor” (87, 
emphasis added). I’ve received and read papers one sentence deep. This either means the paper 
possesses only one sentence keeping it alive or that there’s just one sentence that the paper keeps 
trying to revive to no end. Coles’s diagnosis of a lack of the metaphoric structure of language can 
be treated with rhetorical troping.  
 Applying this form of troping to the classroom, I want to re-consider what David Fleming 
argued for in an article for College English in 1998: the need for more undergraduate “rhetorical 
education” and not just “rhetorical theory,” despite the upswing and interest in rhetoric generally 
as a field of study (169). Fleming, in discussing a certain kind of rhetorical education—a first-
year composition course, really—finds that it promises very little: “It is a rhetoric doomed to 
educational marginalization” (172). A contemporary “rhetorical education” would then need to 
take shape as a “practice in speaking and writing well, that reaching after discursive excellence, 
undertaken by the student, guided by the teacher, and manifest in the gradual acquisition of 
rhetorical competence and sensibility” (181). I agree with Fleming, but I want to push it a bit 
further. In a 2003 issue of Enculturation entitled “Rhetoric/Composition: 
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Intersections/Impasses/Differends.” Michael Holzman defines the ways the word “write” can be 
understood, one of which is “writing error free sentences,” and ends up assessing what it means 
to write within that framework:  
Studying good writing, that epitome of education, and teaching students to write well (the 
product and sign of education), lead to the study of education, of culture—high, popular 
and commercial—and the study of the displacement of both high and popular culture by a 
commercial culture with hegemonic ambitions. (n.p.) 
It turns out that Holzman’s view of rhetoric runs somewhat parallel to Fleming’s (thus they share 
some starting points), but Holzman’s comment above points to how certain rhetorical methods or 
functions can still set in motion frameworks that dictate outcomes despite a writer’s intentions. 
Indeed, Jeanne Fahnestock writes that tropes are “the formal embodiments of certain ideational 
or persuasive functions” (23).   
 In the same issue, Victor J. Vitanza’s “Abandoned to Writing: Notes Toward Several 
Provocations” inhabits the veering and error-embracing style he’s known for and takes 
Holzman’s concerns to the breaking point, exclaiming that “It is simply not safe for students to 
write ‘in’ or ‘at’ the university. Any university. What is taught at the university is not-writing” 
(n.p.). For him, how writing gets “taught” or “learned” isn’t of “interest.” Vitanza sees at least 
two kinds of writing. Writing done in universities…and writing done somewhere else.  
Obviously what goes for writing in the academy can be taught! That’s the problem! It is 
necessary to dis/engage by wayves of abusio. Catachresis. Rather, I prefer not to write, 




I think Vitanza is advocating for certain methods—methods for creating alternatives to rhetorical 
commonplaces. By “commonplace” I mean seemingly easy reference to received wisdom as 
defined by Bartholomae (Writing 138). The three aforementioned tropes at the beginning of this 
introduction each harbor a wide theoretical outlook with regard to writing. The tropes aren’t 
merely misfit, abusive, or good for comedic writing. Indeed, they may open up opportunities for 
creating the opposite of commonplaces—as Vitanza mentions above, “third places,” or, if you 
like, what I’ll call oddplaces. This creation of oddplaces can be broached often by the sheer 
grammar (i.e. the order of operations) of the trope. For example, tropes like catachresis or 
metalepsis, the compounding of multiple tropes, a metonymy of a metonymy. 
 I will question the kind of leads set up by Poirier, Bartholomae, Coles, Fleming, 
Holzman, Vitanza, and others, but also ask: “How can working ‘erroneously’ within language 
with misfit and mis-fitting tropes be as much of an inventional strength as following proper 
usage?” That is, why seek out misfit tropes in student writing?   
My aim is two-sided. First: I want to reclaim certain tropes from their ancient haunts to 
investigate writing in the classroom. Despite certain efforts, like Harold Bloom’s repositioning of 
metalepsis as a poetic revisionary ratio (dubbed apophrades) in The Anxiety of Influence (1973), 
the capability of misfit tropes still lie in wait to work within and alongside student writing. 
Gestures like Bloom’s are geared toward describing how “strong poets” operate, not how 
freshmen composition writers can mobilize tropes for idea generation and not merely idea 
management. Second: A concern in composition has been the appearance (or plague) of the 
commonplace in student writing (I.A. Richards would call it “the stock response.”) That is, in 
order to slip from the established writing, student writers may trope away from the commonplace 




0.1 HEURISTICS IN STUDENT WRITING 
 
 
Before analyzing student writing, it’s important to note that in the examples I’ve chosen, the 
writers are trying to handle what I recognize as “a writing problem.” I was pleasantly surprised 
by this pattern because it echoes with work already done in composition scholarship on the 
solving of writing problems. Namely, I’m drawing from Shelley Reid’s (2010) suggestion of 
reorienting the field of composition in order to see teachers as people who solve writing 
problems. If writing teachers help solve writing problems, then the assumption is that students 
are making them. It also means that they don’t know they exist—or rather, they’re not knowing 
how they exist. I would contend that, while Reid’s re-framing of composition pedagogy is 
compelling, students are already using an available rhetoric to work out compromises in the 
writing. These rhetorical attempts don’t absolve the writing teacher. On the contrary, they make 
our role more vital to the acknowledgement, identification, and elaboration of the attempts at 
revision or in future work.2   
                                            
 2 It is worth noting that James Slevin has written that, as he sees composition “as a 
category of thought” it is, for him, “a response to a difficulty of writing” (13). “Difficulty” is his 
watchword, not “problem.” For Slevin, a “problem” seems to indicate “absence,” and that if we 
see student writing as dealing with problems or problems in themselves, we are not 
understanding how difficulty can be see as a positive, as an engaging struggle. Instead we should 
identify difficulty “as [a] serious intellectual demand requiring a response that depends on the 
critical and extended interpretive powers of the writer and/or teacher” (14). He continues: “…the 
work of composition always and of necessity begins with interpretation. Interpretations, of 
course, are sometimes more, sometimes less original and adequate to the case under 
consideration” (14). Slevin lists the ways that difficulty can be wrenched negatively into 
different meanings other than the positive one he’s arguing for, e.g. difficulty as absence or lack. 
While I understand Slevin’s point, I still think we can use the word “problem” as in “writing 
problem” because the issue that the student is faced with is one that isn’t caused by themselves 
or is their fault. It’s generic or institutional or tropical. 
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 There’s a compelling link that subtends Reid’s idea, connecting it to movements among 
literary studies and cognitive studies of figurative language. For example, in his book 
Shakespeare, rhetoric and cognition, Raphael Lyne lays out the argument, through the plays of 
the Bard, that rhetoric and cognitive linguistics share elements that can inform each other. He 
aims to show how tropes are cognitive heuristics that, potentially, “are, in effect, a kind of 
cognitive science before such a thing was considered” (49). Analogically, this is what I claim a 
few particular tropes are doing in the following student essays in this chapter, and the next two 
chapters—that is, tropes working as a heuristic, as a way to think through an issue or problem in 
the moment without knowing precisely what the problem or solution may be. Further, this kind 
of thought is related to Fahnestock’s previously mentioned work. Lyne agrees that “cognitive 
scientists, philosophers of language, and rhetoricians” understand how tropes work as lines of 
argument; and, moreover, that “[t]hey do so to the extent that metaphor, metonymy, metalepsis, 
and others may be treated not only as ways of conveying the results of complex thought, but also 
as maps of the way complex thought might actually happen” (9). It isn’t the job of this chapter, 
or this dissertation, to explore cognitive linguistics, but I point out these connections here, at the 
start of a series of chapters on particular tropes, because I do want the reader to keep in mind 
how vital, volatile, and sweeping a trope can be when placed against an impasse or turnaround of 
thought. And I’d also have the reader remember that, on a compositional level, tropes can point 
toward heuristics and potential solutions.3  
 This dissertation brings together areas of study that aren’t often introduced in 
composition studies to both track how the tropes have been discussed or encouraged (or 
                                            
 3 For more on heuristics and rhetoric, see Lauer 1970 & 1979. In the former, Lauer 
offered a bibliography eight pages long, mostly made up of psychological scholarship in 
invention and heuristics, in order to assist the interested reader.  
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discouraged) and to borrow methods for reading them in student work. Some areas of study 
include: musicology, medieval biblical exegesis, classical rhetorical studies, narratology, and 
elements of Russian Formalism. Part of this disparateness means having to tie together writers 
and scholars (who tackled their own writing problems) as unlikely as Viktor Shklovsky, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Gerard Gennette. But most importantly, I pull 
from the work of student writing as the core object of analysis. I examine and read both writing 
done recently in my own classroom and essays collected by the Pitt English Department over the 
years. Whether we’re looking at problems, obstacles, or impasses, student writing in the first-
year course is liminal and striving at the same time. To start, the dissertation begins 
historiographically by retracing the concept of troping. Then the four main chapters move into a 
close reading of student writing with misfit tropes by searching for how my own students inhabit 
and use the tropes and how student writing outside of my classroom encounters them. The final 
chapter examines essays outside my own courses; these essays are from the University of 




0.2 SLOW READER, DUMB READER: METHODS 
 
 
Students possess a rich history of language, form, and meaning behind them. In this introduction, 
I’m arguing that this history is leveraged by troping in student work and that this leveraging is 
done as a response to the difficulty of the work itself. To do this, I will rely on “slow reading.” 
This should be distinguished and set apart from that popular notion of “close reading” or the 
cartoon version of New Criticism that we hear of but rarely get familiar with. “Slow reading” 
was coined by Reuben A. Brower. Brower taught at Harvard through the 1960s and 70s and 
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taught Theodore Baird’s influential English 1-2 course at Amherst College, a course that could 
be described as “an ongoing activity rather than transmission of a codified philosophy” which 
encouraged “explicit disavowals of any professional expertise on the teaching of writing, and a 
treatment of the work of the course as a common activity shaped by the collective efforts of the 
teaching staff and students” (Horner 382).4 In other words, it was a class that attempted to avoid 
the commodification of writing by avoiding the explicit teaching of writing. Brower also held 
influence on famous students (like Paul de Man and Richard Poirier) in his creation of the 
Humanities 6 class when he moved to Harvard (see de Man “Return” 23-24; Poirier “Reading 
Pragmatically” 177-184).5 According to Brower, slow reading meant “slowing down the process 
of reading to observe what is happening, in order to attend very closely to the words, their uses, 
and their meanings” (4). Such a way of reading may seem simplistic. But we can add that slow 
reading “lies in a shared concern for describing what it is ‘like’ to read a particular work” as 
opposed to excavating a work for its meaning (x). As Poirier experienced it, the slow reading 
                                            
4 For more on the Amherst 1-2 course, see Robin Varnum’s excellent and well-researched 
history of the course in  Fencing with Words. The book, while being a historiography of the 
course created by Baird, is also rich with interviews of Baird himself and many teachers and 
students of the course who subsequently went on to then teach altered versions of the curriculum 
elsewhere.  
 5 These two have distinctly differing views on the Hum 6 course. De Man saw it as 
occasionally “subversive” and closer to engaging in I.A. Richard’s “practical criticism”; while 
Poirier disagrees with de Man, claiming more individuality than mere methodology, and pushing 
back on the subversive, “Many thought of Hum 6 as a more subtle and ideologically neutral 
version of New Criticism, a mode of criticism which in my view, and for reasons I will get to 
presently, was in fact subservient to quite specific social and even religious forms of authority” 
(“Reading” 178-179). Poirier takes umbrage with de Man’s “mak[ing] equations among New 
Criticism, close reading, Derrida, and himself, to the point where he gives the unintended and 
erroneous impression that any kind of critical-linguistic study which focuses on texts is by nature 
subversive” (179). For de Man, Hum 6 was transformative and he witnessed “a course, then, 
utterly devoid of subversive intentions as well as of theoretical objections. The conceptual and 
terminological apparatus was kept to a minimum, with only a few ordinary language terms for 
metalanguage. The entire stance was certainly not devoid of its own ideological and 
methodological assumptions, yet they managed to remain implicit without interfering with the 
procedures” (“Return” 24). It would seem the truth is somewhere in the middle.  
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approach meant that “reading ideally remained in motion, not choosing to encapsulate itself, as 
New Critical readings nearly always ultimately aspired to do” (Poetry 180-181, original 
emphasis).  
Slow reading tries to separate out language, words, and sentence sounds. The last idea 
comes from Robert Frost’s comments on “sentence-sounds” in his letters to Sidney Cox, and 
Frost’s essay “Education by Poetry” where he praises metaphor and presses upon the reader that 
“unless you are at home in the metaphor, unless you have had your proper poetical education in 
the metaphor, you are not safe anywhere. Because you are not at ease with figurative values: you 
don’t know the metaphor in its strength and its weakness. You don’t know how far you may 
expect to ride it and when it may break down with you” (106). What this dissertation displays is 
how many students do possess an ease with “figurative values” but that, for some reason, it’s 
been dropped in the curriculum or in their everyday practices. More up to date takes on slow 
reading and its ilk can be found in something like the “deep reading” recommended by Sven 
Birkerts’s The Gutenberg Elegies, Marjorie Garber’s Loaded Words (60-71), and David Mikics’s 
Slow Reading in a Hurried Age. For Mikics, “slowness means discovery” (31), and he connects 
his book to the slowness movement taking over television, food, and travel. He also tips his hat 
to Brower’s slow reading; Garber relies more on de Man’s view of Brower’s influence. What’s at 
stake is something much smaller than a wholesale comprehension or understanding of Writing or 
Reading or Rhetoric or anything else with a capital letter.  
It is much closer to what Bartholomae’s extolling “very local rewards and consequences” 
and what Poirier claimed about reading—that it “is nothing if it is not personal” and that it 
should be “a struggle between what you want to make of a text and what it wants to make of 
itself and of you” (167).  
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Normally, slow reading is done between teacher and students in a class, together. But I 
want to suggest that Brower’s method allows something else for teachers: “The student who 
looks at poems as carefully as we have suggested will understand that poetry begins in grammar 
and that to express a just appreciation of a poem demands fine control of grammar on the part of 
the appreciator” (In Defense 16). Also, slow reading “should be taken not as a program but as a 
rendering in general terms of our experience in teaching ourselves and our students” (x). To me, 
“rendering” in this sense means either a performance of the experience of reading or the yielding 
or surrendering of the reading.  
From this slow reading of student writing, I want to show how complex and swift their 
work can be, and what writing teachers can do with that writing once the misfit tropes are dealt 
with. In other words, What is afforded and as yet undisclosed? I also want to ask, “What is it like 
to read this student paper?” before I run headlong into questions that go “What does this student 
paper mean?” or “What could this student paper mean?”  
This attitude is much like Poirier’s one-time colleague at Amherst College, Walker 
Gibson, who started a 1979 College Composition and Communication article this way:  
My first object as a teacher of writing is to dramatize for my students how dumb a reader 
is. ‘No one,’ I tell them, ‘will ever again in your lifetime read what you have written as 
carefully and attentively as I am doing right now.’ The boast may or may not prove true: 
my purpose is to convince them how easily and often a careful and attentive reader can 
go wrong. (192)  
My attitude is Gibson’s attitude. And my goal is his goal. Gibson contextualizes his rather brash 
statement by explaining that “the dumb reader” is him. And the reason he’s performatively dumb 
is because all a reader has to work with is what’s on the page. “The failure of the unsuccessful 
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writer is a failure of imagination,” Gibson goes on, “a failure to forecast what it’s going to be 
like to be a dumb reader of the document,” meaning, the teacher’s role is to scour and scrape the 
text for all the moments that a potential, less-attentive Future Reader will either trip over or miss 
(192). Gibson calls this kind of tripping up “back-tracking” and what causes back-tracking 
“present huge and complex problems of organization and argument, style and tone, defying 
summary” (193). To me, the reading of student papers is a deeper engagement, a dance, almost. 
It is, if anything a performance, but a slow, drawn out one. But a performance for the student’s 
behalf. Again, if anything, a performance as described by Wallace Stevens. 
I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw 
Or heard or felt came not but from myself; 
And there I found myself more truly and more strange. (65) 
Part of this reading is precisely to have the students (and you, the reader) see their language as 
more true and more strange than a first pass would (could) offer, since that is how I also find it. 
Strange and true (the latter meaning correctly positioned, rhetorically contextual).  
 All of these methodological approaches I’ve discussed so far locate themselves in an 
ordinary or everyday appreciation of how language moves and is taken up. Therefore, I want to 
add one more method to my tool kit. Slow Reading and the Dumb Reader are, I think, 
Wittgensteinain approaches to the game (genre) of student writing. And so I will draw on the 
later philosophical writing of Wittgenstein, in particular, that I will also read the student 
papers—through Wittgenstein’s talk of “language games” in Philosophical Investigations. His 
was not a methodology that called forth rigid, pre-articulated tactics, but rather, for my purposes, 
exfoliating orientations toward language and the use of words and the overlapping uses of certain 
words for certain purposes—in my case, academic writing. For Wittgenstein, language games 
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start with the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of 
language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages.  
If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and 
disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and 
question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which 
these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated 
processes of thought. (Blue Book 17) 
But some years later, he elaborated this notion of language games, and in §2 of Philosophical 
Investigations,6 Wittgenstein describes a scenario wherein two builders (A and B) are working. 
Builder A calls out to Builder B certain terms for the limited amount of construction objects he 
needs. E.g. “block,” “pillar,” “slab,” “beam.” When A calls to B, “slab!” and B gives A the slab, 
this entire activity is what Wittgenstein calls “a complete primitive language” (PI 2). Thus, 
according to Wittgenstein, “[g]iving orders and obeying them,” “[f]orming and testing a 
hypothesis,” or “[m]aking a joke; telling it” can be considered language games, not just 
children’s language or primitive tribes, and moreover, new language games sprout, last, and 
eventually wither (PI 23).  
 In §65, Wittgenstein focuses on the overlapping qualities of language games. He goes on 
this way: 
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that 
these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for 
all,—but that they are related to one another in many different ways.   
                                            
6 This book will be abbreviated as PI henceforth. And as is tradition, I will be referencing 
the paragraph numbers for Part I of the book. Anything from Part II will have a page number 
citation.  
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Part of what I’m asking of the student writing I read in this dissertation is, “What language game 
are you playing, do you think you’re playing, are we playing together?” It isn’t hard to see 
academic writing, or as we may call it The Kind of Writing We Ask Students to Write, as a 
language game through Wittgenstein’s frame. I am not searching for one particular way of 
troping in the student examples, but there is a common element to them, a common approach or 
feel to them. And often I find that it is one of the misfit tropes I’m attending to here. For 
example, while teaching English Composition II at the Community College of Allegheny 
County, I encountered this sentence in a student essay about Malcolm X’s self-education in 
prison.  
While looking at his writing, I am painted with a picture of what it was like for him to be 
committed to learning while in prison. 
My first instinct here is to totally rewrite the sentence in my head and say, While looking at his 
writing, I am painted a picture…or…A picture is painted for me by…But that is not what was 
written. What was written is more compelling. The writer is painted by a picture (an example of 
metalepsis, a reversal of cause and effect, as we’ll see in chapter two). I would not want to 
change this sentence for the world. Her version sounds, and means, more than the “correct” 
version could. Especially since I’m asking, when I read this, “What does it mean to be painted by 
a picture?” I can take this literally or figuratively. Her potential misstep in the writing leads me, 
the reader, to see a picture/text reaching out and assigning or creating messages and meaning on 
the writer’s mind or even face. Or, instead of being painted by a brush, she’s painted with an 
actual picture. The image is immediately endless in its novelty. (To say nothing of the 
unexpected play on words with “committed” and “prison”—although, I do think a revision 
should attend to this linguistic generosity.) The endpoint of using Wittgenstein’s ideas here (and 
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elsewhere through the dissertation) is to speak back to the student writing (as with my questions 
above), “Are we playing the same language game together, and if so, how can I, as a teacher, not 
be stymied by the changing rules of the game? And if we’re not playing the same language 
game, what can be done so we both meet in the same arena?” I look at my student’s sentence 
above and think, “Her game is better than my game. She’s troped her way into another place 
here. She’s troped into a thirdspace, an oddplace.” And so I follow and see where it leads. 
Wittgenstein writes in §83:  
 Doesn’t the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily 
imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various 
existing games, but playing many without finishing them and in between throwing the 
ball aimlessly into the air, chasing on another with the ball and bombarding one another 
for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-
game and following definite rules at every throw.  
 And is there not also the case where we play and—make up the rules as we go 
along? And there is even one where we alter them—as we go along. 
Often, I see my assignments in composition go out into the classroom, and what is produced in 
light of them evolve over and above my expectations (gladly so!). They change the rules of the 
game I thought I was playing. Then, I’m forced to adapt to that game because wrenching the 
student writing toward my arena would be either pyrrhic or unimaginative or a waste of time. I 
simply need to read the situation from a different angle. Student writing, then, in this sense, is a 
Wittgensteinian language game right next to the language game of Big Deal Academic Writing. 
And sometimes these two merge and create something else, a Third Game (who knows, really, 
what to call it?), not knowing what the rules exactly are or may be or even can be. I’m willing to 
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play these language games with student writing because of what they can afford the writer going 
forward in the way of linguistic richness, history, and rhetorical awareness. I want to be painted 
by their pictures.  
 Again, this should all sound amenable to Poirier and Brower’s slow reading approach. As 
a methodology alone, and in what I baptized above as an exfoliating orientation, my occasional 
turns to Wittgenstein and ordinary language7 in general should be seen as guide rails, not as 
platforms. The philosopher Stanley Cavell hones in on the kind of readings (and attunement) I’m 
giving (and getting from) student writing, and describes why I’m focusing on certain turns of 
phrase that seem misfit (and mis-fitting) by the students.  
This is all that “ordinary” in the phrase “ordinary language philosophy” means, or ought 
to mean. It does not refer to particular words of wise use, nor to particular sorts of men. It 
reminds us that whatever words are said and meant are said and meant by particular men, 
and that to understand what they (the words) mean you must understand what they 
(whoever is using them) mean, and that sometimes men do not see what they mean, that 
usually they cannot say what they mean, that for various reasons they may not know what 
they mean, and that when they are forced to recognize this they feel they do not, and 
perhaps cannot, mean anything, and they are struck dumb. (“Avoidance” 270)  
What I appreciate most in this quotation is Cavell’s insistence on the potential “unknowability” 
of what we mean and say and write. That our words can outstrip our intentions, “for various 
reasons.” (Just so with the reversal of the picture painting the reader.) You, me, and the student 
                                            
7 Despite the name “philosophy” appearing in the label, ordinary language, according to 
the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “was not developed as a unified theory, nor was it an 
organized program, as such […] Ordinary Language philosophy is (besides an historical 
movement) foremost a methodology – one which is committed to the close and careful study of 
the uses of the expressions of language, especially the philosophically problematic ones” 
(Parker-Ryan, emphasis in original). 
 20 
writers may see this as a blessing or a curse. But this is what is. I am trying to rescue the fallout 
of the combination of certain language games, trying to stop and reclaim what could easily be 
considered worthless and turn it worthwhile. For Cavell, as for me, “we need to remind ourselves 
that ordinary language is natural language, and that its changing is natural” (42) and ordinary 
language “is that which explains how the language we traverse every day can contain 
undiscovered treasure” (“Must We Mean” 43).8 I hope the readers of this dissertation will see the 
“undiscovered treasure” of the student writing, as I, and many other compositionists have found 
it (here I’m thinking specifically of Walker Gibson, William Coles, Mina Shaughnessy, Donald 
Murray, James Slevin, David Bartholomae, Geoffrey Sirc, Stacey Waite, Peter Wayne Moe, 
among others). As a genre, as a language game, “student writing” is odd. It obeys, and hews 
closely to, all-too-dutifully to, certain traditional forms while simultaneously pushing against 
them. It makes awkward moves and sometimes nails them, sometimes fails them (Bartholomae, 
“Inventing”). Student writing can be treated as boilerplate, or it can generate as many 
interpretations as a Lewis Carroll poem. In an essay about Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, Cavell clarifies the former philosopher’s ideas about rules in language, namely, 
how they’re “inessential” (“Availability” 52). I know it does a certain violence to Cavell’s 
original subject, but I am partial to his summary of this idea as a way of thinking of and reading 
student writing, and I quote it at length.  
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect 
others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this 
                                            
8 In Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy, philosopher Sandra Laugier pushes 
Cavell a bit further than he lets on here when she writes of the complexity in ordinary language, 
“the fact that there is, so to speak, nothing ordinary about ordinary language (that it is out of the 
ordinary, if one may say so); that the disquiet summed up in the question Must We Mean What 
We Say? to quote Cavell’s title, is everywhere in it” (12).  
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projection will take place…just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the 
same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest 
and feeling, modes of response, sense of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of 
what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of 
when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of 
organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and 
community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as 
it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying. (52) 
Terrifying because it all works. And what follows in this dissertation is to say that there are latent 
writing talents in students, that they have read much and that they know things. They’ve written 
for a long time, as well (at least a decade) in these “forms of life.” But because classroom and 
academic commonplaces, which exist in ordinary language, speak so loudly in their heads and on 
the page, they need a way to shut them down and escape them. The misfit tropes I consider in 
this dissertation disrupt those patterns and, again, I believe, allow a space to trope off, and out of, 
the commonplace. Most importantly, the aim is not for the student work to elucidate the tropes or 
methods, but the tropes and methods to help elucidate the student work.  
 So the first chapter, “On the Uses and Abuses of Troping in Language; A 
Historiography,” prepares the contextual perspective for the rest of the dissertation and works 
through moments where troping is suggested, advocated, or discouraged in primary sources from 
Ancient Greek rhetoricians through to twentieth century literary criticism. The aim is to put these 
moments on a spindle to see how they reflect or refract each other; to put them into a 
conversation about rhetoric’s figurative knowledge. I find that troping is a distinctly evaluative 
action in language, one that has brought about derision and distrust, but which has just as easily 
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brought upon itself praise and support. Some of the authors in the chapter range from ancients 
like Aristotle and Quintilian to the Medieval era with the Glossa Ordinaria (a well-known study 
bible), Gregory the Great, and St. Bonaventure. I also make a knight’s move into the discipline 
of musicology where pre-modern hymns were sources of “tropes” and “troping,” wherein this 
term’s meaning is unique to musicology, breaking off from the literary use. A look at Early 
Modernity follows with Puttenham and Peacham, leading into how troping was viewed by late 
nineteenth and twentieth century critics and scholars, e.g. Nietzsche, Burke, Bloom, De Man, and 
Gates.  
 In chapter two, “When Will I Deliver Myself from Myself?; or, Troping as Metalepsis,” I 
explain why metalepsis has been so hard to understand and explain. Metalepsis, as a trope, has 
had multiple definitions—four main ones for my purposes—and in the chapter, I show examples 
in both literary writing and student writing how it manifests itself across all four. Then I move to 
work with student writing which is read two ways: as enacting the trope of metalepsis and 
negotiating a writing problem through it. And then metalepsis is shown as a method and 
framework, where the trope (in all of its incarnations) helps dissolve certain persistent issues in 
student composition (viz. anagnorisis), while also raising interesting questions for teachers of 
writing. Chapter three, “Who Rules the Empire of Names?; or, Troping as Catachresis,” 
considers how catachresis has been defined and portrayed by rhetoricians like Quintilian and 
George Puttenham and examine how the trope is treated rhetorically by scholars like Patricia 
Parker, Raphael Lyne, and Madhavi Menon. From here, I move into discussing how catachresis 
can manifest and transform student writing; why students veer away from catachresis; and why, 
based on what their starting drafts offer, it is in their favor to embrace the abusive trope. The 
chapter’s aim is to demonstrate why and how the trope under discussion not only does 
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transgressive work inside sentences, that is, but also explores how misuse can induce invention. 
In chapter four, “‘Tentacles will soon be reaching into affairs’; or, Troping as Enstrangement,” I 
am indebted to the idea of enstrangement as established by Viktor Shklovsky in his essay “Art as 
Device”  (1917). I explain how its use in literary studies has prepared it for work in composition 
and rhetoric. I also experiment with formalized constraints in student writing assignments and 
focus on a past class’s essays that show writing before and after the introduction of the trope of 
enstrangement. I aim to demonstrate how the exercise can be theorized and applied, and why and 
how Shklovsky’s trope/device opens up the compositional opportunities for student writers and 
how the concept adds value to language-use and not just trivial change for change’s sake. In 
chapter five, I compare my students’ work to essays collected for awards consideration by the 
Pitt English Department. With these latter, “control” essays, I’m looking for an engagement of 
metalepsis, catachresis, or enstrangement. When I come across what I suspect to be troping, I 
read the work in the same fashion as I read my own students’ essays. Part of my working 
hypothesis for the rest of this dissertation is: If these other essays are troping, what does that say 
about the tropes I’m offering?; what does it say about the kinds of commonplaces that exist in 



















“What I am pointing out is that unless you are at home in the metaphor, unless 
you have had your proper education in the metaphor, you are not safe anywhere. 
Because you are not at ease with figurative values: you don’t know the metaphor 
in its strength and its weakness. You don’t know how far you may expect to ride 
it and when it may break down with you. You are safe in science; you are not 
safe in history.” 
 





Following the introduction, and Fleming’s call for a more rhetorically-centered undergraduate 
education, in this chapter I want to consider the arguments rhetoricians make in favor of, or 
against, the sort of language that’s ornamented, that’s popularly considered “flowery language,” 
that relies on figures and (for my main interest here) tropes. How can we see the history of 
rhetoric as an advocation for, or disinvitation from, troping? This inquiry isn’t removed from the 
wider scope of the project, which is student writing in composition courses, and I would argue 
the historiography I’m engaging in here has much to respond back to our current teaching 
practices with regard to style and troping. As Frost warns in the epigraph to this chapter, you 
aren’t safe in history unless you know how far metaphoricity can go. In his book Out of Style: 
Reanimating Stylistic Study in Composition and Rhetoric (2008), Paul Butler laments, 
In its neglect of style as a topic of serious scholarly inquiry (as well as grammar and 
literacy, to varying degrees), the discipline of composition and rhetoric has ceded the 
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discussion to others outside the field. . . . It is time for composition and rhetoric to take 
back the study of style—to redefine the way the conversation is being framed and to 
rethink that concept in the public sphere. (122–23) 
My project, and especially this chapter’s historiography, is in direct response to calls like 
Butler’s. But I want to add to his reorientation of scholarship that we should rethink the concept 
and study of style in (and for) student writers. Not just the public. Students are often the ones 
who need a deeper practical knowledge and experience of the ways toward troping and what it 
offers, and eventually they will be (and already are) the public. A first year writing course in 
college should be a rhetorical laboratory, and encouraging student work into areas that can 
productively and enthusiastically try out troping is a part of what Fleming and Butler support. So 
it seems important for rhetorical education to have a sense of troping now, and this project needs 
this kind of cross-sectioning through the ages. My aim is to give a wide picture of how tropes 
and troping get labeled and trundled about through history. As scholars and teachers of rhetoric 
and composition, we often have recourse to turn constantly and consistently to these rhetoricians 
and writers, and it behooves us to know what their pedagogical imperatives or inhibitions were.  
 In what follows, I lean hard on the terms “propriety” and “impropriety.” But why focus 
on this specific dichotomy and not some other? Many other dualities could be chosen and 
tracked down when investigating figurative language and rhetorical tropes: literal/figurative; 
plain/stylistic; technical/poetic; mundane/spiritual; truth/deceit; real/fake; trustworthy/skeptical, 
and so on. Quintilian devoted a chapter to the propriety of words in book 8 of Institutio Oratoria. 
There he writes of propriety and impropriety, “Clearness results above all from propriety in the 
use of words. But propriety is capable of more than one interpretation. In its primary sense it 
means calling things by their right names, and is consequently sometimes to be avoided, for our 
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language must not be obscene, unseemly or mean… But while there is no special merit in the 
form of propriety which consists in calling things by their real names, it is a fault to fly to the 
opposite extreme. This fault we call impropriety” (8.3.1-3). Quintilian would have us believe, I 
argue, in a controlling dichotomy within rhetoric. In his book Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical 
Greece, John Poulakos tells us that the to prepon-to aprepes (proper-improper) dichotomy is an 
old and strong one in rhetoric. It’s the one pairing that appears to persist tenaciously, because it’s 
strongly based around what’s rhetorically worked in the past and how to mobilize those words in 
the present and for the future. To prepon (the proper) only makes sense because the now 
“resembles” the long ago, and as history locks in meanings that are useful and acceptable, we 
rely on those to navigate our way through situations (60). The ancient rhetorical sense of to 
prepon, while referring to mostly oratorical situations, can and should be applied to written 
discourse, as well (as later writers and rhetoricians support). Poulakos describes the boundaries, 
norms, and forms of to prepon this way.   
To prepon is the result of general agreements on how to address recurring topics and 
occasions properly. As we grow within a set of parameters of rhetorical practice, we learn 
that on certain occasions and before certain audiences only certain utterances are 
appropriate. In this regard, we also learn that speaking in public is highly regulated 
according to established norms of appropriateness that we are expected, more or less, to 
observe. Over time, these norms tend to harden and become highly specific types of 
rhetoric (i.e., the apology, the eulogy, the encomium). When this happens, most orators 
tend to address typical situations in typical ways. In other words, they tend to speak 
following predictable rhetorical forms and searching for predictable responses from their 
audiences. (60, emphasis added) 
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At bottom there are boundaries and restrictions in place, and in many cases, long-standing 
traditions that weigh heavily on the person speaking or writing. The composition classroom is, I 
would argue, one such place. As David Bartholomae writes, “It is not a huge leap to include 
student writing as one of the less distinguished genres—one more genre to which criticism must 
learn to attend” (“Teacher” 29). Student writing is a place where “predictable rhetorical forms” 
and “predictable responses” are nurtured (by students) and expected (by teachers). The set of 
expectations for incoming first-year college students can be hard to pin down, except for the 
basic and often lamented assumptions that they (a) want to get good grades to get a good job (b) 
often dislike writing because of a lack of experience or exposure and (c) are at a loss how to 
manipulate, expand/contract, and overall play around productively with language in an academic 
or classroom environment. Perhaps the classroom doesn’t invite or speak to them as the sort of 
kairotic environment that composition and rhetoric teachers hope and expect to foster. What the 
students know, and as Poulakos claims any ancient rhetor would’ve known, is that the 
“unfamiliar should be understood in terms of the familiar” (61). In Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 
James Murphy traces how ancient rhetors split tropes and figures into separate areas:  
the rhetoricians’ attitude toward the figures and tropes seems to have been affected by the 
way in which rhetorical training was conducted in Roman Schools. This attitude carried 
through the early middle ages as well. In Cicero’s time, and as late as Quintilian, it is 
clear that certain figures were regarded as proper subjects only for the most elementary 
levels of schooling; since grammar was regarded as a subject preliminary to rhetoric, the 
figures taught by the grammarian were necessarily less important to the rhetor…This 
tendency may have served to crystallize support for certain sets of figures and tropes as 
“proper” to rhetoric rather than to grammar. (188) 
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In my time teaching writing, I’ve had very few encounters with students who thought that 
stylistically aggressive writing (read: writing that tropes rhetorically) was obviously acceptable 
or necessary. This could be because many writing courses in high school and college are based in 
argumentation or persuasion solely. That is, focused on structure. Maybe. And maybe students 
are apt to turn away from tropes and figures because it’s too “creative” or has a whiff of the 
“show off” of “colorful language”—“Look what I can do with language!”, etc. Indeed, Murphy 
writes that rhetorical ornamentation “rests upon a principle of deviation from a norm” and that 
“[w]ith [Roman grammarian] Donatus and later theorists in the grammatical tradition, a common 
justification [for ornamentation] lay in the beautification of language by purposeful change” 
(186). Again, as Bartholomae asserts, “[i]f you have taught [first-year writing], you’ve 
received…a standard theme, student writing—the writing produced from a certain well-defined 
(and over-determined) cultural and institutional space” (“Teacher” 25). Bartholomae’s over-
determined institutional space is nearly identical with the required course that all students must 
take and need passing grades in. There would be good reason, then, not to rock the boat with 
regard to rhetorical experimentation, to say nothing of the “beautification of language by 
purposeful change.” 
 But I can hear a countering voice saying, “Argument and persuasion are parts of rhetoric, 
as is style—so what’s the issue?” Good question. That’s what this project is about. Trying to 
answer that question, among others. Students are wary of rhetorical excess and trapped in a 
hyper-literalism of the Enlightenment Dream that has wormed its way into the Apple of 
Discourse. And what I’ve found through the compiling of this historiography is that the 
rhetorical tradition is frequently about navigating the space between the extreme poles of the 
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appropriate and the inappropriate, propriety and impropriety. Or, if you prefer, excess versus 
literalism.  
Through troping, though, a student can aim to create something unexpected or unique, 
take something to prepon and make it to aprepes by breaking boundaries and tradition. 
Moreover, it should be the aim of any composition student to create language that can “fall on 
receptive ears and make unexpected sense” thereby “eventually find[ing] its place in the 
audience’s standard linguistic currency” in order to get used on a regular basis, much like any 
other reliable phrase, word, or thought (Poulakos 62). Peter Wayne Moe writes that the 
epideictic, the branch of rhetoric housing language that’s not necessarily argumentative or after 
any kind of decision, has an etymology, epi-deixis, meaning “the rhetoric of showing forth, of 
display, of demonstration, of making known, of shining” (436). Is it this “showing forth” that 
disturbs the student writer? I don’t think there’s a satisfying answer to this question.  
Through Quintilian’s dichotomy of to prepon-to aprepes I have chosen a chain of writers 
that contribute to the continuing conversation about how to bring troping to bear across a 
spectrum of mediums, genres, and occasions. Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian are included first. 
Necessary concessions were made for space, so rhetoricians like Isocrates are not included. Or, 
say, Demosthenes. I’ve tried to follow the letter and spirit of “troping” throughout history, and it 
has lead me to biblical exegesis and medieval musicology. It does turn out that these are more 






1.1 CLASSICAL GREEK AND ROMAN RHETORIC 
 
 
1.1.1 Aristotle, Rhetoric & Poetics 
 
   
For references to troping in Aristotle, it will be best to approach his work split between two 
books: the Rhetoric and the Poetics.  
 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle keeps most of his discussion on style (and thus troping) to book 
three. At 1404b, Aristotle starts immediately by stating that style is “defined as ‘to be clear’ 
[saphe]” and adding that “[t]he poetic style is hardly flat, but it is not appropriate for speech.” 
And here one could state definitively that the lynchpin to Aristotle’s tropology (and arguably his 
whole philosophy) is moderation. Nothing should be too wayward, too foreign, or too familiar. 
To partake in any of these adjectives would be to alienate, confuse, or irritate the listener/reader.  
 The Greek idea of to prepon or “appropriateness” and the middle way or golden mean of 
Aristotle’s overarching philosophy is meant to steer writers, orators, and rhetors away from 
excess or oddness or (intentional) error. The idea that one could capitalize on error after the fact 
doesn’t have a place in Aristotle’s Rhetoric or Poetics, since the author would have logically 
chosen what words would find their way into a composition. And if one made a move that falls 
flat or proves the orator possesses a tin ear, then the rules of correct composition weren’t 
followed.  
 Aristotle makes much of clarity as a virtue in speech, yet also recognizes that “making 
strange” language is worthwhile. But again, what is “elevated” should only be employed when 
appropriate; for example, in verse. Aristotle creates a dichotomy that allows only for artificial or 
natural styles. And orators/writers should, or so he believes, “compose without being noticed.” 
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Being artificial in language, that is, using elevated language, which includes troping, isn’t being 
persuasive. In fact, that kind of language is far from persuasive; it is basically alienating.  
 He writes: “from among these [nouns and verbs] one should use glosses and double 
words and coinages rarely and in a limited number of situations” (1404b7-8), and its usage goes 
straight toward “excess”—which is to say, there are certain pursuits of language that, from the 
start, will put off an audience and prove the orator or writer unrestrained from Aristotle’s 
perspective. This is important to keep in mind, since in a contemporary setting, the kind of 
language that is often considered “outstanding,” “excellent,” or “creative” is that language which 
can often verge on excessive, both in poetry and prose.  
 At 1405a Aristotle delineates between prose and verse: “In speech it is necessary to take 
special pains to the extent that a speech has fewer resources than verse. Metaphor especially has 
clarity and sweetness and strangeness, and its use cannot be learned from someone else.” While 
this may sound heartening to poets and novelists, the question is: What can’t be learned? Use? If 
by “use” Aristotle means the moment in discourse when metaphor is deployed, then one could 
counter with claiming that a judicious amount of reading and observation could remedy this. A 
deep study of kairos, perhaps? But right after at 1406a Aristotle discusses how a number of 
methods can be “frigid.” These methods include compound adjectives, borrowing foreign terms, 
long epithets, and far-fetched metaphors—the latter I find appropriate to call catachresis. About 
these, Aristotle claimed: “These are too poetic.” That is, poeticisms (through figuration) are 
dangerous when brought to prose, as if there was a clear line between what’s called poetry and 
what’s called prose. Although, in antiquity, there was a distinction. The line was one that 
separated speech and writing that was ornamented, rhythmic, patterned, with writing and speech 
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that wasn’t, that was aimed at conveying information rather than something else on top of it or 
alongside it.  
 Then at 1408a Aristotle claims that when lexis (translation) is out of proportion “the 
result seems comedy”—much like Quintilian would claim, to some degree. What one notices is a 
sense of propriety, a need to be serious and say serious things. That is, troping is welcomed if it 
“brings-before-the-eyes” or does well with allotrios, that which is alien (or a metaphor), or made 
strange from the everyday and familiar. To bring-before-the-eyes is Aristotle’s way of 
encouraging striking visuals in the hearer’s or reader’s mind. This produces a pleasurable 
education or a taking-by-surprise in the language. What Aristotle doesn’t seem to approve of is 
the strong poetic sense of certain tropes, since he prefers the smooth communication over the 
overly emotional or poetic. It would be hard to believe that anyone purposely aims for bathos. As 
such, I don’t think troping needs to be framed a dangerous act of crossing the clear lines of non-
ornamented (or less ornamented) speech and writing and poetic speech an writing. Overall, the 
Rhetoric approves of troping but only if done within certain bounds and for certain reasons, i.e. 
with to prepon—a belief that will continue to ripple out through discussions of troping and 
oscillate in unexpected directions. That is, what’s appropriate will change through history, from 
the unornamented to the ornamented with certain conditions.  
 In the Poetics, all discussion of troping is in chapters 20-22 where Aristotle explains the 
diction of poetry. It is a much shorter section, despite being the one place where Aristotle seems 
to believe troping best belongs. The focus is on metaphors, compounds, and strange words, or 
barbarisms, much like in the Rhetoric.  
 Once again, Aristotle instructs the reader to obey the middle way at 1458b: “the rule of 
moderation applies to all the constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even with metaphors, strange 
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words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them improperly and with a view to 
provoking laughter.” Aristotle appears to be more permissive of the poetical in this book than in 
the Rhetoric. This is odd, especially because he repeats much of what was written in the 
Rhetoric; the same examples and the same points. In this way, the Poetics doesn’t add much that 
the Rhetoric hasn’t already established for us, and in a fuller way. There is a sense that Aristotle 
knows and understands the uses and abuses of troping in both books, but will always advise the 
middle way9 as the best for those composing.  
 
1.1.2 Cicero, De Oratore 
 
  
In 55 BCE, Cicero composed De Oratore (On Oration) as a dialogue including Crassus and 
Marcus Antonius among others figures. In book three of the dialogue (sections 149-170), Cicero 
briefly addresses figures and tropes. Cicero hews closely to Aristotle’s basic assumptions about 
tropes. To wit: Be appropriate to the occasion, and do nothing that comes off as too ornate. 
There’s natural language use; and then there’s “terms used metaphorically” and set up in ways 
that aren’t common (sec. 149). For example: “In the case of proper words therefore it is the 
distinction of an orator to avoid what is commonplace and hackneyed and to employ select and 
distinguished terms that seem to have some fullness and sonority in them” (150). Leading up to 
                                            
9 At 2.6.9 of his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle famously declares that what’s in the 
middle is always preferable: “This, then, is how each science produces its product well, by 
focusing on what is intermediate and making the product conform to that. This, indeed, is why 
people regularly comment on well-made products that nothing could be added or subtracted; they 
assume that excess or deficiency ruins a good [result], whereas the mean preserves it. Good 
craftsmen also, we say, focus on what is intermediate when they produce their product.” See also 
book 2 chapter 9 for how attaining the mean is possible, especially in section 2 where he states 
unequivocally, “not everyone, but only one who knows, finds the midpoint in a circle” and thus, 
“getting angry, or giving and spending money, is easy and everyone can do it; but doing it to the 
right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way is no 
longer easy, nor can everyone do it.” 
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tropes themselves, Cicero delineates three main parts of style: “rare words, new coinages, and 
words used metaphorically” (152). This is most reminiscent of Aristotle. Cicero is concerned 
about how these three parts of style find their way into oratory. In poetry, one needn’t worry so 
much (also Aristotelian). Yet there’s a loss of dignity if these tropes are brought to bear in 
oratory/prose.  
 On dealing with tropes directly, especially metaphors, Cicero writes that in a metaphor 
“the meaning we desire to convey is made clear by the resemblance of the thing that we have 
expressed by the word that does not belong. Consequently, metaphors in which you take what 
you have not got from somewhere else are a sort of borrowing…” (156). What’s clear here is 
how, sometimes, it’s necessary to turn to the unknown, the foreign, or the unbelonging, if you 
will, to get across a point. Moreover, he admits that there are moments where our current stable 
of words isn’t satisfying. Well, what of resemblance? 
 In sections 157-158 Cicero, like Aristotle, wants to stick to resembling, to likenesses. But 
the flip-side of all of this is the strangeness of the trope. “To turn”—as in the case of 
metaphors—is to acknowledge that it is possible—and necessary—to get across one’s meaning 
with unlikeness combined with resemblance. I point this out because, to bring in resemblances is 
to move away from identicalness, the one-for-one relationship. As the comparison gets further 
away, the foreignness in the metaphor increases. (Rhetoricians called the most distant of these 
metaphors, catachresis.) There is a fear on the part of the rhetors of letting the language get away 
from them. Or, conversely, there’s a fear of the audience not being capable of following the more 
unique turns of language use.  
 Cicero remarks that, possibly, metaphors are so well-liked and preferred so often because 
one jumps over the obvious word and the commonplace topic to retrieve a new and unusual 
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word. “This [preference] happens, I imagine, either because it is some manifestation of wit to 
jump over such expressions as lie before you, and catch at others from a greater distance; or 
because he who listens is led another way in thought, and yet does not wander from the subject” 
(160). Audiences like that maneuver, Cicero intimates, because they like to work for the 
meanings. There is a welcome stress on the language that makes it seem delightful. There’s also 
a quality of cleverness which haloes metaphors. The making of a metaphor displays the workings 
of the metaphor-maker’s mind. And perhaps from an antique viewpoint, contemporary readers 
are to understand that a catachrestic mind is a mind not worth wondering around? This 
catachrestic quality perhaps leads to Cicero’s dislike of the unseemliness of certain metaphors 
and his encouragement of those which are visual and, like Aristotle says, are a “bringing-before-
the-eye” to the hearer/reader. Regarding harsh metaphors, Cicero advocates a kind of subterfuge 
so “the metaphor ought to have an apologetic air…to look as if it had entered a place that does 
not belong to it with a proper introduction, not taken it by storm, and as if it had come with 
permission, not forced its way in” (165). The reader comes away understanding that troping is in 
need of apologies and caution—to say nothing of subtlety and deceiving cover. This, despite the 
fact that Cicero goes on to say that nothing else adds more to style than metaphor. We come 
away reading Cicero less as a pusher of moderation (compared to Aristotle) than as a 
contextualist, reading the situation for the best approach, casuistically.  
 
1.1.3 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 
 
 
One hundred and fifty years later, Quintilian wrote Institutio Oratoria, one of the core sources of 
rhetorical knowledge for the next millennia. In book 8, chapter 6, Quintilian gives his impression 
of tropes. Tropes are, he writes, “the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper 
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meaning to another” (8.6.1-3). Ostensibly, they are for elucidating content; not for adorning the 
fringes. And while there are tropes that focus on getting the point across while also being flashy, 
there are also those that focus on embellishment over content. Heed the difference, he seems to 
imply. Quintilian takes the view, differing from his predecessors Aristotle and Cicero, that tropes 
aren’t just substituting a word for a word. Rather, a trope can encompass a larger group of words, 
even on a sentence level.  
 His longest discussion of a trope is that of metaphor (8.6.4-13). To him, we use metaphor 
because we believe it may make our “meaning clearer”—but this seems antithetical to, not only 
the previous rhetoricians, but to the popular way metaphor is contemporarily viewed. I’d venture 
that metaphor now is viewed as an obscuring trope, one that is lavish or flashy or indirect. 
Quintilian then gives examples of metaphor and the different kinds, e.g. genus to species; 
animate to inanimate; rational to irrational. He states that “[f]or if it be correctly and 
appropriately applied, it is quite impossible for its effect to be commonplace, mean or 
unpleasing” (8.6.5). This seems to imply that a metaphor can’t fail but that is can only go awry. 
In other words, no metaphor is so bad that it’s absolutely not understandable, but it can be bad 
enough that it makes one grit their teeth or become bored.  
 Again, in sections 14-18, he details mistakes made with metaphor. Don’t use too many in 
a row, or you risk sounding obscure and muddy in your meanings. If you do, you’ll lose your 
audience. You’ll sound enigmatic. Therefore, be proper, appropriate, temperate. (Hear the echoes 
of Aristotle.) There is, again, a giant saddle upon the suggested use of metaphor—keep it reined 
in. Also, what’s allowable for poets isn’t on the menu for prose writers. Quintilian goes so far to 
admit that sometimes poets need metaphors because the meter necessitates it.  
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 In the following sections, Quintilian continues to mention tropes that are best suited for 
poets, including synecdoche, metonymy, antonomasia, onomatopoeia (which he allows is easier 
for Greek than Latin and that, anyway, many of the terms fall out of use), and at 35-36, 
catachresis. Following this, at 37-39 is the mysterious metalepsis. It is “a transition from one 
trope to another.” There is no real explanation to what this may mean. Quintilian seems stymied 
and has this to say: “We need not waste any more time over it. I can see no use in it except, as 
I have already said, in comedy.” But why? He doesn’t say why it’s better suited in that genre. 
What about the move from trope to trope is so well-made for comedy over anything else? 
Perhaps because metalepsis “provides a transition from one trope to another” means more than 
one trope is condensed inside a phrase and can be unpacked. Or perhaps the chain of logic that 
one takes from trope to trope is the kind that spurs surprise. Quintilian gives some credence to 
this in section 44, when discussing allegory. He writes, “for it is novelty and change that please 
in oratory, and what is unexpected always gives special delight.” There is a connection here with 
Cicero who said earlier that the going out of the way for a metaphor was enjoyable.  
 Although Quintilian’s above sentiment is positive and well-taken, mere approval of 
“novelty and change” still sidelines tropes like metalepsis and catachresis that could equally 
surprise the listener or reader.10 There is a tension, or a near contradiction sometimes, in 
Quintilian’s consideration of tropes. For example, in Section 62 while discussing hyperbaton--
                                            
10 Although, there is a moment at 8.2.4-6 where he raises catachresis to a rather high 
status in language use: “there are, in the first place, many things which have no proper term 
either in Greek or Latin. For example, the verb iaculari is specially used in the sense of ‘to throw 
a javelin,’ whereas there is no special verb appropriated to the throwing of a ball or a stake. So, 
too, while lapidare has the obvious meaning of ‘to stone,’ there is no special word to describe 
the throwing of clods or potsherds. Hence abuse or catachresis of words becomes necessary…” 
No doubt Quintilian would state that the necessity is line with propriety, whereas just being 
catachrestic for the sake of the moment is improper. Many centuries later, Vico will take a 
similar stance regarding the creation of language.  
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the inversion of normal syntax--he writes that “if the words were always arranged in their natural 
order and attached each to each just as they occur” our language would be a disappointment and 
ungainly, “despite the fact that there is no real bond of union. Consequently some words require 
to be postponed, others to be anticipated, each being set in its appropriate place.” Even within the 
action of troping, which moves and turns language around, making it strange, odd, and pleasant 
through surprise, it’s telling that there’s still a need, a desire, to keep the chaos in order. This 
shouldn’t be an unusual to read in Quintilian, though, considering that he was highly influenced 




1.2 MEDIEVAL ERA 
 
 
According to biblical scholar and literary critic Northrop Frye, “Above the allegorical level [of 
reading], in the medieval system, is the moral or tropological level, the reading of the Bible that 
takes us past the story into the reordering and redirecting of one’s life. The clearest examples of 
this kind of meaning are probably the parables of Jesus, explicitly fictions, but fictions that end 
with ‘Go, and do thou likewise.’” (229, my emphasis).    
In order to move from Classical and Hellenistic Greece to Pax Romana and then to the 
Medieval era (approx.. 5th to 16th century), it is necessary to follow how the notion of “troping” 
and tropological reading changed from what the Greeks and Latins understood. In other words, 
troping wasn’t merely the use of rhetorical tropes in oratory or written prose. With the rise of 
Christianity in Western Europe throughout the first thousand years, the reading of the Bible (for 
the literate) created, or necessitated, multiple methods of understanding biblical content in more 
than just a literal way. As rhetoric scholar Renato Barilli writes, “The tropes suitable to the 
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Scriptures will be those that stress the parallelism between literal material meaning and spiritual 
meaning (like allegory, enigma, parable)” (42). Troping can also be thought of as tropological 
reading and “can also take the form of literary invention,” writes Ryan McDermott; that is, it is 
“a responsive re-creation of the biblical material in surprisingly original yet recognizable 
renderings” (11). Tropology becomes an interpretative method for the transformation of “words 
into works” (21). And while rhetorical troping is geared toward persuasion and ornament, to say 
nothing of surprise and pleasure through the turns of language use, biblical tropology is meant to 
assist the reader in salvation. It can “draw a moral from something that is not explicitly ethical, 
to enact a translatio by shifting the frame of reference around the object of interpretation” (13). 
This change in the role of troping should create an alarming perspective in how rhetoric can be 
used through application to life. For the Greeks, allegory and metaphor were meant to help rouse 
an audience to an understanding of whatever aim or goal the rhetor desired to see done. For the 
Christians in the Medieval Period, the exact same tropes were used to draw out, interpret, and 
frame ethical actions, and so we’ll need to start with Gregory the Great, who established the 
method of tropological reading. 
 
1.2.1 Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job 
 
 
Gregory the Great, also known as Pope Saint Gregory the First, lived from 540 to 604 AD and 
was one of the most prolific writers of the Catholic Church. Upon the request of Leander, the 
Bishop of Seville, Gregory composed a commentary on the Book of Job, in Latin, Magna 
Moralia. According to Gregory, there were three ways he would read the scripture. During the 
discussion of each chapter and verse, he goes through three readings: the literal, the allegorical, 
and the moral—the last understood here as the tropological, the turning of the trope to action. In 
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the “Letter to Leander” that prefaces the actual commentary on Job, Gregory writes: “to this 
burden that they asked me to assume, they added as well that I should not only search the literal 
words for the allegorical sense but that I should then bend the allegorical sense to the exercise of 
moral action, a more serious obligation still” (49). He confesses that he frequently dispenses with 
the literal reading for the figurative, especially the one reading that will lead to moral action.  
 In the third section of the “Letter” Gregory ties together two competing notions of troping 
in a creative and productive manner. Discussing this methodology, he considers, “Sometimes we 
neglect the exposition of the clear words of sacred history lest we be too long in reaching those 
that are more obscure; sometimes the words cannot be understood literally because taken literally 
they do not produce knowledge in the readers but instead produce error” (51 emphasis added). 
In a chiastic reversal, the literal is taken as erroneous and the figurative as the knowledgeable. 
This move is interesting for the fact that, up to this point in history, many ancient rhetoricians 
espoused moderation in troping, fearing that the auditor or reader would stumble amid mixed 
meanings. Yet, here Gregory the Great advocates for the figurative as a superior method of 
reading: “Obviously, when the words taken literally are inconsistent with one another, they show 
that there is something more in them that must be searched out, as though they said in so many 
words, ‘When you look for us in our outward appearance and we disappear, look for that in us 
that is well ordered and self-consistent and may provide deeper understanding’” (53).  
 In order to fully grasp Gregory’s method, look at an example of his moral/tropological 
reading of Job 1:3, the last line of which is “Yes, Job was the greatest of the Easterners” which 
uses the trope of epithet. The literal meaning of the trope produces error in that it’s clearly 
hyperbole. With what yardstick are we to judge or measure the greatness of Job? Beyond this, we 
have to understand that “Easterners” does not necessarily meaning those who live in the East. As 
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we’ll read below, it’s half-way figurative claim. Those in the East are those who are with the 
godly. But still, reading it literally without these meanings, it is hard for us to see Job as the 
actual greatest without the tone turning into a fairy tale. Thus, it’s hard to read the trope literally. 
So, on the other hand, we read Gregory’s moral interpretation: 
 We too will become the greatest of the Easterners when we become united by means of 
the rays of our discretion, as far as it is possible for us, with the spirits who stay in the 
eastern light, forcing the clouds of fleshly decay to disperse. That is why Paul says, ‘Our 
conversation is in heaven.’ Anyone who goes after the defective things of time is riding 
for a fall, but anyone who desires heaven proves that he lives in the East. He is the 
greatest of the Easterners, not of the Westerners, for his ambitions lie not among the 
deeds of those who seek lowly and passing things but among the choirs of the citizens of 
heaven. (104) 
The reading here encourages a life that steers clear of “fleshly decay” or sins of the flesh, which 
could be any bodily corruption from gluttony to lust to sloth. And it is pivotal for this dissertation 
that even within Gregory’s tropological readings he includes even more troping in his 
explanation. Gregory’s tropological method and lifting up of troping is, I think, the beginning of 
my argument and examples of student writing later on. As if it needs pointed out, this kind of 
reading is distinctly anti-Aristotelian—thus literally a turning point—and goes quite squarely 
against the mean and intermediate in the interpretation of the biblical scriptures. We should note 
that this carries only for biblical scripture and not, say, personal letters or private poetry. It is a 
specific tool for a specific purpose. This tool, though, will unscrew itself from its position and 
escape the toolbox later in history.   
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1.2.2 Saint Bonaventure, Breviloquium (approx. 1257—exact date unknown) 
 
 
Some 600 years later, Saint Bonaventure continued, as a theologian, the multi-tiered reading that 
Gregory established. It is simply a continual uplifting of tropes and troping. Again, oddly, it’s as 
if the Christians in the medieval era flipped the Platonic notion of what’s seen and unseen. 
Whereas the Greeks considered language in its non-tropic form as upright and proper, the 
Christian fathers found literal language not enough, or perhaps unfitting for the grander truths 
hidden underneath. And so what was on the surface, the non-figurative, was passed-by in favor 
of the figurative, the tropic, that which could assist in higher order reality.  
 Breviloquium means “brevity of speech” or “conciseness” and it is considered a 
masterpiece work in Bonaventure’s career; but it’s in the Prologue that he lays out his analysis of 
scripture. In the section titled “The Depth of Holy Scripture” he echoes Gregory the Great’s 
methodology.  
Finally, Scripture has depth, which consists in the multiplicity of its mystical 
understandings. For, besides its literal meaning, in many places it can be interpreted in 
three ways: allegorically, morally, and anagogically. Allegory occurs when by one thing 
is indicated another which is a matter of belief. The tropological or moral understanding 
occurs when, from something done, we learn something else that we should do. The 
anagogical meaning, a kind of "lifting upwards," occurs when we are shown what it is we 
should desire, that is, the eternal happiness of the blessed. (13) 
Interestingly, there’s a metaphor of depth with regards to scripture. There’s a hiddenness or 
shrouded essence in the truth. What this depth-metaphor does, though, is justify, in some sense, 
how important and vital tropes can be for right-living and understanding, not to mention pure 
invention. This is another return to the overall dichotomy of proper and improper. Language, as 
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previously seen, can be beautiful in its own right without a need for turning. But in fact, it is 
here, with Bonaventure, where turning is exactly what’s needed to get the most out of the 
scripture. 
 
1.2.3 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon (1130) 
 
 
In Ivan Illich’s commentary on Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon, he suggests that “Reading, as 
Hugh perceives and interprets it, is an ontologically remedial technique” (11). Reading is 
remedial because it’s a remedy or a curative. And although reading is restorative, there still 
needs to be a way or a guide to get there. Hugh was a philosopher and theologian, and he 
composed Didascalicon as a guide to the divine through the arts. Reading—moreover, reading 
the scriptures—was yet another way toward getting closer to Christ. In book 5, chapter 2 of 
Didascalicon, Hugh offers the same approach that Gregory established before him and Saint 
Bonaventure would continue afterward. Hugh’s reading method follows the triad of  “history, 
allegory, and tropology” (120)—that is, a literal reading, an allegorical reading, and the moral 
reading. Where he differs from the other patristic readings is his reluctance to “over-interpret” or 
see signs where there may be none. It is, in a way, a return to the proper—the Greek to prepon.  
To be sure, all things in the divine utterance must not be wrenched to an interpretation 
such that each of them is held to contain history, allegory, and tropology all at once. Even 
if a triple meaning can appropriately be assigned in many passages, nevertheless it is 
either difficult or impossible to see it everywhere. […] Thus also is honey more pleasing 
because enclosed in the comb, and whatever is sought with greater effort is also found 
with greater desire. (120, emphasis added) 
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Hugh ends with a pithy statement that doesn’t refute his prior sentiment but which at least 
complicates it. He enacts this complication by way of, again, a rhetorical trope: the maxim. Here 
the maxim compresses the difficult work of reading scripture into apiary imagery. The trope 
suggests, and almost delights in, the difficult as the most uplifting; a disposition toward exegesis 
that repeats the depth metaphor. Adding “depth” to “difficulty” leads back to the original debate 
about language as beautiful in and of itself and in need of turning. In this sense, does scripture 
need turning or is it proper just as it is? It should be noted that, quite fittingly, the trope Hugh 
uses, the maxim, itself offers a comment on moral action, if not an outright call for it—which is 
by design in tropological reading.11  
 
1.2.4 “The Ordinary Gloss on Jonah” 
 
 
In biblical terminology, a “gloss” was an exegetical tool for studying the Bible; it was both 
formally and educationally inventive. Glosses started as notes and commentaries by the patristic 
writers. Ryan McDermott’s introduction to his translation of “The Ordinary Gloss on Jonah” 
explains how the “gloss” worked in the medieval period: “As the foremost vehicle for medieval 
exegesis, the Gloss framed biblical narratives for a wide range of vernacular religious literature, 
from Dante’s Divine Comedy to French drama to a Middle English retelling of the Jonah story, 
Patience” (424). A gloss could, depending, contain one, or all, of the three typical readings: the 
literal, the allegorical, and the tropological. In the early 13th century, what’s now known as the 
Glossa Ordinaria was established, being an accepted compiling of commentaries. The following 
commentary on the Book of Jonah is from the Glossa Ordinaria.  
                                            
11 It’s hard not to interpret the beehive image as an analogy for the hard graft that readers 
of biblical scripture will and must endure. But the maxim is designed to have the reader of the 
Bible as the thing or person hunting out the honey from the honeycomb.   
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A direct and clear example of a tropological reading is at Jonah 1:5. “And Jonah went 
down to the inner parts of the ship, and slept with a heavy slumber.” The marginal gloss (the 
commentary printed to surround the scripture) reads as follows for the words “and slept”: 
Tropologically: Many are those who, sailing with Jonah and having their own gods, 
hasten to go to the contemplation of joy, but after Jonah had been caught by lot, and by 
that man’s death the storm of the world was calmed, and peace was restored on the sea, 
then the one God will be adored, and spiritual offerings will be sacrificed, which, 
according to the literal sense, they did not have in the midst of the waves. (429) 
Without diving too deep into interpretation here, one could assume that the moral action to be 
taken from the tropological reading of “and slept” is about “spiritual offerings” and making a 
sacrifice in the absence of having nothing to sacrifice, much as the sailors on the ship. What’s 
even more striking about the whole system of interlinear and marginal commentary is that the 
literary apparatus still exists, to some degree, in current study bibles and in the methods of 
homilies or biblical preaching, wherein a pastor turns scripture into a call for spiritual and moral 
action. In this way, troping is a long and well-established mode of reading in the Christian world.  
 
 
1.3 MEDIEVAL MUSICOLOGY 
 
 
From a biblical method of reading the holy word, tropes and troping move into a Catholic form 
of singing or praising god starting in and around the 8th century.12 Tropes become, 
                                            
 12 Paul Evans, in his article “Some Reflections on the Origin of the Trope” (1961), writes 
that “By the middle of the 11th century, the art of troping in its original sense was for all intents 
and purposes dead” (130), which makes one wonder if the job of the trope—to notify and 
educate—had done its job so thoroughly or so poorly; either way, it was destined to die.  
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compositionally, a section of chant in the Mass, used in conjunction with the Introit, often a 
psalm sung as the priest approaches the altar with the Eucharist. Musicologist Richard Taruskin 
explains that connecting a novel musical theme (the trope) with an established one (the Introit) 
“was by casting the new one as a preface, to amplify and interpret the old one for the benefit of 
contemporary worshipers” (n.p.). What, if anything, is carried over from ancient rhetorical 
notions of troping in the medieval musical version? If troping can continually be thought of as a 
play between proper and improper, then it seems clear the tropus as a musical element is full of 
propriety. Rhetorically, troping, in theory, walked the line between obscurity and clarity, 
propriety and impropriety, whether or not that was actually the case. Yet in the Catholic Mass, 
tropes and troping created conformity and harmony in a sacred setting. This knitting together is 
important for where the troping took place. Taruskin elaborates: 
The primary sites of troping were the antiphons of the Mass proper. Attached most 
characteristically to the Introit, the trope became a comment on the Mass as a whole, as if 
to say, “We are celebrating Mass today, and this is the reason.” …While troping became 
a very widespread practice as the Cluniac reform spread over large areas of France, 
Germany, and northern Italy, the individual tropes were a more local and discretionary 
genre than the canonical chant. A given antiphon can be found with many different 
prefaces in various sources, reflecting local liturgical customs. (n.p.) 
What’s telling about the needs of the trope is its hyper-local sensibility, especially with respect to 
the liturgy, or the established form of worship. In other words, the necessary orderliness of the 
Introit, the Mass—the whole liturgy, really—also came to turn on the few words of the trope that 
daily kept the Mass a living and local event. The trope becomes a pragmatic compositional act, 
one that performed a complex of aims: to inform, to create pleasure, to aid in worship, to be a 
 47 
reminder or liturgical calendar, and so on. What should be clear from the musicological 
definition of the trope is that it was an autonomous piece of writing that prefaced an existing 
piece to help build onto and off of it. Thus, the need for a harmonious interaction in melody and 
word. That tropes were dependent on prior existing work in order to come into being would 




1.4 HIGH MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN 
 
 
1.4.1 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova (1210) 
 
 
Not much is known about Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s life. What is extant of his writing is the Poetria 
Nova, a medieval guide to the arts of poetry. He approaches troping positively and eagerly, and 
while working through the “Ornaments of Style,” he claims that the adornment of language has 
two sides: internal and external. According to Vinsauf, “First examine the mind of a word, and 
only then its face; do not trust the adornment of its face alone. If internal ornament is not in 
harmony with external, a sense of propriety is lacking” (42). Before looking into his notion of 
propriety, note his use of tropes. Both metaphor (“mind of a word”) and catachresis (“face [of a 
word]”) appear. I label the phrase “face [of a word]” as catachresis because while a word can’t 
have a mind or “an inside,” a word is, for all intents and purposes, a symbol and a surface; 
although the phrase can also be seen as a metaphor, of course, but in this instance, Vinsauf’s 
referring, not to graphology, but to the initial meaning of the word. That’s why “face” seems 
more of a stretch. Also, catachresis is where metaphor is employed to give a label to something 
that doesn’t yet have one. In this case, a word has an immediate impression upon a person—“a 
face”—but it would be harder to say just exactly what the “mind” of a word is. It may be difficult 
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to understand a phrase like “the mind of a word,” so metaphorically rich in itself. But Vinsauf’s 
use of “inside” and “outside” could be substituted as the equivalent terms for “mind” and “face.” 
In his method, he is much like Aristotle—proposing the dichotomy of propriety vs. 
impropriety.13 Yet it may be hard to reconcile Vinsauf’s acknowledgment of a classical sense of 
propriety while simultaneously pushing the boundary of that propriety in the “mind” metaphor. 
Which is to say that Vinsauf is one of the few grammarians/rhetoricians who’s been so free in 
dropping-in tropes while explaining them.14 His tropes aren’t merely mentioned as examples but 
used with the aim of harnessing explanatory power. Here’s another example in his description of 
metaphor: “When you transpose a word whose literal meaning is proper to man, it affords greater 
pleasure, since it comes from what is your own. Such a metaphor serves you as a mirror, for you 
see yourself in it and recognize your own sheep in another’s field” (44, my emphasis). Why is 
this important? Because to have propriety is to have a sense of context, audience, setting, and 
where else could one feel free to trope than in a discussion of tropes? Yet, this isn’t an frequent 
habit in grammars and rhetorics of the medieval period, to say nothing of the classical era. The 
tendency is to keep impropriety—an outgoingness and ultra-ornamental quality—hidden or 
reigned in. Leave the flash to the poets, as it were.  
In a subsection titled “Difficult Ornament,” Vinsauf proceeds through examples of ten 
tropes15, offering his own examples of the tropes as used. The first is metaphor. In using what’s 
non-human to describe a human, he suggests this: “When I see what that object’s proper vesture 
is, in the aspect similar to man’s, I borrow it, and fashion for myself a new garment in place of 
                                            
13 E.g. while discussing the craft of metaphor, Vinsauf writes it is to be “ready visible to 
the mind’s eye” (45-46), an echo of Aristotle’s injunction, including the latter’s belief in the 
inspired talent needed to fashion a metaphor.  
14 As noted by Marjorie Curry Woods in Rhetoric as Pedagogy, pg. 74.  
15 Metaphor, onomatopoeia, antonomasia, allegory, metonymy, hyperbole, synecdoche, 
catachresis, hyperbaton, and anastrophe. All of which are usual suspects in discussions of tropes.   
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the old” (43). In other words, Vinsauf is definitely of a prescriptive metaphoric model: there are 
proper and improper ways to fashion them and understand them. He’s often giving examples to 
the reader to guide them. So perhaps what at first blush seemed improper is actually quite proper, 
seeing that the Poetria Nova can be considered a pedagogical setting. And while his outlook on 
troping is overwhelmingly positive, his explanation for it focuses on otherness and foreignness. 
He does this, again, with more metaphors: “if a word is old, be its physician and give to the old 
new vigour…Let it avoid its natural location, travel about elsewhere…There let it stay as a novel 
guest, and give pleasure by its very strangeness” (43). The idea that a word is a traveler and can 
find places—topoi—that see it as strange and odd, pre-dates what later will be called by the 
Russian Formalists “defamiliarization” or “enstrangement” (and with a little stretching, 
catachresis). But Vinsauf also calls the old word “a guest” and so guests leave at some point. His 
controlling metaphor of travel indicates that there’s a coming and going or foreign or odd words.  
And despite his encouragement of troping both in treatise and in the writing of the 
treatise, Vinsauf is set against obscurity or layering: “Yet be weighty in such a manner that your 
subject is not hidden under a cloud…Words are instruments to unlock the closed mind; they are 
keys, as it were, of the mind. One who seeks to open what is closed does not set out to draw a 
cloud over his words” (54).16 He goes on to warn writers and speakers about being too lofty or 
recondite in their speech and word choice. It’s recommended to back down from erudite displays 
of wordsmithing. “Be of average, not lofty, eloquence,” he says. “The precept of the ancients is  
                                            
16 I would offer that being “weighty” and thus “hidden under a cloud” is a mixed 
metaphor at worst, and at best, catachresis. One would think that in order to be hidden in a cloud, 
the words would need lightness in their manner.  
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clear: speak as the many, think as the few” (55). Vinsauf even gives solace to those enthusiastic 
verbalists who are desperate to show off (much like Vinsauf himself…).  
You may be a genius, he concedes lamentingly, but don’t flaunt it.   
 
1.4.2 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (1589) 
 
 
In the third book and first chapter of Puttenham’s handbook The Arte of English Poesie, wherein 
style—what he calls “exornation”—is explored, he proclaims it should “delight and allure as 
well the mind as the ear of the hearers with a certain novelty and strange manner of conveyance, 
disguising it no little from the ordinary and accustomed” (149). Puttenham lines up with, say, 
Vinsauf three and a half centuries before, by suggesting a “strange manner of conveyance” for 
ornament and troping. Novelty and strangeness become keywords for these kinds of rhetorical 
handbooks, but not the kind of novelty or strangeness often thought of today. Even in the realm 
of “the strange” propriety still takes hold; for example, Puttenham, using similes, writes that 
troping makes up “the flowers as it were and colours that a Poet setteth upon his language of art, 
as the embroiderer doth his stone and pearl, or passements of gold upon the stuff of a Princely 
garment” (150)—and he goes on to describe how using the art of poetry—figures and tropes—is 
to be done in a temperate manner, because if not, it would be like a woman applying lipstick to 
her forehead or chin instead of her lips, and she’d look ridiculous.  
Once again, there’s deep seated need to make thoughts and speech even, just, 
harmonious; in short: Aristotelian. It appears the whole idea is not to scare or wobble or provoke 
the reader. The idea is to keep some kind of steady keel for them. Which isn’t bad, necessarily. 
But it’s interesting in that one may retroactively ask these rhetoricians: Who’s to say what is 
moderate and what isn’t? The writer? The reader? The critic? Moreover, what if you don’t want 
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to stay even or calm in troping? If we consider that Puttenham died in 1590, and that 
Shakespeare began to write his first play The Two Gentlemen of Verona sometime between 1589 
and the first years of the next decade, we would be hard pressed to say that some of the most 
read and watched writers in England obeyed this balanced approach. Further, we may safely 
assume that Shakespeare was familiar with the Arte and, if so, didn’t necessarily abide by the 
suggestions laid out therein. So the answer to “Who’s to say what is moderate and what isn’t?” is 
everyone—the writer, the audience, the language, everything working together.  
In chapter two, which is exhaustively titled “How our writing and speeches public ought 
to be figurative and if they be not do greatly disgrace the cause and purpose of the speaker and 
writer”, Puttenham tells us that figuration/troping is necessary because it’s in writing and public 
speeches and is necessary to differentiate from “ordinary talke” (151). He then relates a story 
about a “Knight of Yorkshire” who ends up in Parliament, and while a smart and upstanding 
gentleman, spoke “an alehouse tale” in front of the Queen during an assembly. Puttenham goes 
on to say that this is unfortunate, since his position in Parliament required him to know how to 
speak publicly. And while he was still a Knight, and good and fine, etc., he still had a clear need 
of figurative speech; that is, for Puttenham, speaking eloquently and cunningly cannot be done 
without figuration (152). 
Puttenham critiques figures and tropes having a duplicitous and wily way about them. 
They can trick judges in court. But if a pleader is using them to make a case, then they are 
acceptable. But then he veers toward moderation again, and by way of an astute and precise 
knowledge of audience, he claims, one can “keep[ ] measure” with figures and “cannot lightly do 
amiss” should the speaker possess “special regard to all circumstances of the person, place, time, 
cause and purpose he hath in hand” (167); if someone possess all this correct orientation, then 
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they can steer the improper parts of rhetoric into the properly artful. By this point in history, 
regarding troping, especially with Puttenham, there is a sense that the action/art of troping is 
working best if in the hands of a sociable and knowledgeable person, one who has a hold on the 
ways the world works. Cosmopolitanism and urbanity are the required traits of the one who 
would trope well and trope for greatest effect. This may be because in order to turn anything in 
your direction, for your own fortunes, you need to have the widest vision of the world. But then, 
this doesn’t help explain how an untraveled glover’s son from Stratford changed the future of the 
English language for centuries to come. 
 
1.4.3 Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593) 
 
 
Defining tropes, Peacham calls them “an artificall alteration of a word, or a sentence, from the 
proper and natural signification to another not proper, but yet nigh, and likely” (n.p.). Peacham 
doesn’t stray too far from most traditional notions of troping and style. And I’ll just give one 
longer quotation to show an example of how excessively middle-of-the-road he is when speaking 
of troping.   
This excellent Art of translating [i.e. troping], among other profitable rules commendeth 
to us this necessarie observation to begin with, that is to say, that those things ought to be 
equal in proportion, which we purpose to compare by translation, that is, of foure things 
two ought always to be compared to two, as for example, we say the flower of age, here 
in this translation the herbe and the flower is compared to man and his youth, for the 
same that the flower is in the herbe, the same is youth in man. By the same proportion the 
Poet saith, unhappy Dido enflamed is, in this example Dido and her love is compared to 
the wood and the fire. (n.p.) 
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This almost burdens troping with a mathematical obligation by creating a one-for-one lock-and-
key procedural system. Yet, what this kind of notion points toward is a conception of troping as 
a reversible activity. Why reversible? Because if a poet or writer can trope their way into a 
pleasing phrase, then it’s the reader’s job—after enjoying the ornament—to untrope the trope 
and read the “actual” or “true” meaning. To find a way out of it. Troping, especially here with 
Peacham, is taught as a way to enthusiastically keep readers from falling asleep or staying 
aurally tickled—in short: it’s brain candy. And like candies or sweets, it’s to be taken in 
moderation for fear of rotting the mental teeth.  
 
1.4.4 Giambattista Vico, The New Science 
 
 
Giambattista Vico, a major figure of Enlightenment rhetoric and philosophy, is known primarily 
for The New Science. This book, Vico’s deals with philosophy, history, sociology, rhetoric, and 
(in a nascent form) anthropology. Vico argues for a cyclical movement in human civilizations 
from poetic and theologically based societies, to those establishing law, order, and rationality. 
The New Science meant to counteract the then dominant Cartesian strain of rationality. Vico’s 
goal aimed at carving out a space for what couldn’t be pinned down and mathematized. With 
regard to language, Vico believed it was essential to developing societies and was a (Kenneth) 
Burkean pre-cursor, in that he made central to rhetoric the four tropes of metaphor, synecdoche, 
metonymy, and irony. (His highlighting of these tropes not only influenced Kenneth Burke, but 
also much later, Harold Bloom.)17 In the section “The Poetic Logic,” Vico contends that “All the 
                                            
17 In A Map of Misreading, Bloom writes that “Vico’s poetic logic charmingly associates 
tropes with…necessary errors” (94). I agree. In fact, the whole dissertation could be seen in a 
Vichian light—that tropes themselves are errors, or instigated impropriety, and that the misfit 
tropes are troping Vico’s origins of tropes. Bloom’s playing up of metalepsis deflates this a bit. 
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first tropes are corollaries of [a] poetic logic” (116). For Vico, poetic logic was an extension of a 
poetic metaphysics, a whole way of seeing and living, wherein the earliest sophisticated human 
cultures gave attribution of worldly matters to unseen forces (prior to a development of 
systematized rationality or empiricism). So, for example, “the first poets attributed to bodies the 
being of animate substances, with capacities measured by their own, namely sense and passion, 
and in this way made fables of them. Thus every metaphor so formed is a fable in brief”—and so 
when the “theological poets” of pre-literate days spoke, they “denot[ed] all flowers…by Flora, 
and all fruits by Pomona” (116, 115). These were moves that condensed imagery and explanation 
into an informative and linguistic short-cut. And, as Vico writes:  
From all this it follows that all the tropes (and they are all reducible to the four types 
above discussed [i.e. metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, irony]), which have hitherto 
been considered ingenious inventions of writers, were necessary modes of expression of 
all the first poetic nations, and had originally their full native propriety. But these 
expressions of the first nations later became figurative when, with the further 
development of the human mind, words were invented which signified abstract forms or 
genera comprising their species or relating parts with their wholes. And here begins the 
overthrow of two common errors of the grammarians: that prose speech is proper speech, 
and poetic speech improper…(118)  
It’s hard to overstate the last sentiment. But it would make sense, as seen through Vico’s thesis, 
that grammarians (or philosopher, historians, mathematicians, rationalists of any stripe, etc.) 
would claim that poetic speech—and by extension tropes—isn’t appropriate or worthy or useful. 
                                                                                                                                            
Although, he still recognizes that, as a trope, metalepsis is a vital component of poetic invention. 
Point being, what I’m pointing at is how, while tropes are necessary mistakes, to some degree, 
there are still a sub-set of tropes that are over and against the original impropriety. They are, I 
suppose, properly improper.  
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As we saw with Gregory the Great, troping is creative for a way toward making “clear” what one 
thinks and writes and is creative for conceptual thoughts, though not just in a creative writing 
kind of way. Tropes aren’t just ornamentation here. They are effective and necessary for getting 
right what one is thinking and trying to communicate. 
 
 
1.5 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE & TWENTIETH CENTURY CRITICISM 
 
 
1.5.1 Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 
Barilli writes that in the nineteenth century the avant-garde writers like Charles Baudelaire, 
Stéphane Mallarmé, and Paul Valéry started to “reject the generic notion of poetic diction, and 
therefore somehow help bring about the divorce of poetry from rhetoric” and, more importantly, 
they dispensed with “transparency of language and reintroduce[d] the idea of its opacity” (110). 
This reversal “emphasiz[es] language, which will shake rhetoric from its fixed routine and force 
it to rethink tropes and schemes”—a move that carries momentum into the work of their 
contemporary Friedrich Nietzsche (110). It was toward the end of the century that Nietzsche 
drove a decisive wedge between the notions of tropes as misfit, overstepping propriety, and 
tropes as a way forward into a new way of speaking or thinking; this is especially germane where 
the most aberrant (or shocking) error in language can be capitalized on and accepted. For 
Nietzsche troping formed a drive in the human, one of many. And this “drive-to-metaphor” will 
continue to pump and push forward in blind creative fashion even though the new tropings and 
metaphors the drive builds will eventually turn solid and into “a regular and rigid new 
world…built up…as a prison fortress” (254). Meaning, every new verbal strangeness, however 
formed, is destined to become banal.  
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 With Nietzsche, one should abandon literal notions that there’s a “mind of a word,” that 
there’s any literal depth or height to a language or a word. Shed the Platonic view of things in 
favor of the rhetorical one. In his notes for a university course on rhetoric, Nietzsche says, All 
language is troping and figuration. And in the marketplace of linguistic ideas, what works or 
doesn’t work is in the hands of the language user, what Nietzsche calls “the individual speech 
artist”: “but [language] is determined by the fact that the taste of the many makes choices. Only 
very few individuals utter schemata [figures] whose virtus [virtue, worth] becomes a guide for 
the many” (25). These utterers represent artists—or even those who may fall backwards into a 
figure: the kairotic student, the inspired politician or teacher, etc.—who coin or craft newer 
words and phrases and in newer ways. Though their creations are under judgment from “the 
many,” by a process Nietzsche isn’t clear on, there’s still the lifecycle of troping. “If [the figures] 
do not prevail, then everyone appeals to the common usus [use, practice] in their regard, and 
speaks of barbarism and solecism. A figure which finds no buyer becomes an error. An error 
which is accepted by some usus or other becomes a figure” (25). Nietzsche’s most fascinating 
point here is how those who take on new figures risk loss. Caveat emptor, it seems.18 To bring 
forth new language in a trusted setting—to risk impropriety in society, whether immediate or 
wide-ranging—is to test the limits of to prepon. Perhaps to test to prepon with the hope of 
bending or breaking it.  
                                            
18 Arthur Danto argues that Nietzsche’s theories on language use and error becoming 
figures is much more philosophically and psychologically significant for societies: “Deviant 
speech and deviant experiences are dangerous in two distinct ways. They are dangerous to 
society insofar as they pose any threat to the conceptual scheme so long ago worked out, so easy 
and so comfortable, with which we have housed ourselves in the shifting world” (41). To create 
new speech is to suggest a new way to think, which threatens the status quo, and thus threatens 
the utterer’s future place in society.   
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These lecture notes prefigure, as it were, Nietzsche’s more famous essay on language, 
“On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense” wherein he proposes a yet more bolstered, and 
poetic, account of just how arbitrary and groundless language is. The most famous passage 
begins with the question, “What is truth?” Nietzsche’s answer is as follows: 
a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human 
relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, and 
after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. Truths are illusions about 
which it has been forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory 
impact, coins which have lost their image and now can be used only as metal, and no 
longer as coins. (250) 
To justifiably unpack this passage could take hundreds of pages, but suffice it to say that 
Nietzsche’s outlook on truth is based around language—and language is an ever-shifting 
construction of the human animal who began to communicate millennia ago through poetic 
language and which, over time, slowly lost its poetry and metaphoricity and then died, becoming 
what one understands as literal phrases. The same goes for concepts as made up of language. 
And if language is considered true, and concepts built with language are true, then where are 
language users, he seems to imply?  
Nietzsche calls these initial poetic utterances “the mass of images that originally gushed 
forth as hot magma out of the primeval faculty of human fantasy” (252). Thus, when one literally 
says the phrases “the face of a mountain” or “the leg of a table” these once started as metaphors 
but they have now encrusted into literal truth. Nietzsche didn’t find this process dispiriting or 
negative: on the contrary, he found it liberating, especially from limiting philosophies based on 
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Platonic or Kantian thought. Which is to say, if language was built the way he described, then 
there is no noumenal thing-in-itself or an ethereal plane of perfect forms.  
Troping becomes more legitimate at this point because Nietzsche lays out the long 
history of it as the basis of human language. All there had been, has been, and will be is 
figuration and the constant birth and death of odd and erroneous words. “[O]nly insofar as man 
forgets himself as a subject,” Nietzsche writes, “indeed as an artistically creative subject, does 
he live with some calm, security, and consistency”—because to focus on the creation of language 
is to constantly question the notion of truth, which, while “made up” to some extent, is necessary 
for human life (252). Humans need “everyday truth,” “truth-as-lived,” truth in a 
phenomenological sense. And so Nietzsche’s devastating point is that while humans need “calm, 
security, and consistency,” they also need to not forget that they’re “an artistically creative 
subject” that sculpts language to our requirements and desires.  
Humans always make up new words and always have, and so troping and erroring is a 
part of the linguistic process. This isn’t a radical idea or new with Nietzsche—far from it. 
Aristotle knew what was going on but he had to put a governor on speech—which may look 
from our contemporary view like a real and true moderation, but which is actually much more 
restrictive than it needs to be. One could conceivably ask: Is it any wonder that Modernism 
followed on the heels of Nietzsche?19  
                                            
19 Right after Nietzsche came Ferdinand de Saussure and his semiological claim that the 
“sign is arbitrary.” And before Nietzsche’s observations on language, there was Vico, Condillac, 
and Rousseau; there was Percy Bysshe Shelley’s beautiful claims in the Defence of Poetry 
(1821) that “In the infancy of society every author is necessarily a poet, because language itself 
is poetry…Every original language near to its source is in itself the chaos of a cyclic poem” 
(676-677); and finally, there was Nietzsche’s hero, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s claim in “The Poet” 
(1843) that “Every word was once a poem. Every new relation is a new word” (294) and the 
striking claim, “Language is fossil poetry” (296)—a claim that, in four words, can summarize all 
of “On Truth and Lying.”  
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1.5.2 William Empson,  Seven Types of Ambiguity 
 
 
In focusing on the rhetoricity of language, Nietzsche also pointed out the multiple perspectives 
inherent in words—not just from their etymology or their history, but in their different uses 
within a sentence.  
 Fifty-seven years after “On Truth and Lying” was written, British critic William Empson 
presented seven of what he called “ambiguities” in literature, specifically English poetry.20 To 
call Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity a study of “tropes” would be a bit of a stretch. Because 
while ambiguities aren’t classically tropes, they do borrow trope-like qualities. They are device-
like in that they may create ambiguity in grammar, use, or rhythm. For Empson, an ambiguity is 
“any verbal nuance, however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece 
of language” (1).  That is, one can appreciate a verbal confusion in the words and language 
without “sheer misreading”(x), which would instead be a mere solecism. To go over every 
ambiguity here is beyond the scope of this brief historiography, but I do want to highlight one 
example to display Empson’s importance for my arguments later.  
 Empson’s second ambiguity is based in word or word order and “occurs when two or 
more meanings are resolved into one” (48). I draw on his example of Shakespeare, where 
Empson finds an ambiguity in a preposition (“of”) in King Lear.  
   Blasts and fogs upon thee. 
  The untented woundings of a father’s curse, 
  Pierce every sense about thee.   (I. iv. 320.) 
                                            
20 I would argue that these ambiguities, while, naturally, ripest in literature, 
simultaneously exist in ordinary language use. In fact, I find Empson most elucidating when I 
apply the ambiguities to student writing.   
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Empson claims that “The wounds may be cause or effect of the curse uttered by a father; 
independently of this, they may reside in the father or his child” (89, Empson’s emphasis). 
Which is to say, the reader knows the curse belongs to the father, but is it his to mete out or to 
suffer? Is of here meaning “belonging to” or “caused by”? There are multiple readings of the line 
because of the ambiguity of the preposition (and because of whom the curse is from—Lear 
himself, Goneril, Cordelia? and where is it going?), and Empson’s point is that no matter which 
meaning the reader takes—despite the author’s intention—the preposition invites sound, valid 
readings of the curse as apt, no matter the origin or the destination.21  
 This kind of ambiguity does point forward to a trope I’ll discuss in the next chapter, that 
of metalepsis, where one definition explains it as cause and effect swapped. But what makes 
Empson’s ambiguities so persuasive as mechanisms in language, under the umbrella of troping, 
is their ability to force a hesitation in the reader—and by extension, the writer, if they’re aware—
and a reconsideration in the meaning and direction of words that are often skipped over or 









                                            
21 “Further, it is quite unimportant how ambiguity arises...For it is clear in all cases that 
two interpretations are possible, and as far as the written or spoken word is concerned, it is 
equally important for both parties. It is therefore a perfectly futile rule which directs us to 
endeavour, in connexion with this basis, to turn the word in question to suit our own purpose, 
since, if this is feasible, there is no ambiguity. In cases of ambiguity the only questions which 
confront us will be, sometimes which of the two interpretations is most natural, and always 
which interpretation is most equitable, and what was the intention of the person who wrote or 
uttered the words” (sec. 14-15). Quintilian’s take on ambiguity is simpatico with Empson’s, 
except that Empson wouldn’t seem to buy that the best interpretation is the most natural one.  
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1.5.3 Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes” from A Grammar of Motives 
 
 
“Four Master Tropes” is a short appendix in the back of Burke’s A Grammar of Motives. For 
Kenneth Burke, the four master tropes are metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. And 
they are all essential to human motivation and to the communicative structure of human 
language, which is symbolic action. Yet Burke, while never commenting on troping per se, does 
implicitly approve of and find necessary—possibly fundamental?—the actions of troping.  
Using the four master tropes is more than just a rhetorical choice; they appears to be the 
way our lives are filtered. Since each trope represents another action, Burke shows how some of 
the basic methods of language-use are funneled through one of the four. Moreover, he claims 
that in many instances all four of them will, like multiple rivers, reach a confluence and merge. 
The idea being that if you partake in one trope, you are by some degree partaking in another at 
some remove. This isn’t as far-fetched as it may seem, considering that some tropes closely share 
operations.22 Burke also offers literal correspondences to the tropes, like so:  
• Metaphor can be perspective 
• Metonymy can be reduction 
• Synecdoche can be representation 
• Irony can be dialectic    (503) 
For example, the trope of metaphor or perspective, can be shown through Burke’s 
favorite subject: human motivation. Since one can only know about the subject through  “a 
variety of perspectives that we establish [as] a character’s [or subject’s] reality,” one can 
                                            
22 E.g. chiasmus, the reversal of word order, and the cause and effect reversal of 
metalepsis: “Humans created science, but science created humans.” That is an example of one 
sentence taking part in two tropes. And there’s an argument to be made that the second part of 
the sentence is a metaphor.  
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understand something like human motivation in various ways. Thus, it can be understood as 
“conditioned reflexes” or “neurosis” or “the love of God” (504). Which is to say that one can 
only come to a more “complete” understanding of a subject through multiple passes at differing 
perspectives. As the next three chapters plan to show, this has serious implications for the 
contemporary composition student, in particular if they’re aiming to subvert the commonplaces 
of a society, discipline, or a micro-community like a classroom.  
So it’s not necessarily troping in the way that Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian had 
described it; it’s not the eloquent use of rhetorical tropes for the turning of a single word in a 
sentence. As he says, “my primary concern…will be not with their purely figurative usage, but 
with their role in the discovery and description of ‘the truth’” (503). The master tropes are, to 
Burke, ways of getting at reality. This says something larger about troping—that the power 
inherent in the tropes, and how they frame our reality, goes unnoticed by most people when they 
use them, whether knowingly or unknowingly. We should see Burke as taking an important stand 
in rhetorical theory, using tropes (and troping) and social navigation tools and critical methods to 
understand human motivation, speech, and writing.  
 
1.5.4 Angus Fletcher 
 
  
Into the twentieth century, there is no poetry—no writing—without tropes and troping. In his 
book A New Theory for American Poetry, critic Angus Fletcher follows critic John Hollander in 
supporting not mimesis as a creative impetus but troping. Fletcher renders the motivation this 
way, that “poets do not so much imitate the world, as they trope poetic forms. Poems are made 
by troping their own shape, that is, by making a metaphoric or other figural change in some 
previously invented available form” (148). Thus, there is a necessity, or a future, in troping. 
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Literality through figurality (a call back to the tropological readings of Gregory the Great). 
Fletcher explains that writers don’t simply work on or change the topic or “subject” in a poem 
but that “they stretch the form” (148). Why is form more important in this sense than subject? 
Because “[t]he poet…tropes form, but not substance; the latter act comes into play to serve the 
former, more fundamental poetic purpose” (151). This reminds me of Gertrude Stein’s famous 
analysis from “Composition as Explanation”: “Nothing changes from generation to generation 
except the thing seen and that makes a composition” (513). Stein can be understood to mean that 
if a composition, the form, is the thing seen, and as each subsequent generation only sees 
difference in fashion, technology, knowledge, food, and so on, then it would make sense that the 
form, the shape of the thing seen has to trope to keep up with the times. Troping is adaptation 
and tradition in the same package. An acknowledgement of the past in the present.  
In The Topological Imagination, Fletcher continued to investigate “the current linguistic 
conditions for the use of metaphor” (63) and finds that the cultural change from metonymy to 
metaphor in the Renaissance and into the Modern era can be explained by I.A. Richards’s 
analysis of metaphor—that of “the tenor and the vehicle.” Moreover, he points toward Richards 
quoting Hamlet’s use of the word “crawling” to describe himself: “What should such fellows as I 
do crawling / between earth and heaven?” The fact that the English language proliferated so 
much post-Renaissance, says Fletcher, is because Richards’s theory is based on an “antithetical 
troping” of tenor and vehicle. That is, metaphorical transfer, and perhaps troping in general, is 
powerful not just because of the resemblances between objects, but also because of their 
dissimilarities. Fletcher adds that this is due to troping wrenching words about so that “meaning 
acquires a different cognitive shape, a new topology” (66). But what is signally important in his 
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observation is how meaning’s landscape can shift through the displacement of terms through 
troping. And how troping can help redraw the boundaries of well-worn concepts.  
 
1.5.5 Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading 
 
  
Bloom claims two main sources of inspiration for his small treatise on poetic influence: Emerson 
and Nietzsche. It may not come as a surprise to find the latter name because of Nietzsche’s 
opening the way to language as a rhetoricizing element, as mentioned earlier.  
 According to Bloom, there is a specific and processual movement to the creation of 
poetry and literature. He seems to imply that without the revisionary “ratios”—the turning from 
precursors, or troping—that he describes, there literally would be no literary history: “Authentic, 
high literature relies upon troping, a turning away not only from the literal but from prior tropes” 








Each new writer not only will, but must, turn or, more appropriately for Bloom “repress,” the 
past writer’s words (which weigh heavily on the new writer) against themselves and impose a 
variation on the trope with a different trope by following a series of the above ratios. This whole 
activity will happen with mistakes. It will be improper and imperfect. It is also expected and 
accepted.   
To clarify, though, “trope” here can mean both a rhetorical trope, e.g. metaphor or simile, 
or “trope” as an oft-used image or theme or form (if referring back to Fletcher on troping). For 
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example, a common trope of science fiction is “the first contact story.” In student writing, 
depending on the class, a common trope could be a literacy narrative or, oddly enough, (to trope 
a trope) another version of “a first contact” story: that of a relative’s death or a major lifestage 
event. The point here, as opposed to the past explanations of troping seen, is that Bloom’s work 
of troping is conscious and unconscious at the same time that it’s willed. Troping is conscious 
because the new writer is always trying to overcome/overwrite the past; and it’s unconscious in 
that the new new writer represses or unknowingly de-fangs past influences so as to incorporate 
them in an acceptable fashion. Impropriety was risked in troping by the ancient rhetoricians up to 
Nietzsche, when tropes were “carried too far” or in the “wrong way,” but Bloom claims that this 
willfulness is the model for poetic creation.    
a trope is a willing error, a turn from literal meaning in which a word or phrase is used in 
an improper sense, wandering from its rightful place. A trope is therefore a kind of 
falsification because every trope (like every defense, which is similarly a falsification) is 
necessarily an interpretation, and so a mistaking. Put another way, a trope resembles 
those errors about life that Nietzsche says are necessary for life. (93)  
It’s as if, through Nietzsche to Bloom, the fault and vice of certain tropes—or of just troping too 
much—is accepted and made a virtue of language. (A metaleptic move that would’ve been 
familiar to Nietzsche.) Or, it’s not “as if”—it is what Bloom accepts and makes. As opposed to 
the moral and moderate stance that previous thinkers had put forth—(Aristotle’s moderation and 
so on)—Bloom capitalizes on this reversal of values. Troping “defend[s] ultimately against the 
deathly dangers of literal meaning, and more immediately against all other tropes that intervene 
between literal meaning and the fresh opening to discourse,” he writes, which echoes Richard 
Poirier’s claims that troping “frees us from the predetermined meanings” (94).  
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 Later, in A Map of Misreading Bloom writes that “meaning, as difference, rhetorically 
depends upon troping, [and] we can conclude that tropes are defenses, and what they defend 
poems against are tropes in other poems, or even earlier tropes in the very same poems” (75). 
And as if to condemn the tropes and forms of expression to a sacrificial world elsewhere, he 
claims that they “can relate to life, but only after first relating to other figurations” (75). This can 
be read as saying that tropes are, in a way, cannibalistic. That is, in whatever work they find 
themselves in (poetry, high prose, student writing), tropes are necessarily active in reconstituting 
themselves and digesting their previous versions for the future. For Bloom, it seems, tropes are 
endlessly struggling in a push/pull of metabolizing each other or fending each other off.   
 
1.5.6 Paul De Man, Allegories of Reading 
 
 
Turning, literally, to Paul De Man, one faces a controversial literary critic who endorsed 
deconstructionism and tropological readings. With de Man there is a strong emphasis on the 
Nietzschean view of rhetoric-as-tropes (rather than rhetoric-as-persuasion) and the re-imposition 
of rhetorical theory as a method of criticism. For him the “turns” of literature, the figurative 
elements making up the texts (what Bloom claimed as necessary), were to be read 
tropologically—which is to say that, at the bottom of everything, there was always, and always 
will be, rhetoric. Rhetoric as an interactive collection of tropes was seen to prove the instability 
of langauge as a system. This is because “Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up 
vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration” (10, emphasis added). Deconstruction, the 
method embodying this, removes the explicit boundaries between what is traditionally called 
novels, poems, belle lettres, and any other written text. Which is to say, what a text might be 
saying, or trying to say, and what a reader/critic can eventually come away with is always at 
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odds; and so one is left with “referential aberration.” For some, this is a boon, since all texts will 
fall onto a level playing field for the deconstructing critic. (Which makes sense since, both a 
notice posted in a city hall bulletin board and a contemporary lyric poem can both use rhetorical 
tropes or figures in their composition, much as a student in college can along with a professional 
novelist.) Thus, with a returned focus on figurality (and on reading for figurality), it’s no surprise 
that de Man gives over three chapters in Allegories of Reading to Nietzsche and the rhetoricity 
and figural make-up of his philosophical works like The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of 
Morals.   
 For de Man, rhetoric has gained a see-saw reputation in that, on one hand, it’s a 
questionable tool that abets lies, subterfuge, and casuistry; on the other, it’s a shrunken assistant 
to Roman orators and their grammar books (130). Then there are those in the history of 
philosophy and literature--i.e. Nietzsche--that congratulate and applaud the power of rhetoric as 
an epistemological destabilizer. These, and others (viz. Rilke, Proust, Rousseau), he reads with a 
rhetorically astute eye for the tropes that motivate and undermine their work. De Man’s point 
being that tropes and tropological reading is the “fundamental” way of reading (despite there 
being no fundament…). Through rhetoric, and turning tropes, a reader can best, but not finally, 
get at what texts are up to.    
 Via Nietzsche de Man argues that “[c]onsidered as persuasion, rhetoric is performative 
but when considered as a system of tropes, it deconstructs its own performance” (131)—but it 
doesn’t deconstruct for any reason other than tropes are tiny methods, and clear ones too. De 
Man continues in this vein, stating, “Rhetoric is a text in that it allows for two incompatible, 
mutually self-destructive points of view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the 
way of any reading or understanding” (131). And yet, somehow, readers persistently glean 
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meaning and reason from narratives rife with rhetorical tropes! It’s instructive to compare de 
Man’s insistence on “insurmountable obstacles” and “incompatible” perspectives with Empson’s 
ambiguities. At least in Empson there’s a nod toward the rhetorical as a performance and as a 
system of tropes, and a system that works both sides, not for obstinance, but for the layering that 
enriches meaning.  
  What is the propriety level in de Man? It seems nearly non-existent. There is no 
evaluative element here. Every word is almost set to screw (or unscrew) and couple with (or 
decouple) the next, and so on down the line. And perhaps deconstruction goes way too far here 
in de Man. Readers are left to ask whether troping, as the “free play of signifiers” that de Man 
advocates, is a plague or a pleasure upon human consciousness and its rhetorical endeavors. 
 
1.5.7 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse 
 
  
Echoing the tropological elements of de Man is the historian of literary criticism Hayden White, 
specifically in his Tropics of Discourse, where White finds all discourse to be tropological. Thus, 
all methods of trying to source the truth or make sense of history or literature are tropological or 
figurative in nature, and as such, discourse prefigures and figures—or makes up and populates—
the present world, including history, literature, and sociological observations. This is because the 
forms of discourse are more important than the contents of discourse (this is also reminiscent of 
Fletcher’s ideas).   
Speaking specifically about historians and historiography, White claims that “if the 
historian’s aim is to familiarize us with the unfamiliar, he must use figurative, rather than 
technical, language” (94). Why is this the case? Because there is no agreed upon set of terms that 
have been used throughout history that a historian can reliably deploy to “render[ ] the strange 
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familiar,” except that which is figurative, in so far as “[a]ll historical narratives presuppose 
figurative characterizations of the events they purport to represent and explain” (94). Said 
simply: any discourse that claims objectivity is drenched in figuration, and that discourse should 
acknowledge this fact.  
 For White, troping is natural23 and proper—actually, it goes beyond that to being 
ineluctable. Troping changes the improper (or unfamiliar) and makes it proper (familiar), not 
forgetting that the whole process is figurative, not literal. Moreover, our human understanding is 
undergirded by the action of troping and figuration. According to White—who follows Burke’s 
list of master tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony—understanding boils down 
to “rendering the unfamiliar…familiar” and then transferring it to a place “felt to be humanly 
useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by association” (5). That transformation will be 
“tropological in nature” and turns on a “troping that is generally figurative” (5).  
 
 
1.5.8 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey 
 
 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. focuses on Signifyin(g), which can be thought of as a black vernacular 
form of troping in other instances. It comes directly from the Monkey Tales of “Afro-American 
mythic discourse” which star the titular character. In the basic version, the Monkey tells the Lion 
he’s been insulted by the Elephant, and the Lion goes to confront the Elephant. In the ensuing 
misunderstanding, the Elephant beats the Lion who returns to punish the Monkey. The tales 
revolve around the use and misuse of figurative and literal language. From these tales come the 
rhetorical trope of Signifyin(g).  
                                            
23 By “natural” I mean nothing metaphysical, but something like “inherent” or “intuitive.”  
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Gates lays out the history and lineage or Signifyin(g) through a series of readings in 
African-American literature, in novels like Jean Toomer’s Cane, Zora Neale Hurston’s Their 
Eyes Were Watching God, and Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo. The troping is vernacular because 
of the oral history, and because “[f]ree of the white person’s gaze, black people created their own 
unique vernacular structures and relished in the double play that these forms bore to white 
forms” (xxiv). Double-play leads to “double-voic[ing],” the switch-backing, tricking, and 
messing with language that always has a hand in ludic ways. And double-play leads to 
“[r]epetition and revision [which] are fundamental to black artistic forms, from painting and 
sculpture to music and language use” (xxiv). For Gates, revision is specifically “tropological 
revision”: “the manner in which a specific trope is repeated, with differences, between two or 
more texts” (xxv).  
 Signifyin(g) is aimed at indirection and implication and is learned between children--or 
passed between adults to adolescents--as rhymes or linguistic dexterity that can include playful 
insults or shaming, and much else besides (72-75). Gates compares Signifyin(g), which can be 
incredibly hard to define, as an “exceptionally complex system of rhetoric,” something on the 
order of the Ancient Greek paideia (75).24 It is made of black rhetorical figures and figuration, 
and Gates claims that Signifyin(g) itself is a trope-of-tropes and a metaphor for black troping. 
Signifyin(g) also means the use of rhetorical tropes in highly rhetoricized situations; situations 
that are unusually aware of language use and figuration. It also relies on a playing up of the 
signifier against the signified; and, the troping emphasizes the unstated message over the stated 
one. In the Monkey tale, it’s the Lion, tricked by the monkey, who “reads…discourse literally,” 
                                            
24 Gates elaborates on why it’s so difficult: “This difficulty of definition is a direct result 
of the fact that Signifyin(g) is the black term for what in classical European rhetoric are called 
the figures of signification” (81). 
 71 
while the monkey “speaks figuratively” (85). Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, a scholar on signifying, 
elaborates: “the correct semantic…or signification of the utterance cannot be arrived at by a 
consideration of the dictionary meaning of the lexical items involved and the syntactic rules for 
their combination alone” (qtd. in Gates, 85-86). This prefigures Richard Poirier’s statement in 
Poetry & Pragmatism about troping being salutary and the dictionary being no help in trying to 
nail down certain terms constantly troped. So with troping there is no classically stable and 
explicit reference. Not that troping is wholesale relativism, but that it needs and thrives on 
indirect means.  
 Black troping, or Signifyin(g), also maps onto Harold Bloom’s revisionary tropes from 
The Anxiety of Influence, and Gates creates a chart to show how this relationship looks and how 
classical tropes overlay with Bloom’s ratios and the Yoruba or Afro-American equivalents.  
 It should also be noted that not just literature possesses the power of Signifyin(g) or 
troping. Musically, jazz best embodies Gates’s troping and Signifyin(g). It’s a form rife with 
repetition and difference; a form that playfully toys with innovation while knowingly keeping a 
hand on tradition. Gates describes, for example, how Jelly Roll Morton troped on Scott Joplin’s 
“Maple Leaf Rag” (1916) with his own “Maple Leaf Rag (A Transformation)” (1938). The 
rhythm and order is changed just enough that “Morton’s composition does not ‘surpass’ or 
‘destroy’ Joplin’s; it completely extends and tropes figures present in the original” (63). This 
extension is vital in jazz; it’s lifeblood, really. It’s also a key that allows the author/musician to 
work with a rich tradition of material and surprise or pleasantly shock the reader/listening 
audience. This musical extension reaches back to the tropus of the medieval period that 
elaborated or “re-introduced” the introit of the chant. Repetition and variation is the bedrock of 
troping, and troping is the foundation of creative extension. It is also an homage in many 
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instances. Gates asserts that the more “fixed” the text--e.g. “‘April in Paris’ by Charlie Parker, or 
‘My Favorite Things’ by John Coltrane”--the greater and “more dramatic” the Signifyin(g) 







Here at the end I want to return to Paul Butler, whom I quoted at the beginning of the chapter: “It 
is time for composition and rhetoric to take back the study of style—to redefine the way the 
conversation is being framed” (123). The forgoing gaze back at troping’s history is one of these 
(small) steps in redefining the conversation. I turn to Butler again because the next step is 
deconstructing the notion that a plain style—what I construe as the default, house style of 
composition students—is all that’s possible, preferable, or better. A plain style as opposed to a 
style that tropes, a style that I advocate for in his project. In a short section of his entire book Out 
of Style, Butler writes: “much of our discussion of style today stems from beliefs about ‘plain 
style’ that have become part of our popular culture” (53). This discussion also subsumes the way 
students are talked to about style and figurative language. Butler goes on to quote historian 
Kenneth Cmiel, who labels plain style as “a contemporary form of the commonplace…The 
impulse for simple, declarative sentences is strong in twentieth-century culture” (qtd. in Butler 
53). We should expect this impulse to trickle down into education, too. If the style is as 
ubiquitous as Cmiel holds it is, then it would naturally permeate not just journalism, advertising, 
or pop culture, but also schooling. As Butler explains, 
The way that “plain style” became accessible to all is through its notion of a transparent 
correctness. If style is transparent, then the only thing left to be concerned about is 
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correctness, which everyone ostensibly can master. This idea means that the plain style is 
for everyone—not just the elite. (54) 
In contrast to plain style, we’ve seen throughout this chapter that rhetoricians have given varied 
attention and various explanation for figuration and troping. Butler’s above points are well-taken 
if what we see throughout the previous centuries is an instinct to separate out and castigate 
troping as an excess, not an option. But what I’ve shown is that troping has been seen as a way 
for communities and societies in religious orders to keep structure and acknowledge daily 
changes;  it’s been a way to bring a reader’s attention to a spiritual message, or as a way to get 
closer to a deity; we’ve seen troping as a method for artists, poets and musicians, to contribute to 
the greater creative conversation of which their craft takes part. But we’ve also seen it discussed 
as a kind of candy shell on top of “raw language.” Butler’s wider point—and Cmiel’s—is that 
this can’t or doesn’t stand up. The center cannot hold.  
 In his book Motives for Metaphor, James Seitz considers the teaching and reading of 
metaphor and figurative language in the composition classroom, and why so many composition 
textbooks over the past century have downplayed or nearly erased figurative language, leaving 
metaphor as the sole option or example of figuration or troping (30-35). What he finds is that 
students aren’t “encouraged” to enter into the stream of troping or figuration for fear of losing 
the reader’s attention amidst the overabundant imagery and potential failure of the metaphor.  
To close, and to repeat—what I’ve aimed to do with this radically condensed and 
selective historiography is put together, in a form of chronological narrative, a display that tries 
to parse and discuss the various ways troping has taken hold of or been promoted or negotiated 
among disparate genres, thinkers, and disciplines. Not every definition of troping was consonant 
with another. In fact, troping turns out to be unique, in some form or fashion, to each rhetorical 
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generation. Yet what seems evident is that the manner in which troping should be deployed 
changed quite radically around the late eighteenth century with Nietzsche and has only continued 
to return, recursively, to the subject of itself, how it operates, how it means, and why it means. 
From here, I’m going to use this historiography in the subsequent main chapters as a lodestone to 
the ways students approach their writing, within the types of language games they play, and as a 
background to the long history they’re immersed in. I want this chapter to act as a scaffold for 
the reader, as a spinal column that the chapters about misfit tropes can link back to and create 















2.0 WHEN WILL I DELIVER MYSELF FROM MYSELF?; OR, TROPING 
AS METALEPSIS  
“The fact is that every writer creates his own precursors.” 
Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka and His Precursors” 
2.1. INTRODUCTION & ARGUMENT 
In Oscar Wilde’s essay/dialogue “The Critic as Artist,” two aesthetes are discoursing on the role 
of the critic as opposed to that of the artist. Gilbert, Wilde’s stand-in and mouthpiece, tells his 
interlocutor, Ernest, that “the critic as being in his own way [is] as creative as the artist,” wherein 
Ernest replies that he believes all critical work is “purely subjective, whereas the greatest 
[artistic] work is objective always” (1044-45). Gilbert counters that the greatest of artistic 
creations, e.g. Shakespeare’s, are entirely subjective, which means “[Hamlet and Romeo] were 
elements of his nature to which he gave visible form” (1045). Gilbert supports his thesis, too, 
with an apothegm as Wildean as any written: “For out of ourselves we can never pass, nor can 
there be in creation what in the creator was not” (1045).  The key terms in that sentence are 
“creator” and “creation” and they are important for how they turn away from their historical 
meanings.  
Essayist and psychoanalyst Adam Phillips writes of this sentence that “the creator and 
creation here [is] secularizing and parodying what Wilde took to be the increasingly outworn 
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vocabulary of Christianity: Christianity being a language—despite, or because of, his youthful 
flirtation with Catholicism—he found it intermittently more difficult to speak with conviction” 
(13, my emphasis). What’s harder to ignore, knowing the context of Wilde’s religious 
background, is that he finds himself in a constricting situation regarding not just his beliefs but 
his written composition; it’s a situation where the current terms familiar and available to him 
appear stale or stagnant or unforgiving. Yet how did he mobilize those terms (“creator” and 
“creation”) to his needs? Phillips claims Wilde “secularized” and “parodied” them, by turning 
their meanings around and by transplanting them from the past to the present. Of course, those 
terms can’t lose their original meaning entirely, or the whole rhetorical move would be void.  
 Wilde, I would argue, troped what was commonly known or accepted about those words 
and reformed them. Or said a better way: he redefined them. Wilde’s use of Christian language to 
redescribe pagan/artistic modes of being is what’s known rhetorically as metalepsis, or what 
Harold Bloom alternatively calls “metaleptic reversal,” which is when a present writer attempts 
to push aside an earlier writer, “substituting early words for late words” (Map 74).25  In Wilde’s 
case, the earlier terms lose their religious affiliation and are transformed into secular terms. This 
allows Wilde to move ahead in his argument with the terms he desires, wrested from their 
                                            
 25 In a felicitous turn of scholarship, R.J. Williams finds metalepsis (or what he calls 
“metaleptic transfiguration”) figuratively at the heart of Nietzsche’s idea of “eternal recurrence” 
in his article “Metaphysics and Metalepsis in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” Moreover, Williams 
describes Nietzsche’s use of metalepsis “a parody” much as Phillips found Wilde also engaged in 
parody. Williams calls Nietzsche’s outlook on parody (found in The Gay Science) “invention and 
creative imitation”—qualities that I claim troping, writ large, espouses (31). Metalepsis and 
catachresis (discussed in the next chapter) are also analyzed with respect to the New Atheist 
writings of Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins in Wayne 
Glausser’s article “”The Rhetoric of New Atheism.” Glausser’s prime example of metalepsis is 
with Sam Harris’s use of “prayer” in a secular context—again, echoing Phillips’s comments on 
Wilde. 
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original meaning.26 But we must see that Wilde’s (perhaps unconscious) employment of 
metalepsis still takes shape as a form of an argument.  
 In her book Rhetorical Figures in Science, rhetorical scholar Jeanne Fahnestock has 
addressed how figures and tropes work as lines of argument. She claims that it may seem 
unusual, but readers can identify certain figures with “forms of argument or reasons” which 
traditionally were the “topics”—or topoi—of classical rhetorical education (23).27 Moreover, 
Fahnestock’s point is that this action, i.e. the use of argumentative lines, still exists, but that we 
may not be fully aware of it. In fact, we may even shun it.  
When distinguishing among particular lines of argument or topics ceased to be an 
educational goal, it is not surprising that the cognate notion of the figures as epitomes of 
those lines was lost as well. A repertoire of lines of argument is also part of the material 
of rhetoric and of its sister art of practical reasoning, dialectic…[and] listing types of 
arguments and using such a prefabricated, one-size-fits-all list as an inventional resource 
is completely antithetical to contemporary notions of…the spontaneity of invention…For 
someone to say that they are driven or inspired by general topics or lines of argument 
rather than by personal insight…would probably seem absurd to most people. (23-24)  
Note what Fahnestock is saying between the lines: that we can extract from the form of 
figurative language “a line of reasoning” or “a condensed or even diagram-like rendering of the 
relationship among a set of terms” (24).  
                                            
 26 The original terms potentially, or most probably, being tropological in and of 
themselves. And taken tropically, “creator” and “creation” can already be seen to be previous 
tropes that Wilde then tropes on himself, thus living up to the more classical definition of 
metalepsis given by Quintilian, which I explain below. 
 27 Fahnestock focuses on antithesis, incrementum, gradatio, antimetabole, ploche, 
polyptoton, but not on the tropes I’m investigating here: metalepsis, catachresis, and by 
extension, enstrangement. For other interesting work done on figurative language and cognition, 
see Hart; Turner; Lakoff and Johnson. 
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 What we should take away from the example of  Wilde’s terms and from Fahnestock’s 
research is that writing difficulties can be dealt or negotiated with by troping. And in the face of a 
writing problem (nevermind the creative/poetic crisis that Bloom dwells over), student writers 
have at their disposal, whether consciously or not, a rhetorical trope—metalepsis—that can act as 
a lever, a time machine, and form of parody all at once, depending on the context or 
employment. It can act as an argumentative and strategic maneuver.  
 For student writers, metalepsis shows itself most importantly as a means of choosing 
one’s own source of inheritance. Metalepsis makes it seem as if one’s compositional and 
rhetorical choices had always been the lineage one descended from, that “every writer creates his 
own precursor,” as Borges oracularly states at the head of his chapter.  
 
 
2.2 SOME VERSIONS OF METALEPSIS 
 
 
Metalepsis has been given multiple definitions, many of which compete with or confound each 
other.28 But Paul de Man has pointed out that “tropes are transformational systems rather than 
grids” and cannot be expected to, or generally don’t, stay static across time (63 n.8). Quintilian 
explained that metalepsis was meant “to form a kind of intermediate step between the term 
transferred and the thing to which it is transferred, having no meaning in itself, but merely 
providing a transition. It is a trope with which to claim acquaintance, rather than one which we 
are ever likely to require to use” (8.6.38). Quintilian’s “example” (which I find thin) shows how 
the Latin words cano (“to utter melodious notes, to sing, sound, play”) and dico (“to say, tell, 
                                            
 28 Raphael Lyne also underscores the ambiguity in exactly locating where a trope is, and 
recommends looking at the trope in context, since “[d]eciding whether something is catachresis 
or metalepsis can come down to judgment rather than logic” (31-32). This is where I find myself 
often in the delineation of the tropes I’ve chosen. 
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mention”) are linked by a third term canto (“to sing in praise of something, or to recite to 
music”). After this example, metalepsis is quickly dismissed. There is no quotation of past 
literature; there is no example that puts these terms into context. Cano/dico/canto are simply laid 
out to show a transitive relationship and then left alone.  
 Why would this be problematic? Shakespearean scholar Madhavi Menon, discussing the 
trope’s ambiguity, asks: “Is metalepsis that which suppresses or that which is suppressed? […] 
By figuring the relation between words, metalepsis both denies us a face that we can recognize, 
and provides us with a form that continually changes shape. It is the figure of figurality and, in a 
sense, the essence of rhetoric” (74-75, emphasis in original). Keeping the trope's protean nature 
in mind, it's for the purposes of this chapter that I rely on four definitions of metalepsis.  
 (i) Metalepsis is a compounding of multiple rhetorical tropes in one sentence or phrase 
(this version hereafter M1). Both the Oxford English Dictionary and The Handbook to Literature 
offer this definition. The latter authors believe that “metalepsis seems to be the adding of one 
trope or figure to another, along with such extreme compression that the literal sense of the 
statement is eclipsed or reduced to anomaly or nonsense” (Harmon & Holman 307). Since 
Shakespeare is so rich with this kind of rhetorical troping, consider the example I gave my class 
in Spring 2017 from The Winter’s Tale: 
  If I prove honey-mouthed, let my tongue blister,  
  And never to my red-looked anger be  
  The trumpet any more.    (II.2.33-35, my emphasis) 
These lines are spoken by Paulina who’s trying to defend her confidant, the queen, against the 
king’s accusation of adultery. I wouldn’t claim Paulina’s line is nonsense, although it is 
compressed enough that it does take a number of readings to give up a generative parsing. The 
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reductive gist of the line is something like, Let my tongue stop working, if I keep talking so 
persuasively. I’ll point out four tropes and figures in this line. There’s metaphor, where the 
speaker refers to herself as a trumpet (to say nothing of the mixing of metaphors); there’s epithet 
in her description of herself as “honey-mouthed”; then there’s the lesser known apagoresis, 
which is a statement crafted to stop a certain action: here the action being her own talking; and 
finally, cataplexis, which is a threat for ill-doing, also self-directed toward talking. Again, more 
often than not, the more popular tropes and figures will show up in student work, e.g. rhetorical 
questions, hyperbole, simile, personification, etc. But this example should suffice to show how 
M1 operates.  
 (ii) Metalepsis is the reversal of cause and effect, i.e. to have the outcome influence the 
cause (M2). Examples of this would be phrases like “pallid death” or “breakneck speed.” Death 
is what causes a person to be pallid as an effect not the other way around. And the speed at 
which a person moves is the cause of the broken neck. 
 (iii) Following Harold Bloom in A Map of Misreading, metalepsis is the transfiguration 
of an old literary work’s terms within a new (M3), i.e. Wilde’s example above. Bloom states that 
“transumption [the Latin name for metalepsis] murders time, for by troping on a trope, you 
enforce a state of rhetoricity or word-consciousness” (138). As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Bloom draws much of his tropological inspiration29 from Nietzsche and Freud, 
                                            
 29 Bloom has recently written in The Anatomy of Influence (2011) that he’s since stopped 
recommending his sixfold ratios of creative influence anymore due to their being abused. It’s 
interesting that even Harold Bloom realizes how an idea can grow and move beyond the original 
boundaries and escape the creator’s intentions. 
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especially when building metalepsis off the Freudian repression model.30 I will expand past 
simply literary works and show how M3 works in student writing.  
 (iv) And then, to a lesser extent, metalepsis is a narratological move of frame-breaking, 
following Gerard Gennette (M4). According to Gennette’s Narrative Discourse, metalepsis is the 
stepping through the narrative frame from diegetic to extra-diegetic or vice versa. For example, 
when a real-life author mentions to the reader what she plans to do explicitly and directly with 
the characters, or the inverse where the characters plead or communicate with the presumed 
author or reader to engage with them, as in Tristram Shandy or in much of postmodern fiction 
(234-237). Gennette admits the effect is odd and either contributes to a comedic outcome or one 
that edges on fantasy (235); and, that “the most troubling thing about metalepsis indeed lies in 
this unacceptable and insistent hypothesis…that the narrator and his narratees—you and I—
perhaps belong to some narrative” (236). With M4—and this is a key point—the student can 
bring exactly this absurdity and irreverence to the essay. The student can also generate a sense of 
doubt in the reader that what they thought they objectively were reading is now subjectively 







                                            
 30 This Bloomian revision through troping also can be seen on a larger level in how most 
writers work when trying to trope on a trope or renew a trope. E.g. in the fantasy and science 
fiction genres, certain tropes—say, first contact, time travel, discovering a magical ability, etc.—
become places (topoi) of invention, an interesting crossing of place and method. In fact, one 
could argue that F&SF are dependent on new writers overturning and revising the tropes. For 
more, see John Clute. See also the site TV Tropes for a wider application of this idea across 
multiple popular media. (One quickly realizes how mired in tropes we are reading the latter, and 
moreover, that trying to revise a trope is more difficult than it seems.) 
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2.3 STUDENT EXAMPLE ONE 
 
 
This first example exhibits what I’ve called M3 & M4. The assignment was the sixth one of the 
semester, about a month into course called “The Unexamined Life,” wherein we read Plato’s 
Apology, Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day, and essays by the psychoanalyst and 
essayist Adam Phillips. In the sixth week, I wanted them to try and establish a preliminary list of 
key terms for the course, since each semester every class uniquely throws out different concepts 
for us to focus on. Here was the assignment as I gave it to them. 
#6) a. Create a vocabulary—a list of key terms—for this course. Define them in 
the context of the course. 
The responses ranged from traditional essays to straightforward vocabulary lists. The following 
is in a list and mostly written in Twitter format.31 There’s troping going on in the writer’s choice 
of that form, too—but the context here is that the definitions are untraditional in their execution. 
They are more like exempla than dictionary definitions. 
Philosophical - Tweet: Isn’t it crazy how we buy pizzas in circles, cut them into 
triangles, and store them in cardboard squares man? 
Early - Tweet: Sometimes i wake up early and wonder what I’m doing with my 
life. Evolution didn’t have to do work in the morning so why do i? 
Confusing - Tweet:*raises hand* “kyle what do you think the answer is?” *kyle 
answers* “I don’t know, I don’t have the answer or expect anything” 
Mind-altering - Tweet: Maybe Stevens from The Remains of the Day is actually 
the most happy person ever. Deep 
                                            
 31 All student essays in this dissertation will be unchanged from how I received them 
from the student during the original semester. Revisions will be noted as needed. 
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Care - In my writing I care a lot. At least I think it seems like I do. When I speak I 
don’t give a fuck. Why is that? We talk in class about grammar and syntax and 
the use of language and it really seems like in the end none of it actually matters. 
Our ideas get across one way or another. I write to people, or teachers, or friends 
(besides texting which involves no thought) maybe 10-20% of the time. When it 
really boils down, and the solution that is language cools and becomes some gross 
bubble-filled solid, I come off as a some poser liar but in reality I don’t care 
enough. I can talk in class about how I like milk or how some people add ketchup 
to jello, but in my writing I feel like I take myself too seriously. Apart from the 
occasional use of parentheses or expletive seen above, my writing does not reflect 
who I am and what my opinions truly are. Even here in this very paragraph I’m 
coming off as too serious or careful. I feel like at least here in this paragraph I’m 
moving closer towards actually expressing myself, but as you would say this is a 
“dad lesson” and there is no way I am a dad. I am not responsible enough and I 
don’t like kids. 
The first four are clearly sarcastic. While I feel the terms chosen were done in earnest, the 
exempla written for them is back-handed, which says more about how the student views the 
terms; he severely questioned them and their use in class. The first and the fourth tweet are 
mocking and flip in attitude. Not all that unusual for some freshmen composition essays (and a 
tone I often encourage, if done well). In the third tweet, I am called out specifically, which is the 
first instance of M4 in his piece. And the term I’m named under is telling, i.e. “Confusing.” 
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  Confusing - Tweet:*raises hand* “kyle what do you think the answer is?”   
  *kyle answers* “I don’t know, I don’t have the answer or expect    
  anything” 
I’m being held accountable through mock dialogue; the character of me is quite nihilistic. This is 
more properly a caricature of me, because I had asked the class questions that I didn’t know the 
answers to (a typical pedagogical move of mine). The kind of give and take above was getting 
tiring to someone who just wanted to hear a solid and stable answer. In a way, this entry solves 
the “confusion” problem, because the student definitively solves the issue by placing it on me, or 
at least setting it back at my feet. But the writing problem isn’t just confusion. This student was 
direct and biting in his critique of me, and, by extension, his classmates (unless the voices in the 
entries are his own). Trying to create a set of terms to be guided by or work by is difficult, and I 
think this student’s main problem arrives in the last entry titled “Care” where he’s sussing out 
what these terms mean.  
 “Care” is a small essaylette in itself. It could be taken as a representative expression of 
many freshmen level writers I’ve taught while at the University of Pittsburgh. M4 continues here 
and, while my name doesn’t show up in this one, it’s more of a direct address from outside the 
confines of the typical essay by falling into second person—“but as you would say.” This is not 
the kind of second person point of view generally employed by students where they want to 
ingratiate themselves with the potential reader, e.g. “Imagine if someone offered you a millions 
dollars, you probably wouldn’t say no,” etc. The student turns to M4 at the end of “Care” after a 
long build up of self-analysis into his writing-speech habits, and again makes me complicit in 
what appears to be his inability to “properly” express himself or show a true self. He claims that 
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what he’s getting to in the end isn’t actually his. Which leads me to ask: If it isn’t his, then whose 
is it?  
Apart from the occasional use of parentheses or expletive seen above, my writing does 
not reflect who I am and what my opinions truly are. Even here in this very paragraph 
I’m coming off as too serious or careful. I feel like at least here in this paragraph I’m 
moving closer towards actually expressing myself 
The student is flinging himself into opposite directions in each sentence, trying to settle on where 
to be. At first, the very writing we’re reading isn’t even him. Then, in the next sentence, we 
receive confirmation—through a practical and formal analysis of his writing—on how this 
writing isn’t his. Then there’s reversal (or a paradox), and the writing (in the paragraph, at least, 
the whole “Care” essaylette) is now edging towards a successful expression. So which is it? Is he 
writing well or is it a horrible failure? Or is it both? (I’m put in mind of the Cretan paradox as I 
read “Care.”) It would be too easy to say this kind of frame-breaking tries to overcome the 
audience problem, i.e. the issue in freshmen writing where there’s no immediate audience to 
address or convene with. Instead, the student’s troping with M4 allows him to get out from under 
the issue of writing these key term entries with any kind of formal rigorousness.32 In both cases, 
the student yokes me onto the situation as a cause and an effect. I instigate the confusion and also 
am confused by the whole class’s work/entries. The student proleptically tries to cut his own legs 
out from under himself before anyone else can.33  
 And all of this comes before the “dad lesson” comment. To put this into context, I’d been 
telling the class that the typical pat endings to many student essays can sound like “dad lessons,” 
or easily received pieces of folk wisdom or common tropes seen at the end of sitcoms where the 
                                            
 32 I still think the entry is rigorous, just not in the way I expected. 
 33 This is itself a rhetorical trope called anesis. 
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father kneels down and explains the simplistic moral lesson to his kids in a few lines. “Once I 
was blind but now I see” kind of conclusions. The struggle for the class was not to end that way. 
And one method not to do that was to point right at me, the teacher, and thumb the nose by 
redefining my terms. So the student anticipates a comment from me about the entry being a “dad 
lesson” and subverts the term, edging on another version of metalepsis, M3. Even if the ending is 
a “dad lesson,” the student turns the term and drains it of meaning by ending with the 
impossibility of him being a dad because “I am not responsible enough and I don’t like kids.”34  
Another angle of the writing problem here is a frustration in trying to get around me, in trying to 
say something that makes sense of how he sees himself as a language user within and without 
my purview. “Dad lesson” is flipped on its head and made to be less pejorative. Since he feels 
it’s almost impossible to escape my criticism, the student redefines himself as a non-dad. Thus, a 
“dad lesson” can now be a classificatory term that can be used without entailing him within it.  
 Now, it could be easy to dismiss this essay as the product of a student who’s simply 
pissed-off or frustrated and evading the work—and I’d be willing to entertain arguments in that 
direction—but I can’t ultimately read it that way. These are serious key term entries and attempts 
at trying to make sense of the class.  
 So what’s the writing problem trying to be negotiated here? It is anagnorisis; or, more 
properly the avoidance of anagnorisis.35 We can call anagnorisis Recognition or the Reveal or 
Discovery. The term is found in Aristotle’s Poetics 1452a (chapter 11), where he states, “A 
                                            
 34 A whole essay could be written on how this student defines “father” based off this 
sentence. 
 35 See Johnstone, MacFarlane, and Cave. But Piero Boitani gives a thorough rendering of 
anagnorisis through early Christian times into the Medieval times in his The Tragic and the 
Sublime in Medieval Literature. It’s also worth mentioning how anagnorisis links up with literary 
epiphany in student writing and how the misfit tropes under discussion in this dissertation help 
avoid the classical epiphany for epiphany’s sake.  
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Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either 
love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil fortune.” Later, in subsequent chapters, 
he states that Recognition (anagnorisis) is a quality of a complex dramatic structure and that 
there are multiple kinds ranging from less artful to more artful. The point is that the anagnorisis 
is a result of a necessary change in the characters of tragedy. I would argue that students 
similarly are compelled to end decisively and to discover change in themselves no matter what 
the assignment tends to be (I address this further in the Conclusion). In an Aristotelian tragedy, 
the story is over when a character realizes her true identity, e.g. Oedipus discovers he is his 
wife’s son, etc. But teachers are not often requesting or demanding these dramatic “self-
realizations” from student writing. Few to none of my assignments ask for students to excavate 
their essences in an existential mode. If the general student drive is toward unmasking and 
realizing all the time (and a good question to ask is where that drive originates), inquiry is no 
doubt hard to engage in. It will be maddening for the writer trying to compose a list of key terms. 
What’s bothersome about anagnorisis is the inclusion of the ending—the immediate signal for 
conclusion where the end of the essay means closure. Or worse—insight.36 In the article “The 
Dogma of Transformation,” Thomas Newkirk shows how a batch of student essays from the 
1930s written at the University of New Hampshire inhabit the mindset and style of a flaneur, one 
who’s dispassionately recording the world around them without passing any kind of judgment or 
conclusions by arriving at clichéd moralizing. In one example, Newkirk writes that “There is a 
thoroughgoing ‘gentleness’…no sharp edges, no revelations or reversal, nothing uncomfortable 
or controversial, no generational tension” (259).  
                                            
 36 I could include a whole section here on how literary epiphany has transferred from 
short fiction in the early 20th c. to the popular media of the late 20th and 21st and has now 
become a trope/topos of composition. 
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 In essays like my student’s above, the format is treated like a math equation. It is treated 
linearly. They are searching for a decisive and cumulative solution instead of establishing a 
stopping point. Situations like this are struggles to Have Things Add Up. M3 is the initial attempt 
to avoid the “dad lesson,” but does the final statement successfully avoid anything? At what 
cost? In his drive to avoid anagnorisis, the student forgets the class and the class’s collective 
project to create key terms that speak back to them and help them map out their actions and 
thoughts. Instead, the student goes headlong into the validity of his writing, all the while 
attempting to avoid coming to the end. Anagnorisis is a “cessation of turbulence” according to 
historian of ancient rhetoric Henry Johnstone (7). This makes sense if we reread the “Care” 
essaylette. The whole thing from front to back is a swirl of aggressive and energetic thought. The 
metaleptic turn at the end cuts the power on all of the energy and stops the “turbulence.” 
Johnstone goes on to write that “Anagnorisis is essential to the seriousness of a 
tragedy…[because] a false anagnorisis could only be the recognition of a false enmity” (7, 
emphasis in original). This is because, according to Aristotle, anagnorisis either leads to 
friendship or enmity, where “enmity” is a feeling of ill will or hostility. False revelation leads to 
recognition of misplaced hostility. If that falls apart, then there is no tragedy; there is no purpose, 
no seriousness.  
 The student could very well have defined middle of the road terms, with boilerplate 
definitions. And yet he decided to go out of his way to burst the frame of the essay, address me, 
and then reverse the terms I’d been using to exculpate himself or redefine himself with his own 
terms. If we believe that the avoidance of anagnorisis is the main writing problem to be 
solved/negotiated, then it would make sense that the writer builds up such a dramatic structure 
only to have the “cessation of turbulence” at the end.  
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 “Care” reminds me of, and resembles to some extent, a paper that David Bartholomae 
calls the “Fuck You” paper, a document he received in 1973, in his first composition course at 
Rutgers, a course he found filled with basic writers (“Tidy House” 313-314). The paper was 
written by one Quentin Pierce, who was to answer the question “If existence precedes essence, 
what is man?” after reading an essay by Jean-Paul Sartre. Pierce’s essay has lines like “Man will 
not survive, he is a asshole” and “This paper is meanless, just like the book, But, I know the 
paper will not make it” (313).  
 My student wasn’t a basic writer; in fact, he was quite an advanced writer. But the 
similarities of the performance are striking. The trope is unmistakable. As Bartholomae admitted 
of his class, “I knew enough to know that the paper was, in a sense, a very skillful performance 
in words” (314). And he also knew enough to keep the paper over all others for decades because 
it was different, and surprising.37 The “Fuck You” paper was a performance that deviated from 
what was normally acceptable (to the 1973-version-of-Bartholomae, anyway), and yet still was 
able to show that it acknowledged the moves of a certain discourse.  
 “Care” has none of those issues except that it, too, is a performance, but one that relies on 
a specific rhetorical trope, in this instance—metalepsis. It tropes on me and my terminology in 
order to make its point and make it with a level of energy unusual for a Seminar in Composition 
course. At the end of the essaylette, I came away with a rather obscure idea of what “care” even 
meant for him. If the terms I introduced can be flipped and reversed—troped—then the writer 
                                            
 37 Geoffrey Sirc, in English Composition as a Happening, has an irreverent and 
compelling argument for why this Pierce Moment represents a burst of Punk in he early 1970s 
Composition scene. Sirc calls Pierce’s work “the excess that our pedagogy cannot process” in a 
jab at Bartholomae’s response to the paper, and as a representative of the “ultra-academic”—an 
insult, to be sure (260-261). I think Sirc wants more of Pierce’s writings in Composition. If what 
he wants from it is more explosive and creative composing, then I too support his call; but it still 
doesn’t even try to ask the work to be aware of itself, which, Punk or No Punk, is still a 
necessary aspect of writing. 
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can show how he cares; he can show how care manifests itself in the language and the writing. 
For other students, metalepsis turned out to be a great source of creative wealth that enables them 




2.4 STUDENT EXAMPLE TWO 
 
 
The second example is from my Spring 2017 course on “Utopia, Atopia, Dystopia.” The 
assignment asked the class to try and explain “how language becomes idle,” or, what, to them, 
was “idling language”? I identified this paper as engaging mostly with M1 (but also, 
interestingly, with catachresis at some points). The bolding and underlining are my addition and 
used to explain the essay afterward. 
This paper says nothing. 
 
 Idling is the cavity filler of English. I cover the holes with large 
cement words but ultimately my tooth is still missing. Idling is using words 
“perhaps” or “maybe” or a potluck of hedges because I am unsure. I do not start 
with a point but rather a word that undermines it. Idling is ditching the word angry 
because angry isn’t angry enough, I must be exacerbated because it is 
sophisticated and long and no one will know that I actually have nothing to say, 
just a collection of syllables. Idling is a purple language cop out and I give 
three examples when I’m trying to make one point because my paper is too 
short and has more filament than concrete sentences. I am painting over the 
gaping hole in the wall with big bad profanity because the shock of fuck is 
cooler than having something to say. I have no thesis, I have no evidence, but I 
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have thesaurus.com so I should be safe. My idling is ten pages with two ideas 
because my margins look like an orgy of doubtfulness and words I just met a 
minute ago. Perhaps this is what I mean. Maybe Christopher Robin was 
schizophrenic. I could be wrong but Atticus Finch wasn’t a racist. Do I want to 
say, people in sweatshops are suicidal or do I say the body politic whose 
occupation relates to sweatshop work is fatally depressed with suicidal 
tendencies? If I idle I will never say what I mean but have an entire paper of 
meaningless words. And this is why Lewis Carroll got away with Alice because 
everything was the color of acid and the words meant nothing but sounded like 
poetry. Why do I need to question your point when the words you use make me 
feel it in my legs? And now, when I’m at the end of my paper and I have still 
made no point, at least I have left you with the impression that I have a large 
vocabulary and I’m never too confident. I guess.  
This paper can, I know, sound like a similar type of paper (the first example), but the tone here is 
much different. It’s more nuanced, controlled. It is a compact performance. Let’s start with the 
first sentence, which I’ve bolded. These are the most dense spots of metalepsis. And the 
underlined sentence, to me, is the hinge of the paper, which I’ll explain more below.  
Idling is the cavity filler of English. I cover the holes with large cement words but 
ultimately my tooth is still missing. 
The first sentence is a metaphor of a metaphor (M1). It is a trope of a trope. How is this? Firstly, 
English has no way to be filled in the way she’s describing and has no cavities. Secondly, idling 
has become such a way to do this. This is precisely why George Puttenham referred to metalepsis 
as “the far-fetcher,” as the kind of trope that goes far out of the way and needs extensive 
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unpacking to try and understand it. I would argue that even though there’s a recognizable 
“dental” theme in these sentences, there’s more than just that imagery to tease out.  
 First, there’s “the cavity filler of English,” bringing to mind the idea that language is a 
giant tooth or some kind of road with potholes. Idling, then, is a substance that fills those holes. 
It’s interesting that she decided to run with figurative language from the start. It is telling that the 
figures carry through because she’s adamant on trying to show how her explanation need not be 
stripped of rhetoric in order to make a point. In fact, her point is made just as well, or better, by 
her explosive rhetorical showing.) In the second sentence, the writer explains that the idling is a 
“large cement word” that “cover the holes,” not properly filling them. Still, the “tooth is 
missing.” The last part is nearly nonsense. Unless we follow her through her line of reasoning.  
 Richard Ohmann, writing about “Literature as Sentences” in a 1966 article, explains that 
deviancy in sentences is what makes the restrictions of grammatical categorizations clear, and by 
extension, worth reading (263). Further, “Such deviance is so common in metaphor and 
elsewhere that one scarcely notices it, yet it helps to specify the way things happen in the writer’s 
special world, and the modes of thought appropriate to that world” (263, my emphasis). Pushing 
the sense and nonsense of “worlds” even further, William E. Coles—three years before 
Ohmann’s article—also recognized this predicament while looking for a certain breed of 
sentences in placement tests. These sentences could’ve been written by people, Coles claimed, 
living on the other side of the moon. “Some of these were gauche, some bizarre, some 
unthinkable, but they all had in common a quality which argued a way of seeing, a level of 
apprehension that nothing was going to touch—not all the paraphernalia of education, not love, 
or death, or doomsday” (31). What both Ohmann and Coles point toward in their commentaries 
is a kind of writing that goes so far as to find itself just shy of idiosyncratic and alienating. And 
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in turn, this type of writing becomes alluring for its alien quality, written on the other side of the 
moon.   
 So, is the answer to read this student’s work as literature? No, it isn’t. Rather, a way to 
read the work could recognize the student’s “mode of thought appropriate to [her] world.”  
Metalepsis has allowed her to achieve this. We could, then, understand the writing this way: that 
English language is a tooth (yet another metaphor, I know). She keeps filling the tooth with idle 
words and hopes it’ll hold. But in the end, there is no tooth at all; it’s all just idle word-
scaffolding. Her (theoretical) paper (that she’s not written yet) is a travesty, a failure.  
 I want to argue that the last phrase of the of the sentences above is the hardest to parse 
because it is so compacted as a metaphor, as a mode of thought particular to her world, coming 
especially at the end. It feeds off all of the figurative language up to that point, and as a 
culmination, it is on the surface nonsensical. Again, we see “the far-fetcher” at work—because in 
order to keep up with the writer’s speed of thought, the reader has to labor, and labor patiently, 
with no map.  
 Yet the labor of unpacking deepens when the writer keeps tossing out compacted 
metaphors of metaphors, as a few lines down she announces  
Idling is a purple language cop out and I give three examples when I’m trying to 
make one point because my paper is too short and has more filament than 
concrete sentences. I am painting over the gaping hole in the wall with big bad 
profanity 
Her first redefinition takes multiple passes to come into focus. I read it as Idling is a purple 
language cop—wherein idling represents the pedestrian language of academe and purple 
language is suspect. All of which should make sense, considering the way she feels about idling 
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language. Yet I also read it as Idling is a (purple language) (cop-out). That is, idling is a cop-out 
instead of trying to engage in stylistic flourishes of purple prose; or you can read it in the exact 
opposite way, that idling is the purple language and that it is the cop-out. By dropping the 
hyphen in “cop out,” an interesting confusion sets in. It is an Empsonian ambiguity, and another 
metaphor of a metaphor.  
 There’s another potential nonsense moment at the end of the selfsame sentence when she 
writes her essay “has more filament than concrete sentences.” Interestingly, “filament” has a 
number of meanings, the most well-know that of a filament in a light bulb, the thin wire that 
glows. But surely that can’t be what she means, considering that in the phrase “more filament 
than concrete” filament is the negative term. (Although I would argue that her paper does have 
bright and incandescent moments.) So “filament” perhaps means the substance that often is in 
animal or plant structures, a filling fiber of sorts. If we follow this meaning, then the inclusion of 
concrete sentences is odd because previously a similar term “cement” was also negative. But 
here I think “concrete” means something akin to “substantive.” This is why the next sentence is 
isolating her falsifying actions, her painting over instead of writing down or dealing with 
substantial ideas. “Painting over a gaping hole with…profanity” is catachrestic (which I discuss 
further in the next chapter), a metaphor that is stretched beyond its limit. The phrase is also yet 
another metaleptic move by the inclusion of “big bad profanity,” troping on the Big Bad Wolf of 
“Little Red Riding Hood” nursery rhyme fame. In most versions of the tale, the Big Bad Wolf is 
defeated despite all of its (profane) attempts.  
 The writing difficulty/problem here, at first blush, could also be anagnorisis, as it was 
with the first one. I find the writing problem here is trying to write sardonically about “idling” 
while not actually writing an idling paper. It is also about having one’s cake and eating it, too. 
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The student is savvy enough to try and get close to the edge of being mistaken for idling, when in 
reality she’s doing the exact opposite as a way to mock it. All around, is a sophisticated move in 
such a short paper. This is not unusual, though. Both Richards and Coles mention similar moves. 
For Richards, in Practical Criticism, it happens in both the poetry and in the reader responses to 
the poem, in this case, Thomas Gray’s “Elegy.” “The Elegy is perhaps the best example in 
English,” Richards writes, “of a good poem built upon a foundation of stock responses” and the 
“stock responses do not exhaust the Elegy” (Practical 239). Over and above the poem composed 
of stock elements, a response composed of stock elements “will find nothing new, will only enact 
once more pieces from their existing repertory” (240). A good question to ask is where the 
existing repertory is stocked from? General culture? Internet? Television? Social media?  
 In trying to answer what she thought idle language was, my student used her own paper 
as a set piece to perform a subversion on idle language, or again, what Coles often called 
“Themewriting,” writing that relies on stock language to say such watered-down platitudes that 
the whole essay has no reason to exist other than as a container for that kind of language. (It 
would be hard to see Coles’s coining of Themewriting not influenced by Richards’s stock 
responses.) Here’s how he defined “Themewriting” in an article from 1969: 
Themewriting is a language, a way of experiencing the world. It is used not for 
the writing of papers, but of Themes. Invented originally by English teachers for 
use in English classrooms only, it is as closed a language as the Dewey Decimal 
System, as calculatedly dissociated from the concerns of its user and the world he 
lives in as it has been possible to make it. But the selling points of it as a 
commodity are irresistible. For since the skill of Themewriting is based upon the 
use of language conceived of entirely in terms of communication, the only 
 96 
standard that need be applied to it is whether it succeeds in creating in the 
reader—that is, in another Themewriter—the desired response. (“Circle” 136-
137) 
Coles takes umbrage with Themewriting because it shirks a kind of responsibility with words 
that is incumbent upon students in college composition. (Or incumbent upon all of us who take 
ourselves seriously or as adults.) The writer of “This paper says nothing” wants to avoid idly 
describing idle language by going in the opposite direction without overstepping the stylistic 
pale. The paper is an answer by example, an answer that isn’t familiar or Thematic; that’s not a 
closed language, but a compressed idiolect; that doesn’t simply fulfill a readerly desire but which 
thwarts short-term enjoyment in favor of a more scrutinizing read. Metalepsis offers her a way to 
possess her language that is undecidedly non-commodifying and compelling.  
 But why would she do this? I presume it could be a litany of reasons: to press boundaries 
(hers and mine); to test her own linguistic abilities; to engage in the rhetorical tropes and 
strategies of the past 2,500 years; or simply to be funny. The versions of metalepsis that she uses 
aren’t a dodge, like the first paper’s. These are rhetorical moves of condensation. And 
condensation is the compaction of multiple images into one representative, possibly elusive, 
image. One that requires plenty of work to untie. What’s also occurring in this paper is ironic in 
that the title (“This paper says nothing”) claims a pre-determined failure when she’s actually 
saying, not everything per se, but much more than she can possibly claim. 
 Is it true that “out of ourselves we can never pass, nor can there be in creation what in the 
creator was not,” as Oscar Wilde proclaimed? In this foregoing paper, I would argue yes, if 
through metalepsis the writer of “This paper says nothing” has tried to deliver herself from 
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herself; and if she’s found that with enough linguistic compression she can mask herself so that 




2.5 STUDENT EXAMPLE THREE 
 
 
I want to end with a reading of a student paper also written for my Autumn 2015 Seminar in 
Composition course that engages M2 & M3. This paper tropes key terms, established both by the 
class it was written in and the professional discourse of composition at large. The paper also 
performs a certain struggle against the writer’s own language sentence by sentence, while 
reconsidering her past writing methodology. Poirier claimed that “troping” is a “salutary 
activity…Because though troping involves only words, it might also, as an activity, makes us 
less easily intimidated by…terminologies inherited from the historical [or personal] past or 
currently employed in the directives of public policy” (Poetry 129). Here, I want to argue that the 
following paper expands “public policy” to include the conventions and pretend absolutes of the 
writing classroom.  
The essay is titled “Progress Process” because I’d asked the class to dispute certain 
terms-evolving-into-key-terms that we’d been throwing around in class. E.g. “improvement,” 
“break down,” “correction,” and “examine.”  Here’s the assignment as I gave it to them: 
#2 
a. Write one page explaining a time you tried to improve your writing. 
b. What needed the improvement? That is, how was it “wrong”? 
c. How did you know how to make the writing “correct”? 
d. Define the way you use the word “improve.” 
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The assignments reflexively built upon themselves and made it a point of disputing terms, so I 
can’t pretend that they magically felt free to counter the established norms. But I was surprised 
to read a number of papers that wavered in a liminal space, saying something to the effect of “I 
know I should be trying something different, but I’m too worried that I’ll mess up the attempt.”  
    Progress Process 
I could say that improving my writing would mean making it better. But 
then I would have to define “better.” Quite impossible if my definition of its non-
comparative form fluctuates when I use it to describe my writing. In my laziness, 
or lost-ness since I am unable to and not merely refusing to define good, I will use 
improve to instead mean progressing. It is a vague term, broad enough to 
accommodate my whims but concrete enough to give improving my writing a 
definition that I can accept.  
 For the greater part of my writing development, I was afraid of moving 
backward. Progress is supposed to be forward after all. In terms of improving my 
writing this means that once I committed to an element of a style then I would just 
build off of it to further improve. The problem was that I had been committed to 
this style for three years, but it never felt right to me. This was during a period 
when I chose to add artificial emotion to my pieces so they would be more 
appealing to others. Sure some enjoyed reading a synthetic stance on a topic but 
no matter what I added to this style I found the emotion unnerving where others 
found it entertaining. Frankly my artificial emotions had created a madwoman 
persona. And she could not be placated with any additions.  
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 I must have gone mad myself when removing this madwoman persona 
from my writing style because before I knew it I was left with the skeleton of my 
writing. Back where my writing had started. And being back frustrated me. But 
that is where the root of the problem was. In the beginning I intended writing to 
be a well-crafted vessel for my thoughts, and artificial emotions had corrupted 
that purpose. I did not really think as that madwoman did and so by adding a false 
personality I had actually distanced myself from my own writing. I would have to 
start again but in the sense of progressing, my writing did “improve.” Put more 
simply I could call it my own again even if it had reverted to its formerly bland 
state. While progress is generally understood to be moving forward and returning 
to the start understood to be moving backward, is it not possible to keep moving 
forward and end up back at the beginning? 
A distinguishing move of this paper is redefinition. The author carefully instructs the reader to 
follow her shiftings with sign-posting—with words like “mean” and “understood to be.” In some 
sense, I can’t help but read the essay as a self-conscious dictionary entry, one that flips terms on 
their head, that is M3.  
Another move of this essay is how the writer addresses the practicalities of 
“improvement,” how it’s possible for a present self to misrecognize what the future self wants or 
needs. That is, the writer admits that what counts as “better” “fluctuates” and that her fear of 
“moving backward” in her style as a writer needs to undergo complication and sharpening. What 
she’s received as standard wisdom and claims to work for most people, doesn’t actually work. 
That is—it doesn’t do anything. Thus, she took on a “madwoman persona,” a move that she 
thought would appeal to her audience.  
 100 
The problem is—and this is important—the move worked. Such a move raises the 
question of how much the student writer owes her audience if the rhetorical persona taken on is 
disingenuous or troubling to the writer. And I want to pause here to quote a longer passage from 
The Plural I that addresses exactly this situation. Coles addresses his class. 
Let’s be clear that it’s not the character of the writer we’re talking about or concerned 
with here. The subject here is writing what these sentences represent this writer as. What 
the writer is we can never know and is up to him anyway. The question I’m interested in 
here, the question that this paper and the last one and all the other papers written for this 
Assignment raised for me is the cost of choosing to talk one way, to see experience one 
way, over and over again. What’s the relationship, in other words, between an habitual 
way of talking or writing and the way one sees? (73) 
Coles insists that no matter what the writing on the page is doing, it cannot equal the writer. All 
the writing can do is represent the writer as. As not is. The “writing as” is a rendition. 
Performance is built into the entire endeavor. Furthermore, Coles calls the writer on the page a 
character. In a sense, the writer of “Progress Process” also sees herself as a character, but a false 
one. Coles would probably say that there is no false or true character, there’s just the character 
given. So do what you will. The metaleptic troping the writer inscribes on her style attempts to 
break the conventional notion of the terms “progress” and “improvement.” Many of her peers 
were committed to seeing improvement linearly, as “gains” over “losses.” Or adding “something 
new that you had no knowledge of before” to one’s writing. But she wants to try to make sense 
of her movements through the history of her writing, to create a useful narrative out of it. So she 
tropes it. And here, through metalepsis, “returning to the start” is what she’s calling “progress.” 
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 The whole essay struggles to metaleptically redefine two words: “improve” and 
“progress.” And by the end, the writer settles on a (surprisingly) deflated definition. For her, the 
key term “progress”–which in Latin literally means “forward walking”—resists her, and her it; 
the buried, etymological meaning entails circling back around.38 Again, troping, according to 
Poirier, “makes us less easily intimidated by [words], by terminologies inherited from the 
historical past,” and here, I claim, a significant term from the framework of student writing—
“progress”—in this sense is metaleptic. “Progress” is a heavy and charged term, “conducive less 
to clarification than to vagueness” and linked to their final grades, and not just in Composition 
but in all courses. Progression is generally accepted as a positive quality. And yet the writer 
redefines “improving” to mean “progressing”—a substitution that elides a specific phrasing for 
another vague term. For her, the vagueness is a boon.  
Other writers in class were quick to engage in clarification or dictionary definitions; or 
toward sounding as authoritative as they can sound in a student essay. Compare another student’s 
definition of “improvement” from the same class: “For me improvement really just means 
advancing my writing’s value in the above mentioned categories of being engaging and clear.” 
Students wanted to negotiate with the reader (me, the teacher) and prove that if they knew what 
improvement was, then I’d bestow them with Knowledge or Recognition. They wanted fixed and 
static meanings, comfortable notions. In fact, one student wrote what amounts to the opposite of 
the “madwoman” writer’s fluctuations: “I view improvement as simply learning to write in a 
manor [sic] more tailored to your audience. I have a wide vocabulary and an understanding of 
                                            
 38 I can’t help but think of lines from Eliot’s “Little Gidding”: “We shall not cease from 
exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know 
the place for the first time.” The last line is the crucial point of the line.  
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how to put sentences together but if I understand specifically how my audience wants me to put 
everything together, I can please the audience.” 
The “madwoman” writer was trying to clear out a space for her actions, to give form to 
her frustration, none of which seem available to an average student writer. For her, imposed 
“distance” from her writing hurt her more than “intend[ing] writing to be a well-crafted vessel 
for [her] thoughts.” What complicates this essay all the more is the description of her 
“madwoman persona” and how it wrecked her writing. The persona may have added flourish to 
the style, but she’s decided that flourishes were “corrupting.” In the introduction to her book on 
style and ideology, The Emperor’s New Clothes, Kathryn Flannery writes that, “Historically, 
when writers have claimed to produce plain language or plain style, they have thereby claimed to 
speak the truth” (28). The “madwoman” writer would seem to buy this thesis. Style is corruption; 
plainness is truth. Flannery, breaking this coupling down, goes on to assert that, “No style, 
rhetoric reminds us, is inherently good or bad. To wish to simplify matters by declaring that one 
sort of style is closer to godliness, cleanliness, or truth is to wish for a prelapsarian world” (20). 
In any case, the student values ownership of her writing over mere stylistics, good or bad, and all 
the while refining a style. Yet it takes her backwards through M2. Metalepsis serves to shift the 
traditional cause and effect of the writing classroom. Often, the understanding is that one 
progresses through a consistent “growth” to a “mature” or “evolved” form. (The terms are in 
quotation marks because they’re what can be said of progress in writing.) Here, though, progress 
is a reduction to the skeleton. To the germ of the germ. Progress, as the reader is most familiar 
with, becomes a radical scaling back into an older and original form. Her taking on a new and 
interesting style (the madwoman), only ended up sending her to a “starting point.”  
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So at this point, it should be asked, what are the writing problems in this paper? Is it her 
need for a style? Or is it a need to get away from the “base” style she’s stuck with? How does her 
metaleptic shift of the term “progress” help her? 
It helps her try, I would contend, to make sense of a failure of a style. The author’s 
struggle is reminiscent of Roland Barthes’s discussion of “style as craftsmanship” in the essay of 
the same name in Writing Degree Zero. In the essay, Barthes recalls how French writers of the 
mid-19th century (Flaubert, Gautier, Gide, etc.) turned away from valuing writing by the 
inspiration it carried, and instead valuing the labor it took to create it.  
There begins now to grow up an image of the writer as a craftsman who shuts 
himself away in some legendary place, like a workman operating at home, and 
who roughs out, cuts, polishes and sets his form exactly as a jeweller extracts art 
from his material, devoting to his work regular hours of solitary effort. (63) 
Barthes maintains that writers needed a justification for the writing to exist outside of its 
“message,” and that the rationale arrived in the form of “work-value” instead of “usage-value.” 
The writer of “Progress Process” falls into this description by her need to justify the building up 
and stripping down of style. Barthes continues, “[t]here even arises, sometimes, a preciosity of 
conciseness (for labouring at one’s material usually means reducing it), in contrast to the great 
preciosity of the baroque era” (63). The author describes her former style as “bland,” but if it’s 
the style that is writing the paper we’re reading, then what could be bland about that? It is 
precise, thoughtful, and generous. 
 But it is metalepsis that stands out in this paper, not her style. It is her troping—the 
rigorous move to shift her meaning’s terms in order to reposition herself—that helps her get to 
the end of the paper. The title of this chapter, “When will I deliver myself from myself?” is a 
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good question to ask of both the author of “Progress Process” and the paper itself. And, in a 
sense, I think the only person who could deliver herself from herself is the author. Was the 
“madwoman persona” a cause of her progress or an effect of her progress? Or was it both? If it 
was a cause, then it was also an agent of return to a former state. But if it was an effect, then 
there should be no problem returning to said former state. Is this the same former state, though, 
or is it now finally acknowledged as having a value? 
 I’ve assembled a lot of words in this chapter to describe only a fragment of what we read 
when we read a just a handful of student papers. The drawn-out process of working through, 
redescribing, and annotating the student work, in those moments of troping, shows how compact 
and compelling the trope of metalepsis under question can be. This is almost certainly because, 
as Emerson wrote in “The Poet”: “An imaginative book renders us much more service at first by 
stimulating us through its tropes, than afterward when we arrive at the precise sense of the 
author” (301). By “service” Emerson means more than a minim, but we should read it as “doing 
a good turn by” or “attending to.” And notice that tropes are servicing the writing in two ways—
through “stimulation” and through “precise sense,” although Emerson stymies as he stimulates 
with what a “precise sense” could be. It would appear that tropes turn the reader away from a 
precise anything in order to apply and supply stimulation cognitively, emotionally, or 
psychologically. In the foregoing, I’ve shown how student writers are “stimulating through 
tropes” via an imaginative “rendering” which, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is 
a performance or a surrendering through reading. The rhetorical performance of metalepsis 
represents a layered verbal act, spinning definitions around each other, whereas to understand a 
fixative trope like catachresis, one will need to discandy the writing—and that is what I plan to 
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do in the next chapter. If metalepsis can help rearrange time and influence, then how does 

















































“Rhetoric has no subject matter to teach because its effects and procedures are 
known by every human communicator. Teaching metaphor or irony, or, for that 
matter, the more esoteric sounding antapodosis or zeugma, has only one 
indisputable result: it makes people do self-consciously what they were already 
doing spontaneously. From an aesthetic point of view, no one nowadays would 
argue that self-conscious rhetoricality is an unmixed blessing. From a cognitive 
point of view, the teaching of rhetoric turns out to have been less a source of self-
understanding than a source of self-misunderstanding.” 
 
Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson,  




“The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk.” 
   





3.1. MINERVA’S OWL SHOULD FLY AT TEATIME FOR THE EMPIRE OF NAMES 
 
 
In this chapter I’ll be discussing the trope of catachresis, its difference from a very close relative, 
metaphor, and how catachresis works in student writing. Throughout, I’ll look at cognitive 
linguistics, poetics, and semiotics to help round out the interpretations and readings of essays that 
use catachresis as a misfit trope.  
 To begin, catachresis can generally be the use of a word in the wrong way, grammatically 
or otherwise. The most popular examples of this type are well-worn phrases like “the mouth of a 
river” or “the neck of a bottle.” Of course, we know a bottle has no neck and a river has no 
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mouth. The transfer of body parts to inanimate objects is a transfer of existing terms to places 
with no literal terms in existence. But these are useful adoptions that we’ve come up with over 
the millennia. It’s worth quoting a longer portion of Quintilian’s explanation of catachresis and 
the indulgence of this particular trope from his Institutio Oratoria.   
We must be careful to distinguish between abuse and metaphor, since the former is 
employed where there is no proper term available, and the latter when there is another 
term available. As for poets, they indulge in the abuse of words even in cases when 
proper terms do exist, and substitute words of somewhat similar meaning. But this is rare 
in prose. Some, indeed, would give the name of catachresis even to cases such as where 
we call temerity valour or prodigality liberality. I, however, cannot agree with them; for 
in these instances word is not substituted for word, but thing for thing, since no one 
regards prodigality and liberality as meaning the same, but one man calls certain actions 
liberal and another prodigal, although neither for a moment doubts the difference 
between the two qualities. (8.6.35-36) 
Notice in this small snippet of the backhanded proscription of no one but poets engaging in 
“abusing” words, “even in cases when proper terms do exist.” Despite this, one can safely 
assume that a poet didn’t coin the phrase “mouth of a river.” Any contemporary teacher of 
college writing could safely assume that not just poets abuse language. So catachresis, presently, 
not only happens in poetry but also in prose, and even in student writing. Language use of this 
kind is, I’m sure Quintilian would say, “endemic”39 to most people.  
 Although, what’s more interesting within Quintilian’s description for this chapter’s 
argument is the range of his definition. Catachresis is the creation or adoption of a totally 
                                            
39 This example potentially a catachrestic use of “endemic,” naturally. 
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unrelated term to describe or name something that has no term already in place. But what 
motivates catachresis?40 To what end? Quintilian doesn’t rightly state for what reason the 
abusive adoption takes place. We read his examples encompassing specifically human qualities, 
e.g. “prodigality” and “valour.” This should signal a potential misunderstanding or confusion in 
Quintilian’s analysis about why humans want to create de novo words (or misapply them) to 
describe their selves, others, and environment. (I return to this below.) On the other hand, why 
we create metaphors seems to make much sense to Quintilian and Cicero, and Aristotle before 
them. We do it for adornment or pleasure or emphasis.  
As Patricia Parker argues in “Metaphor and Catachresis” from the collection The Ends of 
Rhetoric, the confusion or blurriness between the two tropes has stakes in the difference between 
propriety and figuration (61-65).41 Metaphor has established itself as an acceptable and familiar-
enough way to create figure in language, whereas catachresis is, to many, (unexplainably) 
beyond the pale and a “violent” wrenching of language. In short: inappropriate and improper.42 
Complicating Quintilian’s definition of catachresis is his earlier explanation on the “necessity” of 
metaphor, and his discussion of Roman peasants’ spontaneity and invention in language:  
                                            
40 One might say: confusion, assumption, imagination, excess, playfulness. 
41 Cf. Chapter 1, “On the Uses and Abuses of Troping in Language.” I should also 
mention here the distinct lack of academic writing on catachresis as a trope in student writing. 
Nor is there much mention, generally, of catachresis in the disciplines of writing, pedagogy, 
rhetoric, or composition. One could surmise this is because catachresis is a minor trope, elusive, 
or too close to metaphor. I think the aforementioned reasons could be why, but I also think it’s 
because there’s a tendency not to work with tropes inside student writing.  
42 The right question to ask here is: Violent to whom? To language itself? To the user? 
The listener? Humanity? Violence needs a subject and an object. One almost has to imagine the 
ancient rhetoricians thinking that language had a soul and a temperament, and that the temper of 
words was quite testy. How odd. It should be obvious that stating that a metaphor is violent is in 
itself a metaphor. But then, what good is that metaphor? And is that metaphor proper? It would 
seem that adopting such a term like “violent” that has a long history with physicality and tangible 
injury to something so intangible as language would be inappropriate; or, dare I say 
catachrestic…? 
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As an example of a necessary metaphor I may quote the following usages in vogue with 
peasants when they call a vinebud gemma, a gem (what other term is there which they 
could use?), or speak of the crops being thirsty or the fruit suffering. For the same reason 
we speak of a hard or rough man, there being no literal term for these temperaments. 
(8.6.6)  
Notice the praise of the peasants in their inspired turns of phrase. They appear so obvious to 
Quintilian. “[W]hat other term is there which they could use?” (The poor souls, you can almost 
hear the rhetorician lament.) He is forgiving when there is no literal at-hand, in-current-use term 
for a thing.43 Thus, it makes sense to say that the crops are thirsty or the fruit is suffering. These 
metaphors are apt and colorful. But what of the peasants’ coining of “gem”? How is that not 
more than a metaphor and a turn into catachresis? How is it proper or appropriate to call a 
vinebud a precious stone instead of what it literally is or something “closer” to what it literally is, 
e.g. a form of food (“a succulent victual”) or a part of the body (“a glorious or beating heart”)? Is 
there not a more appropriate term for a vinebud? The point here is that the boundaries of 
metaphor and catachresis are thin, at best. At worst, they’re a figment. The difference, then, 
between a metaphor and catachresis is the patience with which the speaker or listener has for 
elaborate or unorthodox comparisons. In both examples above, Quintilian is willing to allow the 
bending of language in order to bring something into existence that’s without a label, to bring a 
thing into the light of the lexicon and conscious awareness.  
 Quintilian is both wrong and right. Wrong about who does and can abuse language, and 
how; but also right about anyone creating the necessary metaphor or catachresis. Not just poets 
                                            
43 This is not to go headlong into a discussion about how there is no actual literal term for 
anything. But should the reader be interested in a starting point, I would direct them to 
Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense.” 
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do this, remember—but field-working peasants!44 Lastly, Quintilian dismisses the designation of 
catachresis from “thing to thing” where one calls “prodigality liberality,” and so on. But I would 
disagree. The reasons for this could, to some, seem like a simple mistake on the writer’s end. 
That is, to call liberality prodigality is purely a solecism; yet it could also just as well be that the 
writer wants to readjust the boundaries or the reader’s understanding of the term being “abused.” 
 I think, to some degree, it all comes down to whose theory of, or approach to, language 
one subscribes to. Or rather, to whose rhetoric you buy. George Puttenham anglicized the Greek 
“catachresis” in The Art of English Poesy and labeled it “Abuse,” explaining that it’s when one 
takes an improper term and applies it where there is none available (264). He writes that we “do 
untruly apply [the improper term]” and fashions an example of catachresis where “on should in 
reproach say to a poor man, ‘thou rascal knave,’ where ‘rascal’ is properly the hunter’s term 
given to young deer, lean and out of season, and not to people” (265). Puttenham’s was the 
standard approach; nothing unusual about his tack. Much of what has been written on catachresis 
can be traced back to Quintilian or Cicero. Although, two centuries later, the Augustan poet 
Alexander Pope included catachresis in his satirical essay on bad writing, Peri Bathous; Or the 
Art of Sinking in Poetry (1727) and gives the following as an example of it: 
 
                                            
44 I want to give a contemporary illustration to Quintilian’s definitions, to try and make 
him sound less conservative and try to suss out why he may’ve had such a washy reasoning for 
the metaphor-catachresis relationship. I’ll do this with a short anecdote. A college friend of mine 
and I were eating lunch and feeding his four year old, Aibi. As we talked and ate, Aibi—for lack 
of a better word—farted. But for Aibi there was no “fart,” no “flatulence,” no “passing gas,” no 
word at-hand for her. Embarrassed, Aibi said she made “stinky music.” This is a lived-practice 
example of how catachresis (and to some extent, synesthesia) is built into the language we use 
and how it fulfills the first epigraph of the chapter, but also the second. Moreover, was Aibi 
doing a violence to the language? If so, what could that be? How would that look? Is the 
violence unidirectional? Or duo-directional? Does she ruin the language for herself, or did she 
ruin it for her father and me? 
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Mow the beard, 
Shave the grass,  
Pin the plank, 
Nail my sleeve. (214) 
Pope’s perfect bathetic poet will never fail to switch out the proper for the improper. Indeed, 
“We cannot too earnestly recommend to our authors the study of the abuse of speech” (214, 
emphasis in original). This is stated ironically but, of course, I would use this as a motto for this 
dissertation and my classroom. Tropes like catachresis, for Pope, are used to fade what’s “lofty 
or shining”; misfit tropes would “take off the gloss, or quite discharge the colour” of good 
writing (212). Compare this with Thomas Gibbons, a writer one generation after Pope. In his 
long but aptly titled book, Rhetoric; Or, a View of Its Principal Tropes and Figures, in Their 
Origin and Powers, with a Variety of Rules to Escape Errors and Blemishes and Attain Propriety 
and Elegance in Composition (1767), Gibbons, an English minister and hymnwriter, also found 
that catachresis was a borrowing of what was proper in its own context and abused when applied 
to a foreign context. Gibbons’s difference from rhetoricians before him is an acknowledgement 
of the power of catachresis and mis-fitting language: “A catachresis is the most licentious as to 
language of all the Tropes, as it borrows the name of one thing to express another, which has 
either no proper name of its own; or if it has, the borrowed name is used either for surprising by 
novelty, or for the sake of a bold and daring energy” (98, emphasis added). Here Gibbons is 
willing to give over a certain amount of admiration, I’d argue, to the trope’s power and ability. It 
may be licentious, but it’s also daring and bold. Around the same time, in The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric, George Campbell (also a minister) took an incredibly balanced approach to catachresis, 
writing, “the name catachresis is no more than another word for impropriety” but that 
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“concerning the catachresis, which hath in like manner been improperly reckoned a separate 
trope…it is but rarely defensible in modern languages, which require the strictest regard to 
propriety” (303). One species of catachresis, Campbell continues, “rarely contributes either to 
ornament or to strength” and happens “when words are used in a signification that is very near 
their ordinary meaning, but not precisely the same” (303). For him, examples include saying 
“high man for a tall man, a large oration for a long oration, a big genius for a great genius” 
(303). It is also when a word originally referred to an object of a particular material, say, wood, 
which later on doesn’t include this element at all. E.g. the original Trojan horse was made of 
wood, and now any thing used to sneak in an ulterior object or motive is a Trojan horse. The 
adoption of the word for the later object is catachresis. Campbell, very interestingly, points 
toward synesthesia (as I will below) as a “species of the catachresis” and explains it as “the 
application of the attributes of one corporeal sense to the objects of another,” for example “as if 
we should say of a voice, that it is beautiful to the ear” (304). A term applied to the visual is used 
for the aural. There is an unraveling action to the catachresis—it unravels the reader/listener’s 
expectations, and the reader/listener is expected to unravel the word-enigma. In Semiotics and 
the Philosophy of Language, Umberto Eco breaks catachresis into two types: “institutional” and 
“institutive” (101). In the former, we’re considering phrases like “the mouth of a river” and in 
the latter, we’re considering the phrases that are under investigation in this chapter. As Eco 
writes, in a reverse echo of what I’ve declared above, regarding the impulse to catachresis, 
“language creates metaphors even outside of poetry, simply out of a need to find names for 
things” (101). He goes on to explain: 
if institutive catachreses require interpretive labor, it is because the latent proportion 
(which could be expressed in a simile) does not exist before the metaphor; it must be 
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found, whether by the person who invents the catachresis or by the person interpreting it 
(at least, for a brief stretch of the trope’s circulation), after which discovery language 
absorbs the trope, lexicalizes it, and registers it as an overcoded expression. (101, 
emphasis author’s)  
Eco’s key takeaway is that which does not exist “before the metaphor” or before it falls into 
circulation. I take Eco to mean that there’s an unconscious aspect to the catachresis, or an 
unknowingness. There must be if the finding of a catachresis can be either by the inventor or the 
interpreter. In this dissertation, it is happening almost all the time by the interpreter—that is, the 
teacher, me.    
 This briefly sketched history of catachresis tells us how the trope has been viewed. But 
for a moment let’s ask about the So what? of catachresis. What are its uses? What is its value? It 
is important to this chapter’s thesis to delineate why metaphor and catachresis have evaluative 
differences. That is, why has one been more acceptable than the other? If they were equivalent, 
or the differences erased, then run-of-the-mill metaphors would be abusio or “too far gone,” and 
catachreses would be “mere” metaphors. But catachresis does exist and does a certain rhetorical 
job, as hazy as it may seem. I will argue that the rhetorical job it does has a bearing on how it 
works within the writing of college students and how it can affect their writing in subsequent 
revisions.  
 I see Parker focusing on this rhetorical job in what she calls the “progress narrative” (68-
69) of metaphor and catachresis from Cicero to Quintilian up through Hugh Blair in the 
eighteenth century. This “progress narrative” idea states that catachresis is primitive and a base 
state of language that slowly evolves or progresses into what we now call metaphor. In other 
words, original uses of language all start off as catachresis, and then as language users become 
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more sophisticated, we begin to consciously craft (through technique) knowing metaphors. 
Beyond that, catachresis is the raw or unconscious formation of language; but metaphor—
specifically, good metaphor—is considered the realm of genius or talent.45  
 According to Parker, metaphor “is related to a primitive lack in language—a lack that the 
later description of catachresis will associate exclusively with it—and contributes to extending 
the empire of names” (62).46⁠ Because there are so many words in English (over 200,000), and 
because we rely on, really, so few of them in the day-to-day, it is hard for us to notice this 
lack.47⁠ This is why, when an unexpected shift in meaning occurs in ordinary language, we sit up 
and take note. To put this into a more everyday context, Irish comedian Dylan Moran directly 
illustrates this in his stand-up when he comments that children have different ontological 
concerns than adults, when they ask questions like, “What is the name of the spaces in between 
the bits that stick out on a comb?” or “What do you call the place underneath the kettle?” (Like, 
Totally). Could this be what Parker means by an “empire of names”? Simply the sheer addition 
of “new words” for what’s unnamed? Or is it the application of existing names to wildly 
unrelated items?  
 No matter which one she means—and I think it’s both, the former happening much less 
than the latter—students can, and should be encouraged to, reroute their writing to build 
language; to prepare for catachresis; to recognize the moments where their language deviates 
from Themewriting, as Coles called it (The Plural I 36-37; “Circle” 136-137), or tropes from 
commonplaces to new places, or as I mentioned in the Introduction, “oddplaces.” I think it 
                                            
45 See Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor (Poetics 1450). 
46 “The empire of names” is, of course, another metaphor. Troping is impossible to 
escape. 
47 Although this should expose an interesting question for metaphysics and/or ontology in 
freshmen writers. 
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worthwhile to stop and analyze this Empire of Names, because this is the crux of catachresis. 
And no one makes this more clear than Pierre Fontanier, the nineteenth century rhetorician, who 
held that “the use of a trope must be deliberate or conscious” (Parker 71); as Parker qualifies, 
Fontanier’s verdict on Quintilian’s Poetic Peasants is that they can’t be said to truly trope 
rhetorical because of this deliberateness; rather, there’s the difference of “poverty” and 
“refinement” between catachresis and metaphor, respectively. One is “forced,” and the other is 
“willed” (71). Again, Parker: 
If metaphor that is beyond conscious manipulation or direction involves those 
involuntary and potentially unconscious transfers that Fontanier insists on limiting to 
catachresis, then the issue is finally not just a distinction based on the presence or absence 
of an original proper term but the question of conscious control. What is at stake, finally, 
is both a psychic hierarchy and a social one. And the stakes in the former are no less than 
the mastery of language itself, the question of whether its movements control or are 
controlled by the subject in question. (72-73, emphasis added) 
The last sentence will help to explain why students veer away from tropes like catachresis; and 
why, based on what their starting drafts offer, it is in their favor to embrace catachresis, 
accidental or otherwise. I want to use Parker to demonstrate why and how catachresis not only 
does transgressive work inside sentences but also in the students’ “psychic hierarchy.” If, as 
Parker suggests, the question of catachresis eventually comes down to “the question of conscious 
control,” then I’d ask: when does it happen? And is it control in the making of catachresis? Or is 
it control upon reflection and revision? Cognitive linguist George Lakoff has pointed out in his 
book The Political Mind that most of our thought processes are 98% unconscious. Which means 
thought is mostly “reflexive,” bandying about with no map. Conscious thought is “reflective.” 
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Yet, Lakoff claims, “most thought is reflexive, not reflective, and beyond conscious control” (9). 
To create an analogy, Parker’s mention of conscious control falls under this dichotomy. Most 
catachreses are likely reflexive creations. The composition classroom, and the teacher, should be 
striving consistently to make the reflexive reflective and have the student control language and 
not the other way around, although that may happen in early drafts where catachresis first 
appears. Again, we are creating and developing “self-conscious rhetoricality,” if you will. And 
yet here it matters more than ever.  
 In this chapter’s first epigraph, the authors (a cognitive scientist and a psychologist, 
respectively)⁠ make plain, as Quintilian did before them, that people don’t need to be taught the 
tropes of rhetoric—or rhetoric as a system of persuasion—because college students or fast-food 
workers or peasants in the vineyards already intuit and use them.48 That is well and good. But 
this chapter’s second epigraph by Hegel points to an important aspect of intellection: We don’t 
often understand what we’re doing until way after the fact, if that. And that’s not a boon; it’s a 
bane. So while “From an aesthetic point of view, no one nowadays would argue that self-
conscious rhetoricality is an unmixed blessing” (Sperber and Wilson 155)49—⁠a banality if there 
ever was one—those in college writing courses shouldn’t be left to wade in a rhetorical 
swampland, satisfied with some vague notion that they’re being rhetorical and using compelling 
                                            
48 Sperber and Wilson are the creators behind a view of language (in the sub-discipline of 
pragmatics) called relevance theory, which states, broadly, “that intentional communication 
gives rise to expectations which help us to decide what the communicator intends to convey” 
(Clark 4). Moreover, with respect to rhetoric and composition, “relevance theory has reanalysed 
tropes and offered new accounts of how they are interpreted in the light of the more general 
theory of communication and in a way that is consistent with current psycholinguistic research. 
This reanalysis rejects the Gricean view that tropes deviate from a literal norm” (Pilkington 160). 
For more on tropes seen psycholinguistically, see Gibbs 1994. I am not wholly unamenable to 
this direction in language-use, but it’s a view of language and tropes that isn’t in line with how 
composition (broadly) practices writing instruction.  
49 Nietzsche would’ve seen it as an unmixed, i.e. pure, blessing. 
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tropes, especially if that trope is catachresis and they’re trying (consciously or unconsciously) to 
put a word onto something they deem interesting and in need of bringing into the world.50⁠ Still, 
what isn’t difficult to see in catachrestic moments is that students create things in these moments 
of “potentially unconscious transfers.” In a union of rhetoric and poetics, they bring to bear their 
most core linguistic capabilities. Thus, the job of the college writing teacher in this scenario is, if 
you’ll permit a metaphor, to try and goad Minerva’s owl to fly at teatime, just a smidge before 
dusk. That way, imagination and spontaneity, intellection and self-consciousness, don’t have to 
duke it out for dominance in the dark, but can work it out together hand in (boxing) glove.51⁠  
 I want to give as an example of this working together—this productive misrecognition 
and catachresis—Marshall McLuhan’s famous book The Medium is the Massage. According to 
McLuhan’s website held by his estate and written by his son, the title is an error that should’ve 
been instead, “the medium is the message”—McLuhan’s well-known phrase. 
When the book came back from the typesetter’s, it had on the cover “Massage” as it still 
does. The title was supposed to have read “The Medium is the Message” but the 
                                            
50 To be fair, the sentence after the one I’ve quoted is just as, if not more, banal: “From a 
cognitive point of view, the teaching of rhetoric turns out to have been less a source of self-
understanding than a source of self-misunderstanding” (155). How, from a cognitive point of 
view, is rhetoric a “source of self-misunderstanding”? Is it because we actually have titles and 
names for the shapes of language that pattern our lives? How, I wonder, is that a 
misunderstanding?  
51 E.g. Aristotle’s brilliant move shifted the focus of those who questioned rhetoric’s 
value from the practices to the reasons behind the practices. From the ground to the sky, as it 
were. “Until Aristotle, people studied how to gain approval, by more or less irrational means. 
But this study, according to Aristotle, is unscientific and has nothing to do with the real [tekhne]” 
(De Romilly 59). What’s so strange about Aristotle’s wrapping rhetoric into a tekhne was his 
surety, his formalizing an action (persuasion) that consistently resists formality, or is actually 
strengthened by challenges to its formality. One can arrive at moments in which rhetoric is 
used—moments that aren’t certain and have no determined outcome—and rely on a particular 
method of reasoning. As Jacqueline De Romilly continues, “...if rhetoric is to be studied 




typesetter had made an error. When Marshall saw the typo he exclaimed, “Leave it alone! 
It’s great, and right on target!” Now there are four possible readings for the last word of 
the title, all of them accurate: “Message” and “Mess Age,” “Massage” and “Mass Age.” 
(“Commonly Asked Questions”) 
Again, notice here that the troping is considered “a mistake.” But actually, it’s not. It started as a 
typo; but it wasn’t just a typo. It didn’t stay a typo because McLuhan consciously decided to 
keep it. (“Leave it alone!” he crowed.) He recognized it and set it into place by choice. I don’t 
know if McLuhan knew about catachresis, but that’s what The Medium is the Massage is. It’s not 
just a malapropism (where a word of similar sound replaces the correct one, saying “pacific” for 
“specific”), nor is it a mondegreen (where a mishearing results in a different phrase, e.g. “for all 
intensive purposes”). It would’ve been those, or close to those, if McLuhan had let the typo go; 
but instead he kept the word “massage” because he knew that it captured something that the 
word “message” couldn’t or didn’t. Which means that he had to “abuse” the language and adopt 
an unrelated term because there wasn’t a “proper” term available. So, we may ask: What is the 
massage in this situation? It’s something that, I think, prior to that moment, had no “proper” 
name.52  
 After the following student examples, I’ll describe what it’s like to read these as a teacher 
and what goes on in the moment, how the sequences and associations of language work. I 
could’ve easily corrected these moments, or ignored them, and moved on, or I could’ve allowed 
them to bloom and flourish, turning the papers from exercises to exhibitions. Said another way, 
                                            
52 Neil Postman offers a witty and perceptive take on McLuhan’s catachrestic title in his 
book, Teaching as a Subversive Activity: “A massage is a process, and for health’s sake, you are 
better advised to understand how it is working you over than to know what it is called” (26). This 
is Lakoff’s reflective thinking in action, to be sure.  
 119 
many of these examples were McLuhanesque in their execution. Although, this doesn’t reduce 





3.2 STUDENT EXAMPLES 
 
 
You think that after all you must be weaving a piece of cloth: because you are sitting at a 
loom—even if it is empty—and going through the motions of weaving. 
 




I’ll start with a paper that has two instances of catachresis. The paper was titled “Try 
Understanding Nothing.” In this, the student was responding to his reading of Plato’s Apology.  
 
Try Understanding Nothing 
 If everyone subscribes to Socrates’ definition of a what makes a man wise, very 
few “wise men”, if any at all, have existed. Let me clarify what I mean. It is Socrates 
himself who says in his final speech addressing the Athenian council that he has yet to 
meet a man wiser than he. This should sound pretentious and or extremely unrefined, but 
he follows this statement up by saying that he is not a wise man himself. How can 
someone who is often regarded as one of the wisest men in history also be a self 
proclaimed middling? It seems, by his own standards, that it is an impossible 
accomplishment to be considered wise. Socrates’ definition states that being wise is 
understanding that one is unwise, or not falsely claiming to have wisdom at all. 
 Socrates’ concept is not overly complicated in any way. In fact, his 
characterization of a wise man is far easier to understand than the stereotypical wise man 
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who is some old sage that sits around his sanctuary and is somehow all knowing (think 
Master Pai Mei from Kill Bill). What makes Socrates’ understanding of not 
understanding so profound is the time period he comes from, and the originality of this 
idea relative to this time period. Philosophers who came to be after Socrates have debated 
and interpreted his statement on the nature of wisdom for millennia. Therefore, the idea is 
nothing revolutionary to our modern society, but the substance behind it remains relevant. 
There isn’t a straightforward list or yellow brick road to follow to wisdom, the path is far 
more involuntary than not. 
 A blaring question arises from this notion. Has there ever been anyone who 
was “ truly wise”? Has there ever been someone who falls into Socrates’ specific criteria 
of makes a man wise? The answer is without a doubt yes, but the distinction comes with 
an inevitable timer that starts counting down the second one is able to formulate a 
question. 
 The truth is that there have been many wise people, billions to be somewhat (not 
really) specific. Now, anyone who subscribes to Socrates’ classic definition of what 
composes a “wise” person would say that clearly this answer is wrong, or that I am 
(which may very well be the case). Fortunately (and for the first and only time ever), 
children are the answer to my problem. Those who are wise, are those who question 
everything. Those who question everything are children. It may sound like a stretch, but 
children are perhaps the wisest of us all. Maybe Holden Caulfield is right, perhaps we are 
all phonies pretending to be wiser than we really are. Innocence and curiosity are 
definitely found in adults, but true wonder and academic humility are reserved for 
children. We are all, for the most part, born with an ingrained sense of 
 121 
inquisitiveness and a knack for being honest about our own intelligence and 
knowledge up until a certain age.  
Let me begin by starting with how this all sounds, how, like I said, the sequence and movement 
of the words go. The phrases I’ve chosen to frame are those with sound and linkages pressing 
most interestingly on them. The first main word in each phrase is from Middle English, and 
before that, Dutch (“blaring” and “knack”). The selection’s main word is Latin in origin 
(“question” from quaerere and “honest” from honos). The balance between Germanic roots and 
Latin roots is a pleasing see-saw effect that plays upon the short, punchy sounds against the more 
sibilant sounds of the Latin. Not only are these examples of catachresis, but they are the most 
evocative sounds in the paper. Robert Pinsky notes this effect in his book The Sounds of Poetry. 
In a discussion of Wallace Stevens’s “The Snow Man,” Pinsky celebrates “a kind of delicious 
contrast between the Latin and Germanic roots, a little like that between crunchy and soft” (88). 
More importantly, though, Pinsky connects Stevens’s use of contrasting roots (e.g. “junipers 
shagged”) with John Keats’s use of contrasting roots in phrases like “unravished bride” and “dull 
opiate.” Pinsky creates a web of associations, via sound and sense, back through linguistic 
history. This combining “is a contrast that calls up the history of the English language and the 
people who have spoken it, often invading, enslaving, raping, and torturing one another, or 
converting one another, and changing the language in the process” (89). It is an important 
contrast and is precisely the leveraging of student troping that I’ve talked about throughout these 
chapters. The opposition between the abstract, scientific Latin roots and the more earthy, 
grounded Germanic roots.  
Still, I’m halted by the student’s blaring question. Specifically “blaring,” which is an 
adjective describing harsh sounds. The sentence presumes there are “mumbling questions” or 
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“ululating questions.” I could imagine that the student meant something more like “forceful” or 
“urgent.” “Blaring” pushes way past the intended meaning into confusion (or comedy). On the 
surface, the use reads as inattentive, and thus, idle like a car sitting at a stoplight—turned on, but 
not moving. (See Wittgenstein’s at the beginning of this section.) Again, it’s idle not because I 
had to read slower to parse that particular term (a move that, like Brower and like Gibson, I’m 
happy to engage in); rather, it’s idle because it disconnects the rest of the sentence from itself. 
But through a McLuhanesque misrecognition, I can also imagine the blaring question as a 
candidate for catachresis. And a productive one at that. The phrase, in this way, then reintroduces 
itself to the sentence and, I argue, finds a new and interesting place.  
 As a writing teacher, my instinct is to correct his calling “prodigality liberality” and 
suggest the word “forceful” or “urgent” for “blaring.” But because I had to slow down to read the 
sentence—and question it—and actually ask what that might mean to have a blaring question, I 
am now in the realm of the catachrestic. I am playing his language game now. I suppose part of 
that is due to reading the student writing seriously, as opposed to reading it expecting errors or 
brilliance or drama. As professor and poet Samuel R. Levin writes in his Philosophy & Rhetoric 
article, “Catachresis: Vico and Joyce,” “Catachresis…arises when, in consequence of a need to 
express something newly come to consciousness, a requirement is imposed on the language 
which it is not properly designed to satisfy” (104). In this case, the question in the student’s 
mind, and then in print on the paper is: “Has there ever been anyone who was ‘truly wise’?” The 
required imposition on language in this moment is that static print becomes voluble, literally. As 
I read the student, he wants the impossible: for him, the question should speak out loud. In this 
case, catachresis partakes of synesthesia, the phenomenon where one sense is described or 
experienced in the frame of another, e.g. sounds are experienced as colors or numbers 
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represented by unique and consistent geometric shapes. Here the visual is auditory. (We should 
be reminded here of George Campbell’s connection between these two senses in just the same 
way.) Again, a writing teacher could easily see this as idle language—as I previously have—and 
agree with Wittgenstein that the writer was making the motions of weaving at the loom without 
weaving. But this conflicts with Levin’s notion, a notion I think that helps explain what it’s like 
to read this particular paper. And in another sense, Wittgenstein’s project was to clear away 
philosophical problems by focusing on how language was used, and then explain meaning 
through use; but his statements can just as well be used as a lens to try and change the use. 
That’s the productive aspect of catachresis, as I mentioned earlier: to trope away from what’s 
expected or usual—to create what has hitherto been uncreated or neglected. So what was the 
writing (or rhetorical) problem in this case? And what does keeping “blaring question” do for 
this writer?  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the problem I recognize is rhetorical. The writer needs to get the 
reader to properly acknowledge his stance on the question, Who is truly wise? This may sound 
easy. Oftentimes, first-year writers in composition will filter their terms through italics, bolding, 
or the caps lock button. Typography takes the place of articulation. But here the writer wrenches 
the term “blaring” out of a comfortable meaning into a new one. Instead of italics or bolding, the 
student fell into a catachresis that allowed him to turn what is normally a formal/visual device 
(italics/bolding) directly into the content of the sentence. This is how I read it. There is no way to 
“blare” a sentence, except to read it out loud, and loudly. That option wasn’t available; so we end 
up with a blaring question.    
 Here’s the other catachresis from the same essay a few paragraphs further along: “We are 
all, for the most part, born with an ingrained sense of inquisitiveness and a knack for being 
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honest about our own intelligence and knowledge up until a certain age.” The phrase under 
consideration here is a knack for being honest. The OED has “knack” as “A trick; a device, 
artifice; formerly often, a deceitful or crafty device, a mean or underhand trick,” and so I wonder 
how the student meant for us to be born with an underhanded trick for honesty—those two latter 
terms opposing each other under any normal circumstances. I also wonder how one can have a 
knack for being honest about someone else’s intelligence, forcing the adjective “own” to stand 
out more conspicuously than I think the author intended. It’s easy to imagine that the “correct” or 
wanted word here was “habit.” But what I think the writer has stumbled onto here is, in an 
abstract sense, how the language subtly shifts itself from normal circulation and demands a 
renewed attention.53  
 As William Coles found five decades ago in his essay “The Circle of Unbelief,” 
incoming college students are already anticipating what they need to write in order to be graded 
to their satisfaction. He writes of such a student that “[i]t is to be expected then, that in the midst 
of the threatening unfamiliarity of his freshman year, the student will shape whatever he can of 
his academic environment into patterns that he is familiar with” (138). For Coles, as for me, (and 
as long as composition continues to grade essays and colleges grade students for a degree) it is 
the work of the composition course to upset expected themes and conventional wisdom. The 
point is to show how troping can aid student writers in dodging the inherited language promoted 
by what they think the classroom expects. In the above example, the subversion would be in 
                                            
53 What’s hard to ignore with “knack for honesty” is the connection to Socrates’ claim 
about rhetoric being a “knack” in Plato’s Gorgias. For both philosophers, a knack isn’t 
knowledge. Honesty is arrived at by dialectic, by rationality. Socrates, who the student is 
ostensibly writing about, probably wouldn’t ever allow the capability for honesty to be called a 
knack.  
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calling attention to the misplaced “knack” and what it offers the sentence, paragraph, paper in 
lieu of “habit,” if that’s what the student intended.  
 The brand of idling language I’m talking about is akin to the words, phrases, sentences, 
or assertions that are often shuffled around in everyday language as if any term close enough to 
the most appropriate in the context will do. Said another way, idling language is language 
glossed. And at first, it seems that both “blaring question” and “a knack for honesty” are 
basically moments of glossed language. Yet, as I’ve pointed out, they are only glossed language 
at first because the writer hasn’t grasped what implications lie beneath them.  
 One of the most interesting problems students face in their writing, and why I think 
catachresis is a product of that problem, is the problem of lacking the exact or best or proper 
words in an environment that they think requires it of them; in other words, the problem of 
bringing something into existence through naming it. (This is potentially why the initial reading 
of certain moments in student papers seems idle.) By naming an object, concept, or structure 
with a term that’s close enough, students are giving the thing an opportunity to be examined, 
whether or not they actually do so in the selfsame paper. The point is to get it on the paper first. 
This is why, when Levin writes, referencing Vico, that “when properly understood, the use of 
catachresis by the first poets was not a mere formal mechanism but an index to a world view” 
(95), we need to understand that—short of calling students primeval poets—they, too, are 
“indexing a world view.” And they are doing this indexing, or trying to, against the tide of 
Coles’s “threatening unfamiliarity” of the first college term and the allure of  safety that 
“shape[s]…academic environment[s] into patterns that [they are] familiar with.” They are trying 
to cognize their reality. As Eco states, following Aristotle’s declaring metaphor a cognitive 
function, “metaphorical knowledge is knowledge of the dynamics of the real” (102).  
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 We can see this struggle of cognizing and indexing a worldview going on in student 
work. Below is an excerpt of a paper called “I Care Now,” written in response to the following 
assignment I wrote.  
a. Describe a time you were too lazy to learn a “new code.” Understand a “new code” to 
be any form of information shared between two or more people. 
b. What did you stand to lose from this laziness? 
c. Define the way you use the word “laziness.” 
d. Define the way you use the word “lose.” 
[Please feel free to intermix these into a coherent response. No need to answer each 
section in order.] 
The paper “I Care Now” turned out to be a motivating piece for the class as a whole, since it was 
read out loud. The catachresis (which I bolded below) also became a recurring image and term in 
the class for the rest of the semester.    
I Care Now 
 “If a bill has passed in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. 
Senate and has been approved by the President or...” I don’t care! It does not bother me 
that my disinterest may make me uneducated and unsophisticated. I don’t care to learn 
about the processes of lawmaking, the branches of government, or the checks and 
balances. You are merely wasting my time right now. This information means absolutely 
nothing to me and I don’t feel like doing it. When is recess? Fifth grade self. 
 “Donald Trump has secured the nomination of the Republican Party to ...” Oops 
once again not too interested. Who is this guy? Never heard of him. Doesn’t really matter 
anyways. I will probably vote democrat. Maybe I should start learning more about the 
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election process and the candidates so I can make an informed decision when it comes 
time. Nah, rather watch Netflix. High school self. 
 Here we are, in the present. Trump administration. How nice? “My body, my 
choice...” “Grab her by the pu...” “President Donald Trump's move to ban more than 218 
million people from the United States and to deny entry to all refugees ...” College self 
and I do care. In the past the word ‘politics’ was cringe provoking in itself. I have grown 
into a person who cares about what is being said and how it affects the country. What was 
once laziness is now panic.  
Laziness is asking your mom to come from the kitchen to hand you the remote 
five feet away. Laziness taking the bus from Towers to the Cathedral. Laziness is 
finishing a test and not checking the answers because, “Shit, what I put is what I put.” 
Laziness is overwhelming and contagious. Laziness is something that will destroy you 
unapologetically. My laziness, though it did not leave me handicapped, did force me to 
quickly catch up with the mounting number of facts and alternative facts present.  
 I did not lose much from my laziness, if anything I gained time. I gained time in 
my parentally developed cupcake world. I gained time in the universe where people 
were civil and honest and treated each person like the last. I enjoyed that world. So, from 
the decrease in laziness I lost a lot. Understand that loss is not only applies to misplaced 
items and sporting events. Loss is gradual or immediate deprivation of a thing, person, 
thought, idea or understanding that you once had. 
The main question here is, what is a “cupcake world”? We can go back a step further and ask, 
what is it like to read “cupcake world”? It is, at first, confusing and destabilizing. Maybe a tad 
babyified. Like something from a Hallmark card. A literal take on the phrase puts one in mind of 
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a cupcake as large as a planet, revolving around a star. But that, of course, isn’t—couldn’t be?—
what the writer intended. Further, we need to ask: How does a word like “cupcake” even make it 
into a paper like this? There is brisk phrasing and placement of quotations (a recurring pattern) at 
work in this paper that takes a distinct turn, which sharpens the writer’s previous year of political 
awareness and sets it in juxtaposition with a baked confection. The association of words in this 
paper sets up a mood—one of dismissal and self-sarcasm (the short snippets, the rhetorical 
questions, the refrain at the end of each paragraph updating the reader on her age and place in the 
world). There’s a structural technique here that makes repetition a major part of the paper. And 
“cupcake world” makes an entrance without any expectation. So it is not only the surprise of the 
catachresis, but of the unusual word “cupcake.” 
The writer has performed what cognitive scientist and linguist Mark Turner calls 
conceptual blending which is “the mental operation of combining two mental packets of 
meaning—two schematic frames of knowledge or two scenarios, for example—selectively and 
under constraints to create a third mental packet of meaning that has new, emergent meaning” 
(10). If anything, “conceptual blending” sounds like a cognitive linguistic definition of 
catachresis, albeit one that takes a deflationary stance on the “correctness” or “brokenness” of 
the rhetorical trope. How does “cupcake world” follow this conceptual blending?  
 We are drawn to infer that there is some ideological mindset she partakes of that draws 
on the qualities of the cupcake: sugary, indulgent, childlike, fun, and so on. Not only that, but a 
cupcake world is provided (and developed) by parents, sources of nurturing love and support. 
This kind of environment seems positive. It was safe. Although, reading along, one understands 
that a cupcake world is dangerous precisely because of the parental overseers, the sugary-sweet 
atmosphere, and the indulgence of what’s not good for us. In this case: laziness, political 
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ignorance. Her laziness protected her and then she lost it. Despite that, loss wasn’t a bad thing in 
this situation, it was a boon. But it shattered the cupcake world, so to speak. The catachrestic 
element here is both in the naming of the thing, but also in the overturning of expectation of what 
a cupcake world means. “Cupcake”—associated with birthdays and fun—is an emblem of 
ignorance. The writer has crossed fields of positive and negative association/imagery with food 
and lifestyle (and the normal meanings of “loss” and “gain”) in search of a way to make sense of 
her political apathy up to that point in her life.  
 We can also see how the conceptual frame for a cupcake world, if written in all-caps the 
way Lakoff and Johnson do in their classic Metaphors We Live By, it could be LAZINESS IS JUNK 
FOOD or FOOD IS CHARACTER.54 Whether or not one can write a metaphor or catachresis into a 
large scale conceptual metaphor like this, the point is that we can see the blending going on. I’d 
also point out that “gaining time” is catachrestic, as well, since one can’t properly store or 
squirrel away time. “Gaining” in this sense probably means something like “spending.”55 Perhaps 
what the writer aimed for was “spending time pleasantly” or “spending time how I wanted to,” 
etc. These are both odd and potentially distancing tropings, merging distinct conceptual areas. (It 
is worth comparing this with the following chapter on enstrangement, especially the version of 
enstrangement practiced by Bertolt Brecht called “the distancing effect.”)   
 The writer took a chance in trying out this emerging concept in a sentence that might not 
parse clearly for the audience. Paul de Man, in his essay “The Epistemology of Metaphor,” 
                                            
54 In Metaphors We Live By (1980), Lakoff and Johnson describe the various conceptual 
metaphors we live within and take for granted. E.g. LOVE IS A CONTAINER, LOVE IS WAR, 
LOVE IS TRANSPORTATION, etc. All of these large-scale concepts are written in all caps to 
help identify them from smaller, individual metaphors. 
55 Compare how close she was to Robert Frost’s assessment from his 1946 essay “The 
Constant Symbol”: “Strongly spent is synonymous with kept” (147). 
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explains how and why the oddness of catachrestic moments like this has bothered readers, 
philosophers, and ancient rhetoricians and still irks those in the present. 
[Catachreses] are capable of inventing the most fantastic entities by dint of the positional 
power inherent in language. They can dismember the texture of reality and reassemble it 
in the most capricious of ways, pairing man with woman or human being with beast in 
the most unnatural shapes. Something monstrous lurks in the most innocent of 
catachreses: when one speaks of the legs of the table or the face of the mountain, 
catachresis is already turning into prosopopeia,56 and one begins to perceive a world of 
potential ghosts and monsters. (42) 
Or, in this instance, one perceives a whole potential world. What are the implications of de 
Man’s claim in the wake of my student’s writing? A revision of “I Care Now” could capitalize 
on the slipperiness of the trope by making more explicit what a “cupcake world” means for the 
writer and for her audience. There could potentially be a striking revision in cultivating and 
embellishing the “fantastic entities” that, at first, sound enticing, but in the end represent the 
voluntary repression of self-awareness.     
 The next paper is called “First is the Worst and So is the Second,” and it’s about how 
students, specifically the author, can improve their writing. What would that look like? How 
would they know what to do? The following is the first half of the paper. 
  
First Is the Worst and So Is the Second 
 Improvement is synonymous to less boring, which tends to be the objective when 
writing any paper. Improvement is when the first draft resembles highway roadkill but 
                                            
56 Prosopopoeia is a rhetorical device that makes inanimate objects speak or where a 
writer makes an absent or dead character speak. 
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the second is a pair of hands reviving it. Improvement doesn’t mean twenty something 
metaphors and intimidating words, sometimes it’s as simple as making sure the reader 
doesn’t sleep through your writing. Before I begin to go deeper I’ll state the obvious by 
recognizing that good and bad writing is subjective, any old schmuck could tell you that. 
And I sincerely don’t believe there are strict stipulations for “good” and “bad” writing 
either. Mostly due to the fact that writing comes in many forms and each form requires a 
different social script. For example, when I try to improve a text message I look for basic 
spelling errors that I know I would easily avoid in a University essay. For large papers, 
my revisions look like torching paragraphs while simultaneously creating new ideas 
that could change the overall thesis of my paper. But what I see as “correct” in my 
writing could utterly piss off the writer next to me. I’m a sucker for metaphors, I like the 
way to sound in my head and the way they sound out loud. Some writers, however, 
consider this to be a waste of words and paper space. 
There’s a jaunty, shooting-from-the-hip quality here that manifests in certain stressed anchor 
points of the excerpt (e.g. “any old schmuck,” “utterly piss off,” “I’m a sucker for metaphors”). 
The paper performs its insouciance through an aging effect, as if the author has reached a 
wizened level of the writing life (again, “schmuck” and “sometimes it’s as simple as…”). I find 
that the chain of word sounds playing off each other assists in her argument. If we return to 
Parker’s claim about catachresis and that what’s at stake is “the mastery of language itself,” I 
read this excerpt as controlling sounds, not the writer being controlled by them. The echo of uck 
in “schmuck” and “sucker” have vivacity and playfulness, not least because of their allusive 
connection to a certain popular expletive, and the uh sound in both are strung across the essay in 
the words “subjective” and “utterly.” While “torching paragraphs” not only matches the 
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destructive imagery she’s already created (roadkill), it elicits a greater web of imagery that 
connects (or blends) conflagration with inspiration or rebirth. Her sentence on torching puts one 
in mind of the myth of the phoenix, its rising, the ash pile, etc. And though the catachresis itself, 
“torching paragraphs,” isn’t composed of Germanic and Latin, it is Latin and Greek roots 
together. “Torch” comes from French torche through Latin torqua. And “paragraph” from Greek 
paragraphos. All of this should be a callback to Pinsky’s excursus on Latin and Germanic roots, 
but this—and the previous two examples, too—also recalls poet James Longenbach’s idea of 
disjunction, “the leap from one semantic, discursive, or figurative plane to another” (27), and 
how catachresis is the vehicle for this action. Longenbach links disjunction with Modernism and 
Postmodernism, but it can also be in poems like James Wright’s “Lying in a Hammock at 
William Duffy’s Farm in Pine Island, Minnesota” where a lovely pastoral description is 
interrupted in the last line by the admission: “I have wasted my life.” “Torching paragraphs,” 
“cupcake world,” and “blaring question” all acted as a disjunction for me, and I think, for anyone 
reading in slow motion with the words and relationships between the words. Or, for anyone 
reading as Walker Gibson’s “dumb reader,” thinking they’re playing one language game, when 
really they were in the midst of another.  
 Up to now I’ve looked at how the words play off one another and sound, so let me now 
turn to a generous reading of the bolded sentence’s context, a context that would insert “I am” 
between “like” and “torching”—thus, “my revisions look like I am torching paragraphs…” Only 
after reading this sentence more than twenty times (in and out of context), did I finally fall upon 
this (seemingly obvious) reading. That said, those words aren’t there. If anything, they are 
elided. The ambiguous elision in the sentence could lead one to think that “torching paragraphs” 
is a new concept she’s trying out with the reader; or that we’re to imagine her drafts as the 
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controlled burning of a field, torching certain parts while rebuilding up others. I want to 
acknowledge the elided version of this line first because I believe that it exists alongside my 
catachrestic reading. The author even admits that she’s “a sucker for metaphors,” so I find her 
amenable to a push in that direction. 
 Since the phrase “I am” isn’t in the sentence as presented, I instead acknowledge the 
potential for the phrase to fully become a catachresis controlling the paper. With “torching 
paragraphs” the author deftly acknowledges how willing a writer must be to trash, throw away, 
or destroy57⁠ full sections of their work. The problem I see her working against (though I want to 
say the problem she’s found and then wrestled with) is boredom. She even claims as much earlier 
in the paper. In fact, she writes, boredom is “synonymous” with improvement. And she tackles it 
with metaphor; and then with catachresis.    
 As a found problem, boredom inside student writing can be difficult to discuss with 
students because it is so abstract, so affectively alive, so diverse in origin. I would argue that it is 
what drove the writer to her “torching paragraphs” and what novelist, philosopher, and 
semiotician Walker Percy described in his 1958 essay, “Metaphor as Mistake.” In it, Percy 
focuses on “wrong metaphors,” those that occur haphazardly and “scandalize the critic because 
they are accidental” (67). For him, critics are scandalized (and maybe teachers, too), but here we 
are encountering just these exact types of accidental tropes in composition and trying to find a 
way to reassemble what’s “wrong.” And by “wrong” I mean “not expected” or “working against 
expectation” or “resistant to eye-reading.” We know the student writer wanted to “make[ ] sure 
that the reader doesn’t sleep through [my] writing” and so she stretches for combinations of 
                                            
57 I originally typed “destory” here by mistake, which has a whole other context and 
implication for the writing under examination and which is a great example of playing off a 
mistake or accident. 
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distinctive (possibly disjunctive) words. In a commentary on Percy’s “Metaphor as Mistake,” 
Eugene Green finds that Percy believes “boredom, as much as necessity, is the mother of 
metaphor” (n.p.). He elaborates on the problem of boredom and writing.  
Curiosity and boredom, we must remind out students, are crucial to the process of 
revising their writing. Our students will be aided by being told that the way in which they 
are talking in an essay reflects inadequate curiosity about their subject or that it reflects 
boredom or that what they’ve said does not stir our curiosity or leaves us bored. There is 
no issue of any abiding human significance which is not better served by a recursive 
pattern of curiosity, boredom, and curiosity renewed. (n.p.)  
This is exactly what I think is happening with “torching paragraph.” The writer of “First Is the 
Worst…” exalts and creates some (graphic) metaphors—drafts are “highway roadkill” or a pair 
of “reviving hands”—but she “stumbles into beauty without deserving it or working for it” 
(Percy 67) with the catachresis. The McLuhanesque Moment (or is it now the Percean Moment?) 
is incredibly rhetorical because it is incredibly kairotic. That is, what makes the pointing out of 
these stumbles into beauty, like this one, important is the reflective capacity the catachresis has 
generated both for the teacher and the student.   
 In spite of that interpretation, I think she’s in the vein of the two previous papers in this 
chapter: she’s created something, named it.58 A “torching paragraph” is a name for a particular 
kind of paragraph that unravels itself as it’s weaving itself in the same motion. It is a paragraph 
                                            
58 This is a place for Ann Berthoff’s forming and naming (Forming 111–112). See also 
where she writes: “Language seen as a means of making meaning has two aspects, the hypostatic 
and the discursive. By naming the world, we hold images in mind; we remember; we can return 
to our experience and reflect on it. In reflecting, we can change, we can transform, we can 
envisage. Language thus becomes the very type of social activity by which we might move 
towards changing our lives. The hypostatic power of language to fix and stabilize frees us from 
the prison of the moment. Language recreates us as historical beings” (“Is Teaching” 751).   
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Every sentence is a kind of experiment. We begin a sentence not knowing where 
or how it will end. We release it to the world unable to predict the response it 
will, fairly or unfairly, elicit. 
 
James Longenbach, The Resistance to Poetry   
 
 
Walker Percy writes (foreshadowing Patricia Parker) that there are “[t]wo conditions” for a 
“mistaken metaphor” (a catachresis) to meet “if the naming is to succeed,” and the first is that 
“[t]here must be an authority behind it,” and the second is that “there must also be—and here is 
the scandal—an element of obscurity about the name” (71). I think all of the student examples 
meet these conditions. That’s what working through each of them in this chapter aimed to show. 
Their obscurity is their identifying tag. Percy continues: “the mysterious name…is both the 
‘right’ name—for it has been given in good faith by a Namer who should know and carries an 
ipso facto authority—and a ‘wrong’ name—for it is not applicable as a logical modifier” (71). 
The students ride the edge of “rightness” and “wrongness” by their catachrestic phrases, and 
what they do with them is create moments in their prose that elevate opportunities for elaboration 
(which by my lights is no small work). Not just elaboration happens, though. Students also work 
inside Patricia Parker’s “psychic hierarchy” and find out how language controls them or they 
control language. They also create moments that bucked logical order and semantic order to say 
something about the issue at hand (Platonic philosophy, political ignorance, complications in 
written revision). In a way, these troped phrases, in context, seemed to stretch beyond the page 
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and the limits of Classroom Language Games, or whatever kind of language game is popularly 
conceived of in a classroom. When I read these examples, I see how they’re all trying to do more 
than what the words they’re using allow them to. And for all the theory I’ve laid out, according 
to Percy, there are at least two ways to look at these moments: i.e. “is it the function of metaphor 
merely to diminish tension, or is it a discoverer of being?” (70). Put another way: Are students 
solving or finding problems with their catachreses? Percy answers this way: 
I cannot know anything at all unless I symbolize it. We can only conceive being, sidle up 
to it by laying something else alongside. We approach the thing not directly but by 
pairing, by apposing symbol and thing. (72) 
For all my build up of tropes as ways to solve problems, I think this chapter starts to show how 
students have created problems or issues for themselves through troping that then subsequently 
need a thinking through. The “solutions” are in themselves an instigator of more work, more 
problems to think through. They (the students) had to symbolize the nothing they didn’t know. 
They had to work by “pairing.” This, then, is a form of invention. The nonlogicality and 
obscurity of the catachreses again goes back to disjunctions and the fracturing of expectation and 
meaning. The moments in these papers I’ve pointed up are disjunctively dramatic in that they 
took language and turned it away from the commonplace (if only for a flickering moment!) and 
made a leap with it. If anything, that should be commended and explored further. They take part 
in what Longenbach calls “dry disjunctions”—shifts in mood that are hard turns into another 
voice. He finds these disjunctions in the rhetorical movements of Ezra Pound or John Ashbery, 
poets who traffic in narrative, drama, and nonsense.  
And this kind of disjunctive, mistaken, and seemingly nonsensical language of our 
students in those particular moments, whether metaleptic, catachrestic, or (as we’ll see in the 
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next chapter) enstranged, is not only poetic but rhetorical. And it’s also a basis for argument and 
story and invention. As compositionist Nancy Welch writes: 
I approach composition with the belief that rhetoric and poetics are intertwined, that 
arguments are underwritten by stories, and that these stories work powerfully as forms of 
persuasion. Since I also come to composition as a writer of fiction, I don’t think it’s a 
problem that rhetoric and poetics can’t be neatly separated, or at least not a problem to 
get past. I learn from stories. I learn from how stories are told. Sometimes the stories told 
in composition bring a stab of recognition. They make familiar classrooms suddenly new, 
disturbing, and strange; they convince me that here is plot with which I must contend. 
(939) 
What Welch is laying out in this passage is a way toward seeing the poetic in the rhetorical (and 
by extension, I’d say, tropes), especially in student writing. She writes of stories, but I see the 
composed essays in the examples above represented as works with similar structures. Imagery, 
characters, patterning, soundplay, messing with syntax. So it makes sense, then, to want to see, to 
want to “learn from how stories are told.”  
It was the aim of this chapter to have tried to open up catachresis a bit wider than it had 
been before so as to help, in Welch’s words, “bring a stab of recognition” to the reader and 
convince her that there is a plot with which she must contend. It is the aim of the following 










4.0 “TENTACLES WILL SOON BE REACHING INTO AFFAIRS”; 
OR, TROPING AS ENSTRANGEMENT  
“No, this is not a disentanglement from, but a progressive knotting into…” 
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT ENSTRANGEMENT IS & EXAMPLES 
In this chapter, I’ll explore troping and form and narrative and disjunction in student writing (as 
Nancy Welch showed at the end of the previous chapter) and, finally, try to see the poetic in the 
rhetorical, as through Viktor Shklovksy’s idea of “enstrangement”59 (ostranenie in Russian), and 
examine how cliché works with/against enstrangement. I’ll also read two student papers that I 
find enstrange the topic at hand, one through an imposed constraint, and the other through the 
student’s own turning of language. And at the end of the chapter, I turn to science fiction studies 
to discuss how the notions of “cognitive estrangement” and “subjunctivity” do, can, and should 
play a bigger role in the reading of student work in Composition. But I first start with how 
enstrangement came about and who established it.  
59 Often also translated as “estrangement” or “defamiliarization.” Benjamin Sher writes in 
his Translator’s Introduction to Theory of Prose (the version I’m using in this chapter), “The 
translation of ‘estrangement’ is good but negative and limited. ‘Making it strange’ is also good 
but too positive. Furthermore, both ‘estrangement’ and ‘making it strange’ are not new, that is, 
they require no special effort of the imagination. In fact, they exemplify the very defect they 
were supposed to discourage. Finally, there is ‘defamiliarization’…This semi-neologism is very 
seductive until you realize that it is quite wrongheaded. Shklovsky’s process is in fact the reverse 
of that implied by this term” (xix). Thus, the term should be something like “refamiliarization,” 
but that’s, date I say it, too academical? 
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Viktor Shklovsky was the founder of a movement known as Formalism, also known as 
Russian Formalism, and is perhaps best known for his 1917 essay “Art as Device.”60 Formalism, 
broadly, was focused on bringing out craft and technique in artistic writing (indeed, one 
translation of “Art as Device” is “Art as Technique”).61 According to Fredric Jameson, in his 
study of structuralism and Russian Formalism, The Prison-House of Language, “The originality 
of the Formalists’ idea of technique is to be found in its inversion”: 
For Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians, everything in the work of art exists for some 
ultimate purpose, which is the characteristic emotion or peculiar pleasure of the work 
itself as an object consumed. For the Formalists everything in the work exists in order to 
permit the work to come into being in the first place. The advantage of this approach is 
that whereas ultimately the Aristotelian analyses end up outside the work (in psychology 
and the extra-literary problems of the conventionality of emotion), for Shklovsky such 
emotions as pity and fear are themselves to be considered constituent parts, or elements 
of the work in the first place. (82, emphasis added)  
The Formalists main claim, then—that everything in a work brings about its existence—is also 
essentially what Shklovsky continually aims for in his writings on writing and analyses of classic 
and traditional Russian literature (and some of the first writing and theory on filmmaking). Such 
a specific claim also narrows the focus of the Formalist critic or reader to a manageable and 
                                            
 60 Alexandra Berlina, in her 2015 translation of the article for Poetics Today, titles it “Art, 
as Device” with a comma, as it appeared in the Russian. This changes the emphasis, breaking the 
comparison up a bit than with the comma. Berlina continues in a footnote that “Estrangement is 
gaining currency. A double issue of Poetics Today (26 [4] 2005 – 27 [1] 2006) dedicated to 
Shklovsky’s heritage is titled ‘Estrangement Revisited’” (152). I should add that I first heard of 
Shklovsky and the idea of defamiliarization/enstrangement from a craft essay (not a surprise) by 
the novelist and short story writer, Charles Baxter, called “On Defamiliarization” in his 
collection Burning Down the House. I discuss this essay more below.  
 61 1965 “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, translated by 
Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, 3 – 24 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press). 
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tactile subject—that of craft or technique as it shows itself. For Shklovsky, writing isn’t built 
with images or symbols or plot or anything else but devices. These devices are often those like 
parallelism, repetition, symmetry, and the like. As he states in “Art as Device”: “In a narrow 
sense we shall call a work artistic if it has been created by special devices whose purpose is to 
see to it that these artifacts are interpreted artistically62 as much as possible” (Shklovsky 2). We 
are asked to reject understanding art as we normally experience it, holistically, or 
synecdochically, as an allegory or a platform for symbols strung together. The devices don’t 
work in service for the whole. Quite the opposite. For example, a television show like Seinfeld 
doesn’t exist as 21 minutes of four or five scenes with an intricate comedic plot about zany 
Manhattanites where artistic devices are subservient. Rather, Seinfeld the show exists only for the 
sake of the artistic devices that make it up; these devices could be ironic reversal, chiasmus, 
deceleration, and enstrangement. Again, devices make more visible the show’s creation—its 
art—as Shklovsky argues: “The perceptual process in art has a purpose all its own and ought to 
be extended to the fullest. Art is a means of experiencing the process of creativity. The artifact 
itself is quite unimportant (6, emphasis in original).63   
 While I’m not arguing for composition teachers to neglect the final product of writing 
(research papers, podcasts, literacy narratives, etc.), I am arguing for the borrowing and 
exploration of enstrangement as a renewal of the perceptual process in student writing; also, just 
as a different compositional tool. Let me stress that “a renewal of the perceptual process” is 
                                            
 62 I would read this, alternatively, as “craft-oriented.” That is, one interprets the artifacts 
with as much appreciation of the craft and technique of the thing, as possible. 
 63 Edward P.J. Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student would be an example 
of certain devices (or rhetorical figures) displayed and shown in actual use for writing teacher 
and student alike. Although, the difference is Shklovsky breaks away from Greek canon in this 
instance. “[Shklovsky] clearly multiplied the entities designated as devices, cataloguing as many 
different varieties as possible” (Steiner 214). 
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nothing so dramatic as it may sound. It’s not a Pauline moment on the road to Damascus. For 
me, a shift in perception can, and should be, seen within the frame of the “very local rewards and 
consequences” (34) that Bartholomae gets through the work of Poirier.  
 Even so, much of the construction of an essay in composition eschews the kinds of tropes 
and troping I’ve been suggesting thus far in the foregoing chapters. Essays of this type are what 
I’ve come to call dutiful. They accept, very willingly (too willingly, I think), received definitions 
of common or difficult terms. Many essays I’ve received and read exist to tick off boxes on a 
checklist. In a way, student writers can be dutiful to the point of automatism. Some scholars in 
composition, like Geoffrey Sirc or William Coles (labeled either romantics or expressivists), 
have made anathema certain versions of this unreflective duty to fulfill some Unspoken 
Demands of an Archetypal Teacher. I support this destruction of dutifulness. But I wouldn’t go so 
far, as I’ve stated elsewhere, that one needs a verification of faith. As Thomas Newkirk has 
pointed out in his striking essay “The Dogma of Transformation,” writing students haven’t 
always been driven toward plangent sermonizing about their inner lives. In a collection of 
student essays from the University of New Hampshire around 1930, Newkirk finds that many of 
the pieces “were outward looking, intensely descriptive, and rarely revealing of any personal 
crisis or transformation—more sight than insight” (256).  
 Wherever the habit, need, or impulse to turn confessional or transformative came from, 
it’s still a habit of writing.64 And this was precisely why Shklovsky made habit the target of 
enstrangement.  
                                            
64 As I’ve shown in chapter 2, it would be disingenuous to think that ancient dramatic 
precursors had no impact on the way we tell any kind of narrative in contemporary society. 
Anagnorisis then becomes a genetic effect of being a descendent of ancient Greek storytelling.   
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If we examine the general laws of perception, we see that as it becomes habitual, it also 
becomes automatic. So eventually all of our skills and experiences function 
unconsciously—automatically. If someone were to compare the sensation of holding a 
pen in his hand or speaking a foreign tongue for the very first time with the sensation of 
performing this same operation for the ten thousandth time, then he would no doubt agree 
with us. It is this process of automatization that explains the laws of our prose speech 
with its fragmentary phrases and half-articulated words. (5) 
The “fragmentary phrases and half-articulated words” can be pinpointed as the everyday, phatic 
speech of life. From here, the path toward enstrangement starts with the unconscious build up of 
language-use, becoming familiar, all-too-familiar. By a certain point in their education, at least in 
America, students come into college aware of certain protocols of language. Especially the 
traditional five-paragraph essay and its various species of compare-contrast, process paper, and 
so on. What’s habitual and automatic is the students’ comfort with the form. (Not to mention my 
own.) Such forms are easy enough to slip into or consume. And the questions is: If student 
choice with language bends automatic, where do they, the writer, exist in the invention process? 
How can they turn language away from those inevitable uses it can’t avoid, as Poirier put it?  
Again, Shklovsky: 
And so, in order to return sensation to our limbs, in order to make us feel objects, to make 
a stone feel stony, man has been given the tool of art. The purpose of art, then, is to lead 
us to a knowledge of a thing through the organ of sight instead of recognition. By 
“enstranging” objects and complicating form, the device of art makes perception long and 
“laborious.” (6)   
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One wants to change “to make a stone feel stony” into “to make a word feel wordy” or “an essay 
feel essay-ey.” The gist of Shklovsky’s point is that we’ve worn down the original sensorium 
with regards to language, and art generally. By “laborious,” I don’t think Shklovsky means 
irritating or hard. Instead, laborious is closer to meaning something like “this needs work to 
unpack” or “engage your attentive consciousness.” Though what does this look like? Shklovsky 
tied enstrangement to riddles, and for good reason. Riddles encapsulate the act of language 
shading the answer from you just enough to force one beyond what’s obvious or clear. For 
example, the famous Riddle of the Sphinx: “What walks on four legs in the morning, two legs in 
the afternoon, and three legs in the evening?” Answer: “A man.” Through a poetically 
compressed enstrangement, the riddle gives a description of Homo sapiens over a whole lifespan. 
Riddles inherently do the work of enstrangement and it is this work Shklovsky finds in prose. 
Shklovsky gives examples from Tolstoy’s writings wherein he describes a flogging from an 
enstranged point of view, so as to show its absurdity. Or his story “Kholstomer”, also known as 
“Strider: The Story of a Horse”, where the reader is given a piebald horse’s first-person point of 
view, so as to play up the absurdities of mankind. In the following example, the piebald Strider is 
musing to other horses on the human words “my” and “mine” and how they are hard to 
understand and what they may mean.  
For instance many of those who called me their horse did not ride me, quite other people 
rode me; nor did they feed me, quite other people did that. Again it was not those who 
called me their horse who treated me kindly, but coachmen, veterinaries, and in general 
quite other people. Later on, having widened my field of observation, I became 
convinced that not only as applied to us horses, but in regard to other things, the idea of 
mine has no other feeling or right of property. A man says “my house” and never lives in 
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it, but only concerns himself with its building and maintenance. A merchant talk of “my 
cloth store”, but has none of his clothes made of the best cloth that is in his store. There 
are people who call land theirs, though they have never seen that land and never walked 
on it. There are men who call women their women or their wives; yet these women live 
with other men. And men strive in life not to do what they think right, but to call as many 
things as possible their own…The activity of men, at any rate of those I have had to do 
with, is guided by words, while ours is guided by deeds. (142)  
What happens in this passage is an enstrangement of private property and the conventional 
meaning of “ownership” and individuality. How does this happen? Shklovsky suggests that 
“[Tolstoy] does not call a thing by its name, that is, he describes it as if it were perceived for the 
first time…In addition, he foregoes the conventional names of the various parts of a thing, 
replacing them instead with the names of corresponding parts in other things” (6). The reader is 
forced into a perspectival shift. And through this shift (one may even say “turn”), both writer and 
reader have to reach further, strain, and get inventive with the description in order to make it 
unusual enough to be unrecognizable at first yet not so unrecognizable as to be an impossible 
riddle. Here are a few more examples of enstrangement in prose. The first is from Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Breakfast of Champions. Vonnegut often used enstrangement in his fiction, the better 
to show, I suspect, “man’s inhumanity to man.” He start the novel by describing that he think 
people are robots. In describing a disease infecting lots of people in his youth, locomotor ataxia, 
he writes: 
Those people were infested with carnivorous little corkscrews which could be seen only 
with a microscope. The victims’ vertebrae were welded together after the corkscrews got 
through with the meat between. (3)  
 145 
 
I tend to think of human beings as huge, rubbery test tubes, too, with chemical reactions 
seething inside. (4) 
Or, in describing elementary school history classes: 
The teachers told the children that [the year 1492] was when their continent was 
discovered by human beings. Actually, millions of human beings were already living full 
and imaginative lives on the continent in 1492. That was simply the year in which sea 
pirates began to cheat and rob and kill them.  
 Here was another piece of evil nonsense which children were taught: that the sea 
pirates eventually created a government which became a beacon of freedom to human 
beings everywhere else. There were pictures and statues of this supposed imaginary 
beacon for children to see. It was sort of an ice-cream cone on fire. (11)  
Vonnegut’s turning a torch or beacon into “an ice-cream cone on fire” is pure enstrangement. 
And his goal is displaying how absurd or idiotic the original sentiment or idea was—at least, in 
the author’s estimation. The same goes with calling explorers or conquistadors “sea pirates.” 
Vonnegut later describes cannons as “[blowing] projectiles out of metal tubes at terrific 
velocities” (12). He is describing something by not using the proper names for it.  
These re-namings and re-descriptions and shifts and turns have been happening, as we’ll 










4.2 RHETORICAL RATIONALE FOR ENSTRANGEMENT 
 
 
This action of not calling “a thing by its name” didn’t suddenly pop up with Shklovsky, and it 
didn’t start with Tolstoy. A large portion of my argument in this dissertation is situated in the use 
of rhetorical tropes. And I hope I’ve made it obvious that the first two, metalepsis and 
catachresis, are safely in the realm of Greek and Roman rhetorics. But enstrangement doesn’t, on 
the surface, belong to either of these. Nevertheless, through some literary genetic history, one can 
find that enstrangement has been practiced as far back as Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations 
(especially in 6.13). The historian Carlo Ginzburg has found that Marcus Aurelius described 
objects, not with their names, e.g. eating, clothing, sex, but instead this way, “Falernian wine is 
grape juice and that robe of purple a lamb’s fleece dipped in a shellfish’s blood” (11 qtd. in 
Ginzburg). Ginzburg finds that, following Marcus Aurelius, one enacts such a perspectival shift 
in order to “rightly see” or “see better” how transient one’s life is and will continue to be (11). 
Enstrangement was simultaneously an existential, rhetorical, and compositional method toward 
living a Stoical life. That is, if one could redefine an experience or an event or an object in a way 
that distanced it, the emotional attachments normally connected to those descriptions would drop 
out. Ginzburg also claims that Tolstoy—who so influenced Shklovsky—was himself heavily 
influenced by Marcus Aurelius and that “Things unveiled themselves to [Tolstoy’s] passionate 
and detached gaze ‘as they really are,’ to use Marcus Aurelius’s phrase” and it was through 
shifting perspectives in his writings (in this case, through the point of view of a horse) that 
Tolstoy peeled away phenomena’s “conventional meanings” (11).65   
                                            
 65 In a strange turn of events, Ginzburg shows how Aurelius’s style was amplified and 
perhaps made more visible by a forgery of his writing from the 16th century: “Marcus Aurelius's 
life and letters had become widely known to the European cultivated public some decades before 
the first publication of his reflections in a disguised, fictitious form. The author of this forgery 
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 Yet, in spite of (or in light of) such a history, there is one element of Shklovsky’s idea still 
not addressed: his insistence on writing as art, not, as writing teachers often read it, as academic 
prose or as some other kind of writing. My aim is to show how Shklovsky’s ideas about 
language and enstrangement port beyond just artistic motives, which will lead me back to the 
classroom. Because it is there that the teacher deals with preconceived notions of what will be 
read and written—what I’ve been referring to as the commonplace or cliché. By cliché, I do 
mean the negative definition. (Sadly, the meaning of the term comes from the French verb 
clicher, which comes from an imitative sound that molten metal would make hitting a form for 
typing. If only it still carried that visual weight!) Although, there have been those who want 
cliché revived, or at least its history more thoroughly reconsidered, for example, Ruth Amossy, a 
scholar on stereotype and cliché. A better understanding of cliché can help flesh out 




4.3 BETWEEN ENSTRANGEMENT AND CLICHÉ 
 
 
Amossy writes that there is a number of passive functions that the cliché can hold and act out for 
a reader. Of these, those most appropriate to our discussion of student writing in college,66 are 
how cliché “Orients and Models Reading,” “Favors Identification,” and “Can Be an 
Argumentative Device” (37). When a cliché “orients a reading,” it acts as a “generic signal” to 
the reader, making her aware of an expected conceptual outlook (37). Within a grammar of 
                                                                                                                                            
was the Franciscan friar Antonio de Guevara, bishop of Mondofiedo, preacher at the court of the 
emperor Charles V” (12). Guevara wrote in such a way [examples] that is ended up influencing a 
slew of writers afterward, including French Enlightenment authors like Montaigne, La Bruyere, 
and Voltaire, all of whom practiced enstrangement as Shklovsky later came to describe it. 
 66 Amossy is writing about clichés in the literary tradition, e.g. Balzac, Flaubert, etc. But 
her observations on cliché equally hold for writing other than literature. 
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student writing, we can see sentences and phrases like this that start off with “In today’s 
society…”, “More and more we see…”, “The dictionary defines the word…”, etc. These are 
sentences that let the reader know there’s Big Thinking going on. Or, at least, a kind of thinking 
that is Doing Serious Work, whether or not it actually is. Then there is the cliché “favoring 
identification,” which “insures a circular relationship between ‘I’ and ‘you.’ It is a common place 
in which emotional identification can occur” (37). As one student essay read more fully later in 
this chapter begins, “Curiosity is an inescapable part of being human. Man has been asking 
questions since its inception and will continue to do so until its demise.” The reader, no matter 
who they are, is co-opted into this circle of discourse, one hard to break out of. (Moreover, who 
could disagree with the author’s statements? What would have to happen in order to do so?) 
Following closely behind these two is the cliché acting as an argumentative device, which serves 
to satisfy the reader that they are reading truthful words and buying into a “solidarity of minds” 
(37). The just-mentioned student example would also fit this third passive function. Amossy 
concludes by declaring, in a tone reminiscent of Shklovsky, that 
The functions of passively registered clichés are, in essence, tied to the phenomenon of 
maximal automatization; those of critically perceived clichés are based on the fact that 
they are quotations. In both cases, however, the cliché posits a relation with a pre-existing 
discourse—anonymous and blurred talk, the insistent buzz of social discourse…and that 
relation mediates both text production and deciphering. (38) 
It is Amossy’s yoking of “automatization” to a “pre-existing discourse” that we are most 
interested in here. The collocation of terms in English composition and rhetoric courses—e.g. “in 
today’s world”—doesn’t simply manifest as an unthinking habit; such verbal decisions carry 
down the line to the reader of the work, both teachers and peers. And the collocations represent, 
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whether the writer knows it or not, a distinct web of relationships and associations that affect the 
writing and interpretation of the paper.67   
 Following Amossy, we can surmise that students are, if only at first, looking backward 
into their linguistic history for models. They have borne their previous teachers on their backs. 
These teachers overpopulate every classroom and stifle students. (I, too, will become a stumbling 
block for them, much to my dismay.) To combat this, I return to a quotation from the head of my 
Introduction. It’s from Emerson’s “Self-Reliance”: 
But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about this corpse of 
your memory, lest you contradict somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? 
Suppose you should contradict yourself; what then? It seems to be a rule of wisdom never 
to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure memory, but to bring the past 
for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day. (138) 
 I’m not sure I know if those thousand eyes belong to one being or a thousand separate ones or 
five hundred. But I think Emerson meant to say that each present has a thousand ways to see a 
thing. Or, that each present has the opportunity to see a thing a thousand ways. And that 
compared to the “corpse” of the memorious past, with it’s entrenched methods, and automatistic 
ways, we are to bring what’s been done previously and judge them today. If at the end of that 
                                            
 67 There are those, like Cathryn Molloy, who embrace the cliché in some of its forms. 
Viz. for Molloy, she focuses on the “malcliche,” which is a cliché that is misquoted, thus 
simultaneously being a cliché or a violation of style and an interesting invention/new use of 
language. Molloy’s malcliche is as close as anyone has come, that I’ve yet seen, to describing 
what I’m trying to do with my broader term of “troping.” “The new expressions that result may 
have the power to subvert or at least rearrange clichéd expressions. They might, at the most, be 
new, tactical expressions with unique communicative force, and they might convey intriguing 
knowledge departures from their originals. Ironically, authors of these misspoken clichéd 
expressions are unaware of their inventive acts, and even if they discovered them, it is unlikely 
that they would consider them profound acts. In fact, they might simply note the correction, and 
then banish the misspoken abomination to the dark corners of their minds to other seldom-visited 
places there” (149). 
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judgment is a new—enstranged—thing, or in this case, an artistic device, then so much the 
better. When a source of invention collapses into a sinkhole, that is when the search for new 
inventional methods happens. Or should happen. That is the rub, though. How does one 
recognize when it’s time to drop the old or turn it over? Ostensibly, one does this when 




4.4 BETWEEN ENSTRANGEMENT, HABIT, & PERCEPTION 
 
 
A student writer’s attention isn’t passive; it’s always bound in activity. Perception possesses 
certain prior knowledge and perceptive habits and patterns and causes of those patterns, whether 
from high school or other concurrent college courses. I follow John Dewey’s definition of 
perception from Art as Experience as “the going-out of energy in order to receive” (53). The 
fuller quotation helps contextualize his meaning.  
In much of our intercourse with our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if 
only of expending unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with other 
matters, as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in 
order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves in a subject-matter we 
have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, 
for lack of answering activity, we do not perceive that which bears us down. We must 
summon energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to take in. (53, emphasis in 
original) 
For Dewey, there is a dialogue between the individual, the object, and the world. A constant 
triangulation. To perceive is to expend energy to receive. As Nathan Crick writes, for Dewey 
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“The very act of communication requires an individual to give form to what had previously been 
formless, and in doing so changes the attitude of that person toward his or her own experiences. 
So in drawing from the social resources of a shared language, the resulting expression serves, 
however slightly, to challenge, supplement, or rearrange both the experiences of the speaker and 
of the community being addressed” (270). Thus, for students engaging in troping-as-
enstrangement, the aim is to take the writing beyond an expected perception, to reshape the thing 
seen in such a way as to go even further than “rearranging both the experiences of the speaker 
and of the community.” The idea is to radically reshape what had already been formed into 
something that demands fresh perception, perhaps instigating a full Deweyan “plunge” in each 
enstrangement depending on the demands made on the reader. Which is to say that 
enstrangement is an overtaxation of the normal level of perception—or a perceptive surprise.68 In  
his book on imagination and narrative, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Jerome Bruner writes that 
surprise offers the possibility of “what people take for granted” because it is “a response to 
violated presupposition” (46). Perception is heavily affected by surprise, to the point that our 
perceptive systems work hard to tamp down the unexpected. Bruner argues that we are deeply 
bound to this habit of expecting what’s normal, what’s familiar. Thus: “The more expected an 
event, the more easily it is seen or heard” (46). For a writer, the more familiar (or seemingly 
familiar) the topic, the easier it may be to note its qualities or definition. Even with an unfamiliar 
topic, the writer would then, by Bruner’s lights, want to make the subject familiar not just for 
themselves, but for the reader, too. Yet, as Bruner explains, “perception is to some unspecifiable 
degree an instrument of the world as we have structured it by our expectancies. Moreover, it is 
characteristic of complex perceptual processes that they tend where possible to assimilate 
                                            
68 Compare with Kenneth Burke’s “perception by incongruity” in Permanance and 
Change (90).  
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whatever is seen or heard to what is expected” (47). We wouldn’t want to teach (or take) a 
writing course where the writers only aimed to shake up their readers with enstranged 
descriptions at every turn, but it does appear that the default setting is the need to assimilate. As 




4.5 BETWEEN ENSTRANGEMENT, CONSTRAINTS, & STUDENT WRITING 
 
 
Much of freshmen writing is about learning the academic moves, generic elements, the feeling-
outward of trying on new voices, and “the going-out of energy,” a building up of abilities in 
academic devices like anticipatory signposting, transitioning, and comparison. Composition 
teachers focus on all of these parts because students need an ability to organize and arrange 
argumentative statements and research.  
That said, I want to know what something like Pynchon’s epigraph to this chapter, the 
“progressive-knotting-into,” could look like in a composition classroom without letting go of 
coherency.69 What I’m after with borrowing Pynchon’s phrase is something like bending the 
student’s compositional awareness/choices back into the writing to change subsequent outcomes 
without teacher input. Part of this means seeking out troping-as-enstrangement, or setting up the 
constraints for enstrangement, then finding out how the students’ forms of writing changed or, as 
mentioned in the last chapter, turned disjunctive.70 Constraint as a method, an exigency, and a 
                                            
 69 This is not an insult. E.g. I found the idea of “enstrangement” in Shelley’s A Defence of 
Poetry before I knew the connection existed by reading the secondary literature. “But Poetry acts 
in another and diviner manner. It awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering it the 
receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought. Poetry lifts the veil from the 
hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar” (681). 
Coleridge, too, made use of the idea. (For more, see Bogdanov 48-49.) 
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subject is an inventive mode in writing because it raises choice into relief. With constraints, 
student writers must consider the choices made in any sentence. Shklovsky, in another work, 
Third Factory, writes on “the freedom of art” through a story about flax, all of which is a good 
example of enstrangement. 
 FLAX. This is no advertisement. I’m not employed at the Flax Center these days. 
At the moment, I’m more interested in pitch. In tapping trees to death. That is how 
turpentine is obtained.  
 From the tree’s point of view, it is ritual murder.  
 The same with flax. 
 Flax, if it had a voice, would shriek as it’s being processed. It is taken by the head 
and jerked from the ground. By the root. It is sown thickly—oppressed, so that it will not 
be vigorous but puny.  
 Flax requires oppression. It is jerked out of the ground, spread out on the fields (in 
some places) or retted in pits and streams.  
 The streams where the flax is washed are doomed—the fish disappear. Then the 
flax is braked and scutched.  
 I want freedom.  
 But if I get it, I’ll go look for unfreedom at the hands of a woman and a publisher. 
                                                                                                                                            
 70 Interestingly, the etymology of the Russian term for enstrangement, ostranenie, has 
spatial and topical resonances: “Tracing the genealogy of estrangement, Shklovsky also 
questions the autonomy and unity of the ‘national language.’ Ostranenie means more than 
distancing and making strange; it is also dislocation, depaysement. Stran is the root of the 
Russian word for country-strana” (Boym 515). And despite the risk of seeking middling 
connections everywhere, Pynchon’s epigraph is from the beginning of Gravity’s Rainbow, where 
certain denizens of London during the Blitz, riding a train, journey out of the city to new and 
unfamiliar places to live. They are, coincidentally, quite literally dis-located. 
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 But just as a boxer requires elbow room for his punch, so a writer requires the 
illusion of choice. (49)  
Again, the rhetorical stakes in the writing classroom may not be as high as they were for an 
worker/artist in Soviet Russia, but Shklovsky’s point is that, like flax, the art or artist needs 
constraint to function; it requires “oppression,” so to speak. (I do not think Shklovsky is in favor 
of political oppression. Quite the opposite.) But if here flax equal words in a language and the 
“thick sowing” equals writing constraints, we read him as ever striving for unfreedom as against 
freedom.  
A simple example from a recent class (Spring 2016) may be best. My students persisted 
in starting sentences with vernacular gerunds, pulling the progressive form of “to be” from their 
verbs. E.g. “Being troubled by the work...” instead of “Troubled by the work…” When I asked 
why they did this, no one knew. Other popular patterns showed up. General pronouns: many, 
most, some, all, people, etc. That is, they wrote sentences that contained no content applicable to 
the sentence prior or after but only existed to stave off the inevitable end—here, the completion 
of the essay. (That is, they fulfilled Shklovsky’s theory without enstranging anything, because 
the essays were full of devices, just none that performed beyond the dutiful.)  
On the next essay, I set three constraints: (1) No forms of “to be”71 at all, (2) Start all 
sentences with a strong noun72, and (3) Use at least two parentheticals. The resulting essays 
                                            
 71 This strategy is called E-Prime. E-Prime is a form of English that uses no forms of “to 
be.” Daniel Zimmerman, in an article titled “E-Prime as a Revision Strategy,” writes that “Use of 
E-Prime can help students with the revision of their own writing and to become aware of 
underlying structural errors and cognitive opacities” (343). Moreover, “E-Prime filters noise; it 
helps to bridge the gap between private notation and public communication. It can catalyze a 
permanent boost in its practitioners’ attention to language, allowing writers to construct their 
own filters and discover their own strategies, rather than to ape and clone ‘inherited’ and, 
frequently, maladaptive predilections” (346). I have, anecdotally, found this to bear truth (see 
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showed a greater attention to sentence forms, word choice, and especially verbs. The lightest 
constraint yielded denser prose.  (This doesn’t—or can’t—catalog the self-imposed constraints 
students bring to the page from past writing instructors. We all recognize the stereotypical basics: 
Don’t use first person pronouns, Paragraphs should weigh in around five sentences, All essays 
should start wide and welcoming so any discerning general reader off the street can pick up this 
general interest prose and read enthusiastically. I’d go so far as to say these kinds of shibboleths 
are neuroses of writing. Neuroses, then, are constraints that don’t yield results. Instead, they 
limit. Or, these neuroses wildly proliferate choice instead of focusing on it.) 
Sometimes, though, the constraints create themselves without my imposition, and it’s 
only afterward that I notice how they link up with what I may understand or have previously 
known about literary devices. That is, I’m also aware of how my constraints fail. But as I 
mentioned earlier, often the automatization of the previous school-based forms of writing block 
any answer to Why did you make this choice? Constraint, leading to enstrangement-as-troping, 
can then open up a space for a metacognitive recognition of the compositional methods, if only 
because it can short-circuit the perceptive process of student writers. 
As a clear example of the automatic moves I’m thinking of, and reading in class, take 
cleft sentences, those that start “Being that…,” or sentences that start with the pleonastic “I 
think.” These are the tiny habits of readymade writing. Pointing out the habits and moves and 
putting a barricade in the way of them is the first part of introducing enstrangement.  
                                                                                                                                            
more above). I.A. Richards had similar things to say about limiting one’s vocabulary in How to 
Read a Page. 
 72 By “strong” I mean anything that’s specific or a proper noun. E.g. instead of starting 
with “This” or “If one” or a pronoun. A strong noun substitution wouldn’t look like “His 
sentences are complex,” but “Word-skeins thicken the page in intricate patterns,” and so on. Or: 
“The sentences exploit quirky syntax.” Oddly enough, John Dewey’s writing style, to me, most 
exemplifies this.  
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I should mention that automatization isn’t only on the writer’s side—but also on the 
reader’s side, my side. Faced with a flood of student writing carrying out similar, if not exactly, 
the same moves, any attentive reading for a teacher surely grows daunting. How to creatively 
read what appear as slight variations of the same, repeated essay? The problem infects both 
ways. If the form controls the student, and the student doesn’t control the form, it is a place for 
slow reading to step in? For Shklovsky 
…objects are grasped spatially, in the blink of an eye. We do not see them, we 
merely recognize them by their primary characteristics. The object passes before 
us, as if it were prepackaged. We know that it exists because of its position in 
space but we see only its surface. Gradually, under the influence of this 
generalizing perception, the object fades away. This is as true of our perception of 
the object in action as of mere perception itself. It is precisely this perceptual 
character of the prose word that explains why it often reaches our ears in 
fragmentary form…In the process of algebrizing, of automatizing the object, the 
greatest economy of perceptual effort takes place. Objects are represented either 
by one single characteristic (for example, by number), or else by a formula that 
never even rises to the level of consciousness. (5) 
No matter what compositional method a student wields coming into a writing class as a 
freshmen, we shall want them to ask: is it a formula that never even rises to the level of 
consciousness? This isn’t to say every single student can’t find a way through the building up of 
habitual moves. But between the student and the teacher in the classroom, the teacher should 
take responsibility to delineate a boundary.  
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 The following are the first few lines of two short essays for the same assignment I gave 
my Autumn 2015 class. (The same assignment used in the chapter on metalepsis.) 
#2 
a. Write one page explaining a time you tried to improve your writing. 
b. What needed the improvement? That is, how was it “wrong”? 
c. How did you know how to make the writing “correct”? 
d. Define the way you use the word “improve.” 
Here’s one student’s beginning: 
Improvement can be described in many ways, but I define improvement as 
making something better. Better in the sense that by the end, you’ve learned 
something new that you had no knowledge of before and you are able to apply it 
to what you already know. 
And another: 
There are so many things humans need to survive, many of them are physical 
such as food, water, sleep, but people also need other people to survive. It is 
proven that in isolation humans go insane. Most importantly people need 
happiness, without that nothing else matters. Improvement is anything that makes 
it easier for people to survive. 
I’m not blaming these authors for any stylistic shortcomings or inconsistencies. But as a reader 
of student writing, lines like these lack performance. They don’t add up. They are, in a way, 
stock responses. Asking a student to explain or defend the above turns into a more productive 
conversation than trying to suss out what they meant on the page, because I believe students find 
oral explication and conversation more conducive, more forgiving of contradiction. Some even 
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prove confused by what they wrote when they’re given back what they wrote. As I go over these, 
I observe that each of the above excerpts both start with the typical world-wide view, glacially 
narrowing in on the topic at hand—the second one even more so; the second one is trying to 
“hook” the reader with some breed of “shocking platitude”; notice the “to be” verbs and the 
broadly defined “things” and their cohorts “something,” “anything,” “people,” and “humans.” 
The word patternings in the second example almost verge on non-content because they are so 
vague. The implications for this kind of “vaguery” point to a lack of focus on the writer’s end. 
Such a fantastically, cosmic scope is easy to propose because, who will disagree? To bring their 
focus back home is harder. To trope home is the hardest part.  
 
 
4.6 TAKING FAMILIAR STUDENT WRITING BEYOND THE PALE 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, my Spring 2016 course was titled “Utopia, Atopia, 
Dystopia.”73 And it seemed totally appropriate that the class’s topic, born of science fiction, 
should solidly imbricate with my notions of enstrangement in the classroom.)  
 Following what I’d tried in my Autumn 2015 class, I put forth a constrained approach 
after the first drafted essays came in. I’ll start with one of two essays by Jerrica. It was written 
with no constraints. Here’s the assignment I gave the class. 
#1 
a. What is the difference between telling a narrative and doing research? 
                                            
 73 The class used these three concepts as ways to read and ways to write. That is, I asked 
them to consider what a “utopic” sentence looked like, etc. It also worked with topos as a 
rhetorical idea. We read Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, Dave Eggers’s The Circle, and Kathryn 
Davis’s Duplex. The class also asked questions about the overlap between narratives, research, 
and games, since they were all important aspects of the novels and heavily explored genres in 
college writing. 
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b. How can you tell a difference, if you see one? What signals the difference? 
c. Define “narrative” and “research” in this context. 
(Do not use a dictionary, please.) 
Here is Jerrica’s essay. It had no title. 
Curiosity is an inescapable part of being human. Man has been asking 
questions since its inception and will continue to do so until its demise. When 
seeking for answers to a question, there are two places one can look: externally or 
internally. Doing research is how those who look externally find answers, while 
telling narratives allows those who turn their search inward to identify the 
answers they seek. Most works fall on a spectrum between the two, however, 
which can make a work’s categorization difficult. 
The easiest way to differentiate a narrative from research is the subject 
matter. Research is done and published by people who look for answers outside of 
themselves, so research focuses on a topic aside form the author, be it science, 
history, or art. Narrative, however, is an author-centric medium, so the material 
will be either about the author or something the author created. The possible 
variation in a narrative’s topic leads to more specific subcategories such as fiction 
or autobiography, but no matter the subcategory, the narrative always focuses on 
the author. The narrative’s focus on the author also leads to the pliable nature of 
the narrative. While an author writing a narrative can create their own version of 
reality, research is grounded firmly in the world we know to exist. Even with 
regards to nonfiction narratives, the author’s view of the subject matter, often 
themselves, can warp the story away from actuality, even with such slight 
 160 
indiscretions as hyperbole and bias. Research does not have this liberty, as it is 
rooted in fact, and any deviation can have severe consequences. However, works 
rarely fall easily into one of the two categories, and teasing apart works in the 
middle of the spectrum can be difficult at best. 
Narratives and research are two extremes, and many pieces are a mix of 
the two. An author may use research to make a narrative more realistic, like many 
science-fiction writers do, or use narrative to make research more interesting, as 
some biographers choose to do. One could even choose to do research to make a 
realistic narrative about a character doing research like Ursula LeGuin most likely 
did while writing The Dispossesed. Despite the vast and convoluted ways the two 
forms can overlap, there is a simple way to tell whether a work leans more toward 
narrative or research. A narrative will tell the reader about the author, because the 
introspective nature of the writing process allows the authors views and opinions 
to seep into the piece via themes and motifs. Conversely, research will inform the 
reader about a topic besides the author, as the external emphasis forces the author 
to focus not on their own beliefs and ideas but fact and observation from the 
world around them. 
Breaking down every piece of writing ever created by man into two 
categories is not only a daunting task, but a meaningless one. The writing forms 
of narrative and research are so often intermixed in a variety of complex ways to 
give the piece a balance, that simply breaking the spectrum into two disregards all 
of the unique mixes in between. While dividing all works into either research or 
narrative can lump together extremely different works or voices, a line can be 
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drawn when one considers whether the work informs the reader about the author 
or another subject. 
As expected, there’s the wide-scope introduction. Though she could’ve started at sentence four: 
“Doing research…” Overall, I find her thinking nuanced enough for a short response: “An author 
may use research to make a narrative more realistic, like many science-fiction writers do, or use 
narrative to make research more interesting, as some biographers choose to do.” But by the end, 
I’m not sure where she stands when she writes “simply breaking the spectrum into two.” In the 
last paragraph, she both dismisses the idea of “breaking down” genres and confirms the 
possibility of delineating “whether the work informs the reader about the author or another 
subject.” Jerrica spent a few paragraphs trying to pry, embellish, or fuss with narrative and 
research, to say something beyond the obvious. In the end, she reverts to shrugging. She ends 
with a diversion. She waves one hand to distract you from the other. The terms of the essay shift 
from narrative and research to “informing the reader about the author or another subject.” 
 This essay averages 24 words per sentence. There is no troping. There are no overt 
metaphors, similes, litotes, or the like. There’s no striking alliteration, assonance, or consonance. 
No deviant syntax. The punctuation behaves itself. The response is cogent, clear, and makes a 
good faith effort at my assignment. But that is not all that the assignment should require or need.  
Jerrica could revise. She could brush up the sentences or ideas that have threads hanging 
off. She could tighten syntax and the pleonastic “thats” and even break up paragraphs for visual 
pizzazz. But what does she come away with? What does the assignment afford her besides this? 
She’s dutiful. Too dutiful, I think. What choices has she made? She’s ostensibly worked through 
some concepts—i.e. narrative and research. Although, has she worked through the language, the 
sounds of the words playing off each other or the concepts bounding and bouncing off one 
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another? What does she take away from the sentences? What does she take away from their 
arrangement?  
Writing through constraints forces the writer to flex different “muscles.” Prose produced 
by constraint must complete a cognitive leap.74 The leap goes from a seat of relative comfort 
with meaning and use to an unaccountable and awkward employment of meaning and use. (We 
again think back to Shkovsky’s example of sowing flax closely together.)  
What follows is the assignment I gave the students in Jerrica’s class after a few 
unperformative essays. First, we read a piece from Raritan Quarterly by literary critic Karl 
Miller.75 It was called “Harry and the Pot of Gold” and offered an adult’s distanced perspective 
on the Harry Potter book series. For example, students borrowed Miller’s prose, some of which 
went like this: “Beowulf and Harry have this much in common: each is a hero, a savior, a dragon 
slayer, a shield against dark forces”; “Witches, wizards, vampires, dragons, elves, hexes, jinxes, 
unicorns, phoenixes, hippogriphs, manticores, farting screwts associate with prefects, homework, 
sports stars, bullies, teacher’s pets, teachers who don’t get on, with ‘getting people back’ and 
putting them down, in the style of classrooms and playgrounds” (132, 135). 
The majority of my 19 students grew up reading the Rowling series. Today, they are the 
adults. I figured it would catch their natural interests. I was right. We discussed the essay. Next 
class, they received the assignment. 
For this essay, I want you to answer the question, “Does a utopia need 
persuasion?” The constraint you must abide is this: you can only use the words in 
Miller’s essay to answer the question. Treat it as a giant word bank. Feel free to 
                                            
 74 See Colin Symes’s “Writing by Numbers: OuLiPo and the Creativity of Constraints” in 
Mosaic 32.3 (Sept. 1999) 87-107. 
 75 Miller, Karl. "Harry and the Pot of Gold: Document View." Raritan: A Quarterly 
Review vol. 20, no. 3, 2001, p. 132. 
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repurpose his words and short phrases into your own. Refrain from copying 
wholesale sentences. Please give the essay a title.  
The assignment was tough, deliberately so. The words “utopia” and “persuasion” don’t appear in 
Miller’s essay. So students were forced to employ enstrangement as a device and trope Miller’s 
terms, images, and concepts. Some students struggled. Some found footing. Many wrote as 
literally as possible. Which isn’t to say they weren’t good. Actually, the results of this assignment 
were the best set of responses I’d received from the class all semester. The class was exposed 
to—and encouraged to use—a collection of words and phrases and concepts they wouldn’t 
normally have had at hand. The words, phrases, and concepts weren’t unavailable to them as 
such prior to this moment, but the mere direct exposure of them as possible material set them 
into a different verbal arena from the start. They had to follow verbal detours, which lead to 
troping-as-enstrangement. The following was the longest and enstranged investigation of the 
question.  
Elsewhere 
 The (overdone) oppression of contemporary class division and social 
desolation and “getting people back” and putting them down are often deserted 
for a world elsewhere: here. There is too much magic in the air. Praised for 
offering lavish tutorial care with bourgeois-bohemian tendencies. A brilliantly 
funny fantasy of multicultural mingling. A place for people to be, and to play, and 
to be reassured. A hero, a dragon slayer, a shield against dark forces. An 
institution designed to train the elite in a system that other mortals cannot follow. 
Children have long been invited to dream, but there are occasions when the 
invitation enrages. Magic succeeds, but also fails.  
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 Children: fully capable of errors, resentment, and vexation. Who might 
well grow up to sink. A parent has an important job: award concocted intoxicants 
to be smoked or swallowed. This rescue scene is of a young wizard, claiming 
restoration to his kind. To some extent redeemed by belonging. But magic is 
subject to limit. 
 Adolescents, immune to any such encouragements (with families to desert, 
mothers and fathers to resent): the explosive handguns they were unable to 
anticipate. Tentacles will soon be reaching into affairs. Dark forces. Primal 
disaster. Prophets of doom. A poem of a thousand years ago pledged to blood. Out 
of the wilderness crawled a vile man who folded what he had (other prospects, 
alternative views) into a small, twisted package. A recruitment crisis of 
unprecedented dimensions, which belies the collapse. Children who once operated 
in comfortable relation to an adjudicated cannon, now critics suspect of birth and 
upbringing. There was some deep and stubborn difference that made even the 
progressive vicious. A scene depicting the captivity and constraint of a party. 
Finally, what the demonized pupils can hardly have hoped for: escape. Another 
brick in the history.  
 Through all the gathering gloom, a nation mourned for lost innocence. It is 
difficult to gauge what residues are present. Mothers freeing more time to devote 
to the children who they are grooming. Adults more at home with the authorial 
establishment of tradition. A connection among subjects that could sometimes 
appear to incorporate all that is arbitrary and conventional.  
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 Legend has it (and it may also be true) but some fantasies are more 
truthful than others. They were not magical. They did not transmute metal into 
pure gold or light. No wizards, witches, vampires, dragons, elves, hexes, jinxes, 
unicorns, phoenixes, hippogriphs, or manticores associated with them: the 
philosophers deemed to be sorcerers.  
Let me start a reading of this essay with a line from (formalist) film critic Roger Ebert: “A film is 
not about what it is about, but how it is about it” (“Flirt”). I want to modify this to: An essay is 
not about what it is about, but how it is about it. This is the context in which I read Jerrica’s 
essay, which one can read and scoff or get angry at the seeming opacity of it. But I applaud 
Jerrica for tenaciously hazarding this writing. As a writer, she had to carefully weigh how she 
composed her sentences through syntax, grammar, and tone. She scrapped duty for a focus on 
language. She made choices and had to reflect on those choices in a careful manner because of 
the tenuous circumstances surrounding her compositional method.  
I will isolate and explain the devices used. Then I will explain why a student should be 
aware of the devices and focus on sharpening and developing them.  
 The idea here was to have students operate within a circumscribed vocabulary. That is, 
vocabulary as raw materials. The constraints put a pressure on Jerrica (and the rest of the class) 
to choose. That is: to make more of fewer resources than less of unbounded resources. Jerrica 
subjects Karl Miller’s words to intervention—an intervention representing layers of meaning and 
purpose. She separates and re-sorts the layers. 
Notice her 11 words per sentence opposed to the prior essay’s 24. Jerrica couldn’t barrel 
into the question and copy the key terms. She couldn’t make the typical assumptions that themes 
or commonplaces promote. As I read this essay, I ask—how will Jerrica maneuver around the 
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missing terms (“utopia” and “persuasion”) and answer the question? In “Elsewhere” we aren’t 
allowed to view utopias as the classical paradise, nor can persuasion identify with anything in the 
traditional Greek or Roman background. All Jerrica had to work with were images and terms 
describing J.K. Rowling’s young adult series about a boy wizard. Above, I said the “leap [within] 
constraints goes from a seat of relative comfort with meaning and use to an unaccountable and 
awkward employment of meaning and use.” This also means troping the terms—in this case, a 
shrewd move compared with Jerrica’s previous essay. “Utopia” in the original question moves 
from a theoretical form of social structure to the duration of adulthood, the “place” where 
everything is settled and controlled from a child’s viewpoint. Persuasion transforms to 
“magic.”76 In order to answer the question, Jerrica possesses (i.e. “owns”) the terms for herself 
and answers accordingly. The effect of her tone and syntax forces the reader to adopt a fresh 
perspective.  The composition’s unity (or disjunctive pleasure) depends on the piling up of a 
continuous metaphor (itself a familiar device) through enstrangement and the smaller devices 
that make up enstrangement: e.g. repetition and variation, word patterning, and repeating phrases 
and sentence rhythms, lists, and deceleration.   
Owing to the constraint of the assignment, Jerrica needed a way in. For her it was 
redescription. As mentioned, she describes a “utopia” as “a world elsewhere”—a Shakespearean 
phrase from Coriolanus. (None of the students knew the source of this before they used it. And 
Miller didn’t reference the play in his original essay. [It appears in Act 3, Scene 3.]) Coriolanus 
states it as a way of establishing his agency outside of the citizens of Rome who’ve banished 
him: “There is a world elsewhere.” And there is. Here Jerrica borrows the phrase to establish a 
(virtual) utopia amidst the “contemporary class division and social desolation.”  
                                            
 76 Incidentally: not a totally unreasonable assumption. Consider the close connection 
between magic and rhetoric in Ancient Greece. For more in this vein, see Jacqueline De Romilly. 
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The four sequential fragments—“A brilliantly funny fantasy of multicultural mingling. A 
place for people to be, and to play, and to be reassured. A hero, a dragon slayer, a shield against 
dark forces. An institution designed to train the elite in a system that other mortals cannot 
follow”—continue enstrangement by rephrasing the first sentence, the thematic claim. As 
Shklovsky said: this is done by “not call[ing] a thing by its name” (“Art as Device” 6). The 
fragments read like blurbs found on the back of bestselling books—meant to entice and titillate. 
This is in direct opposition to the sentences/clauses that are strongly S-V-O: “Children have long 
been invited to dream…,” “A parent has an important job…,”77 and “Tentacles will soon be 
reaching into affairs.”78 
Enstrangement, though, is also developed by other devices (Shklovsky 22-23). Since 
many overlap, e.g. lists and deceleration, I include them together for brevity.  
(2) Repetition & variation. A straight forward device.  The repetition of a phrase, 
clause, or sentence with some variation, no matter how slight. Can also be considered a 
“refrain.”) 
  “magic”  
“There is too much magic in the air.” 
“Magic succeeds, but also fails.” 
“But magic is subject to limit.” 




“Children: fully capable of errors, resentment, and vexation.” 
                                            
 77 This clause in particular starts to read as a cliché, but the conclusion of the sentence is 
“…award concocted intoxicants to be smoked or swallowed”—not quite what one often believes 
a parent should do. Thus, the sentence works because of its reversal,  its undercutting of 
expectations. In this way, Jerrica turned the cliché for her use. See also: “Another brick in the 
history” asymptotically swerving toward Pink Floyd’s “Another Brick in the Wall.” 
 78 While these all use to be verbs, they are written with compelling visuals. The rest of 
the sentences’ parts support the verbs. 
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“Children who once operated in comfortable relation to an adjudicated 
 cannon, now critics suspect of birth and upbringing.” 
 
(3) Word patterning. This is the use of a series or collection of associated terms. These 
create and reinforce patterns between themes and other devices. What’s often a lost opportunity 
in student essays is a conscious effort to exploit the environs of a term.  
 negative words  
oppression, class division, desolation, putting them down, deserted, to desert, 
enrages, errors, resentment, vexation, to sink, concocted intoxicants, to resent, 
explosive handguns, tentacles, dark forces, disaster, prophets of doom, pledged to 
blood, wilderness, vile, twisted, crisis, collapse, stubborn, vicious, captivity, 




“Children have long…”  
“Children: fully capable…”  
“A parent has…”  
“Adolescents…” 
“(with families to desert, mothers and fathers to resent)” 
“Children who once operated…” 
“Mothers freeing…” 
“…children whom they are grooming.” 
“Adults more at home…” 
 
(4) Lists & Deceleration. From “Children have long been invited to dream” to the end of 
the third paragraph is a series of lists about children and adolescents. It’s also a description of 
these groups of people from slightly different perspectives in each instance. What does it add up 
to? Shklovsky writes, “The synonymous (tautological) parallelism with a transition and 
repetition from stanza to stanza turns into what is called in the poetics of the Russian song ‘a 
deceleration’” (“Plot” 25-26). This isn’t a song, of course, but it does use deceleration, the 
slowing down of prose by redescribing over and over the subject under discussion—here, young 
people.    
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 Smaller, less dramatic devices left out of this description like alliteration, assonance, 
consonance are also doing their part. But I wanted to highlight Shklovsky’s listed devices, 
especially how enstrangement allows Jerrica to trope with Miller’s language. Even with all of the 
devices in play there are moments where Jerrica’s effort strains. No doubt, there is an element of 
poetic nonsense. Jerrica becomes fascinated with enstrangement. She elaborates the controlling 
fantasy metaphor out of all proportion to its expressive value. For example, what does “Children 
once operated in comfortable relation to an adjudicated cannon, now critics suspect of birth and 
upbringing” mean? Are the “critics” the children? The placement in the clause makes it seem like 
they’re part of “an adjudicated cannon.” But if “now critics suspect of birth and upbringing” is a 
dangling modifier, we’re reading differently. There’s a grammar, but the sense is lost. So what 
comes next? How does she go on? What would come next could include having Jerrica parse the 
essay for those moments ripe for elaboration.79 Constraint and enstrangement bought her this 
initial draft. Now approaching the essay with previously disallowed terms, I’d ask her to see 
what she could she make of it. I’d ask her to keep the unique construction and tone and imagery 
intact. I’d ask her to monitor the introduction of the words “utopia” and “persuasion.” I’d warn 
her about depleting the tenacity and density of the prose with their entrance. One would hope the 








                                            
 79 I should mention that what I did in class was disperse the essays to other writers and 
had them revise the essays for sense, as much as possible, without contaminating the original 
intention. 
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Perhaps it’s better to call a familiarity a convention, since I’m leaning on the term 
enstrangement, which garages familiarity’s antonym inside of it. Charles Baxter, the novelist, in 
a well-known fiction craft essay, “On Defamiliarization,” takes on familiarity in writing, 
especially student-composed stories.  
Familiarity, after all, is a kind of power, the power to predict and the power to abstract. It 
replaces the pleasure of the unknown with the pleasures of security. It signals that our 
defenses are in place and are working. The kingdom is running smoothly. It’s running 
smoothly because no one is learning anything. (28) 
I find this equally applicable to composition courses. What Baxter sees as the deceiving and 
deflating elements of familiarity, the references to “security” and “defenses,” are precisely 
what’s damaging to language, what stops the turning of terms and the building of concepts—and, 
in the end, any kind of learning. When we think of “the power to predict” we associate a 
smoothness that leads to solutions and strong ideas. But for Baxter—and I’d say for Poirier, 
too—“the power of prediction” merely runs “smoothly.” And smoothness in writing means all 
texture, all depth, any and all topography has been ironed away. And with respect to security, 
one can see what’s coming at them from a long way away. Thus, one could say (in response to 
Amossy) that relying on clichés and familiarity means writers satisfy themselves with the 
prefabricated phrases/collocations that cost nothing to construct. It is merely a return to Bruner’s 
“expectancies.” 
 So, then, students take on troping because it helps them disinherit strong, overpowering 
terms, or it helps them break conventions through the enstrangement of those terms (in a way 
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reminiscent of metalepsis). When Richard Poirier writes that Emerson’s “only remedy was to be 
found in language itself, by continuous acts of troping, syntactical shiftings, rhetorical 
fracturings of the direction set down by the grammar of a sentence” (33), we, as teachers, are 
orienting attentions to just these moments in student writing. From these moments we can alert 
the writer to their existence. But this cannot be all. A student writes an essay, I read and 
comment upon it, pointing to places where the student “shifts syntax” or tropes on ambiguous or 
troubling terms, then the student reads my comments and asks, “Now what?”   
 One way forward asks the student to consider the implications of her writing, especially 
the implications of it resembling someone outside of her ability, a writer who may turn out to put 
pressure upon her ability. What can a student make of that conjunction? This would continue 
with them trying on a redoubled effort to digest and rewrite the essay with those writers in mind, 
and then I’d reread with more comments. This method could keep going on. As I read student 
work, I’m open to the troped moments where the language isn’t giving them what they want but 
they’re trying it on anyway. 
And I think we’ve seen this far, students wrench the rhetorical and grammatical 
positioning and meaning of the language into a possibility for their own display and meanings. 





4.8 THE ENSTRANGEMENT OF “UNDERSTANDING” 
 
 
In order to see better how this works in the classroom, I’m including another entire four 
paragraph essay written by a student of mine—Anna Ridgway—from the Autumn 2015 semester 
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that I think warrants a reading that pays attention to troping-as-enstrangement. Again, the class 
was the “The Unexamined Life.” The premise of the course hinged on the word “exam”—that is, 
most people tend to shirk or evade exams, so why would we want to examine our lives? The 
course also spent time engaging in the kind of discussions that gave importance to peering into 
terms and holding them accountable. We had started asking questions and examining certain 
terms in the course and our readings, and I encouraged the class to dispute these terms when they 
felt it was necessary.  
Anna wrote her essay in response to “On Not Getting It” by psychologist Adam Phillips. 
In his piece, Phillips persuades readers to find comfort in “not getting it.” What Phillips himself 
means with this phrase—by his own admission—isn’t entirely clear. Here’s the first full 
paragraph from Phillips’s essay to show his style and his terms. 
No one wants to be the person who doesn’t get it. Doesn’t get the joke, doesn’t 
understand what’s being said, what’s going. The ‘it’, once again, being an object 
of desire. Because we want it, we want to get it; we want the pleasure of not being 
amused by it; but either way we have to get it. What you get when you get it, 
though, as jokes make patently clear, is not as obvious as it first seems; as Freud 
once remarked, no one ever quite knows what it is about a joke that amuses them. 
We can get pleasure from a joke only when we understand it, but we don’t always 
understand our understanding. Here, at least, getting it and not getting it go 
together. But mostly, not getting it, whatever it is, means being left out; left out of 
the group that does get it, and exempt from the pleasure that getting it gives. (34) 
This was why I chose the essay: the switch-backing and repetitious style, the inability for the 
reader to escape the first personal plural Phillips uses. One necessarily jumps to a conclusion 
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about definitions and offers that “not getting it” is anytime we miss out on what goes on around 
us, thus falling into a state of inferiority. This was the general consensus in class discussion. But 
in the essays I received, students did subtle work  meshing with Phillips’s terms. There were 
ambiguous terms doing double—or treble—duty. Again, my assignment to them for this essay 
was to read Phillips’s essay and discuss it while disputing his language. I purposely kept the 
assignment loose in order to let the students surprise me with their selections or directions. So 
the question is where was Anna troping? What should I do next? 
 
Craving to “Get It” 
 In the essay “On Not Getting it” Phillips asks “[w]hy is it so hard to enjoy 
not getting it?” (45) The “it” for example would be not understanding the 
punchline of a joke. He recommends not understanding ourselves and others 
because it takes away from our lives. Unfortunately, Phillips is wrong in this 
regard. “Getting it” is part of human nature, fuels passions and innovation. 
Humans strive to understand. To understand the world, the universe, and the 
people around us. Although we can never possibly understand everything, we can 
still strive to understand more. Who would ever say “well we cannot possibly 
know everything, so why try?” That would never happen. The need to understand 
fuels human innovation. Without it, there would be no modern science, 
technology, or progression. “Getting it” fuels my passion for knowledge. I always 
want to learn more, know more. I could never enjoy not getting it. I respect those 
who drive themselves to “get something”, to understand and ask questions more 
than I respect those who, as Phillips writes “enjoy not getting it”. 
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 I refuse to believe that our lives are consumed with the need to understand. 
The want to understand does not make my life any less meaningful or 
extraordinary than someone who does not care if they “get it”. Is it really so 
wrong to want to understand a work of Shakespeare? Does it really make out lives 
so bland because we “dumb down” Hamlet by translating it into modern English? 
When I read Shakespeare on Sparknotes, its not to make it easier on myself or to 
dumb down his works, but it is to get the full effect and meaning behind 
Shakespeare’s words. While Phillips writes that it should be acceptable when 
someone does not understand, that we should “enjoy not getting it”, but is it really 
so wrong to want to understand. To slave over a piece of work, so that I 
understand the meaning and the reasons behind the language or rereading a novel 
over and over again to accumulate new information and dive deeper into the 
depths of the book and fully immerse myself so that I can fully understand and 
“get it”. How could anything be enjoyable if you do not understand it? How 
would any movie be enjoyable if the whole time is spent in confusion? To me, 
nothing would be enjoyable at that point. 
 The problem with “getting it” is that one person’s understanding can differ 
from another’s. Take Uganda for example, they have a law that puts gay people to 
death. Ugandan’s think they are getting it and others believe they get it, when they 
oppose the idea of putting gay people to death. In a perfect world, I would say if 
we continued to try to understand one another equality would be achieved for 
everyone, but this is not a perfect world. In fact, our world is perfectly imperfect. 
Those with opposite opinions already believe they understand and there is no way 
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to change their minds (unless by force) and I really have no solution to this 
problem because strongly held beliefs are the most difficult thing to change or 
influence in a person. More often than not, those with strong beliefs will not even 
compromise, so there is no easy solution. 
 Yes, Phillips may be talking about “getting” a punchline of a joke or 
meaning or a poem, but the incessant need and want for knowledge and 
understanding is what drives humanity. “Getting it” allows humanity to 
understand the world and each other, to empathize, and try to improve for the 
better. It means progression. My own penchant for knowledge and willingness to 
work hard stems from my need to understand. While I disagree with Phillips 
wanting people to enjoy not getting it, I do agree that there should be no 
humiliation in not getting it because failure is a part of the process of 
understanding. This is not about societies expectations for everyone to get it, but 
about humanities necessity and personal desire for knowledge, understanding, and 
“getting it”. 
To an extent, this essay is Themewriting in the Colesian mode. But themes still have odd internal 
workings. They still have moments of possibility, and we should read them as such, with both a 
careful and critical eye. I follow Peter Wayne Moe’s reading of Coles’s method of dismantling 
Themewriting in The Plural I, when Moe points out in an extended analysis that student writing 
is often inhabiting “epideictic rhetoric,” that of praise and blame (437). For Moe, “[Coles’s] 
classroom is one of resistance that shows forth the potential of the epideictic to reshape shared 
values. Coles addresses the problems of trite and banal epideictic rhetoric head on: his teaching 
confronts flashy but substantively weak writing, his assignments push students past hasty 
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conclusions and toward sustained inquiry, and his discussions show that much is at stake in this 
classroom, even as he and his students do little more than praise and blame student writing” 
(437-38, emphasis added). I think Anna’s paper falls squarely into the praise and blame category 
of epideictic. How else to read her paragraphs on reading Shakespeare and Ugandan politics? 
They can do nothing else but praise and blame with so little space to work deeper with the 
materials. Her major claims are too unwieldy for such a short piece, they take on hasty 
conclusions (“This is not about societies expectations for everyone to get it, but about humanities 
necessity and personal desire for knowledge, understanding, and ‘getting it’”) which stop just 
short of sustained inquiry. Of course, that could be a symptom of the assignment and its length.  
But notice two things about Anna’s paper: (1) forms of “understand” appear twenty-four 
times; (2) forms of “getting it” appear seventeen times. For such a short essay, these terms 
shoulder a significant amount of work for Anna. This is what led me to suss out what she tried to 
make of these two terms: one given by Phillips; the other her own contribution. 
 Aside from her tilting toward the windmills in mentions of Shakespeare, Ugandan 
oppression against homosexuals, and science and technology on a broad scale, she makes plastic 
the verb “understand” in interesting ways—ways I don’t think she herself recognized in the 
composing. The verb is frequently accompanied by other verbs, verbs which parade their punch 
and power: “fuel,” “drive,” “craving,” “need,” “want,” and “strive.” I don’t doubt she is enacting 
her passion through the prose. But why divorce “getting it” from “understanding”? Even in the 
first two sentences, she sets up the reader to translate “it” into “not understanding the punch line 
of a joke.” And then she reverses course by focusing more on the positive “getting it” rather than 
Phillips’s original “not getting it.” 
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 She favors understanding over getting it. She writes as if getting it is a preparatory stage 
for understanding, as if she’s shading out rough areas of epistemology. E.g. in the second 
paragraph, Anna proclaims: “I refuse to believe that our lives are consumed with the need to 
understand. The want to understand does not make my life any less meaningful or extraordinary 
than someone who does not care if they ‘get it’” (my italics). People, in her eyes, want and need 
understanding, but merely “get it.” To demote Phillips’s term, especially if she disagrees with 
him/it, makes sense. It’s a shrewd move—the forking of the original term allows her a way to 
balance both her interlocutor’s position with her own (if overconfident) position. 
 Although, in the first paragraph, she uses Phillips’s term with aplomb even though her 
own term starts cropping up all over the paragraph. Graphically, if one circles the two terms in 
different colors (as I have done in red and green in my physical copy) it begins to look spatially 
tactical, like a football coach’s playbook or a general’s survey of a battle—her terms 
considerably outnumber Phillips’s. This holds true for almost the entire paper. I find her troping 
on “understanding”—again, a word centrally located in epistemological studies and 
philosophy—interesting, difficult, and refreshing and, oddly, thick. As I read, I am brought into 
her turning, her layering. Poirier believes with problematic terms like “understanding”—or what 
I’m assigning to the word—“the dictionary will be of little help in determining how they 
function” because “they are constantly being troped within sentences that insist that readers, too, 
must involve themselves in the salutary activity of troping” (129). He goes on to say that the 
“salutary” effect “might…make us less easily intimidated by them.” And I agree. 
 For the student, “understanding” has not only violent implications but latent ones. She 
distrusts the manifest (or what she’s designated as the manifest). See the end of the second 
paragraph where she asks if 
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it [is] really so wrong to want to understand. To slave over a piece of work, so that I 
understand the meaning and the reasons behind the language…to accumulate new 
information and dive deeper…and fully immerse myself so that I can fully understand and 
‘get it’. (my italics) 
These are not patient, neutral terms. For her, she has “to slave” to reach understanding. Although 
two paragraphs later she’ll claim “there should be no humiliation in not getting it because failure 
is a part of the process of understanding,” I still read a spectrum of “understandings.” What, I 
wonder, is “fully understanding”? Is there “partial understanding,” then? Further below this, 
“understanding” plays off neighborly terms and gains mirth as a quality. “How could anything be 
enjoyable if you do not understand it?” she asks. “How would any movie be enjoyable if the 
whole time is spent in confusion? To me, nothing would be enjoyable at that point?” 
Understanding underpins enjoyment. Or, if one has to slave to get there, it pins enjoyment down. 
But these are all smaller moves compared to the troping she does in the third paragraph. 
This is the political paragraph where the meaning shifts a lot—and the student (I think 
unbeknownst to herself) enstranges the term “understanding” when she claims: 
I would say if we continued to try to understand one another equality would be achieved 
for everyone, but this is not a perfect world. In fact, our world is perfectly imperfect. 
Those with opposite opinions already believe they understand and there is no way to 
change their minds (unless by force) and I really have no solution to this problem because 
strongly held beliefs are the most difficult thing to change or influence in a person. 
It is the second use of “understand” that moves away from the familiar definition of “perceive 
significance” or “be sympathetically aware.” For her, the opposition “understands” in a way that 
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doesn’t resemble the popular definition of understanding at all. (One almost wants to read it as 
italicized.)  
 Now I’ll put my cards on the table and say that, prior to reading Poirier on troping, I’d 
have made some solemn injunction to Anna about cleaning up the “understanding” litter that’s 
strewn about, the way the word spreads all over the place. Or I’d have asked her to be specific 
and concrete. There’s nothing a priori wrong about those kinds of comments, but to me they halt 
the struggle of the self against itself that seems to entail a productive and intelligent working 
through of reading and writing.  
Moreover, Anna’s move is enstrangement, but here it is also what’s rhetorically called 
ploche—the simple repetition of a word. More than that, it is antanaclasis—the repetition of a 
word where the meaning changes in each use. 80  But finally, I confer enstranged-status upon it 
because the meaning of “understand” ends up taking on a slew of different non-recognizable 
meanings in the context of use. And I want to end this section on student writing, and Anna’s 
“understanding,” with Hayden White’s take on familiarity and unfamiliarity—and by a certain 
circuitous route, propriety and impropriety. 
Understanding is a process of rendering the unfamiliar, or the “uncanny” in Freud’s sense 
of that term, familiar; of removing it from the domain of things felt to be “exotic” and 
unclassified into one or another domain of experience encoded adequately enough to be 
felt to be humanly useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by association. This process 
of understanding can only be tropological in nature, for what is involved in the rendering 
of the unfamiliar into the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative. (Tropics, 5)  
                                            
80 See Fahnestock on the figure of “ploche” in Rhetorical Figures in Science, 159-161. 
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White makes a strong point for troping and enstrangement, but with his use of “understand” as 
the word troped/enstranged, I find this deeply ironic and instructive. Through Anna’s draft, I read 
her as trying to understand “understand”—yet she’s going beyond the move of making the 
“uncanny” familiar. I agree with White that the “process of understanding can only be 
tropological in nature”—(“figures of thought,” indeed!)—but here the process of understanding 
both tropes itself and the term, turning doubly tropological. White’s point is that understanding 
happens tropologically, through tropes, through the turning of terms. Shklovsky’s goal with 
enstrangement was to make the familiar come back home to us through making the familiar 
strange. It is a reintroduction of what’s so close to us because it had faded away from use. That’s 
what I see Anna starting to do in her paper, trying to push back on “understanding” and making it 
do heavy lifting again. She’s not allowing it to sit and become too familiar a term that the reader, 
or herself, loses sight of what it means—or could mean—to understand something. Something 
large (Ugandan politics regarding gay people) and something relatively small (comprehending 
Shakespeare). Of course, I came to this reading by attending to the organization, the grammar, of 
one word following another, asking how those facts or phrases are linked. And most times the 
student sentences are indicative, factual. Other times, the sentences bend toward the mood of 
subjunctivity. I will end this chapter with a short discussion of what (and how) mood, 




4.9 ENSTRANGEMENT & SUBJUNCTIVITY: PUSHING TOWARD THE OPENING OF 
A CONCEPTUAL SPACE 
 
 
In this final section of this chapter, I will extend and explore the implications for why 
enstrangement is valuable to composition and rhetoric and to help further elaborate the student 
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examples above. To do this, I will turn to critical literature in science fiction studies, specifically 
ideas brought out by critic Darko Suvin and the novelist Samuel R. Delany. This may seem like a 
knight’s move from the topic of writing into a topic more situated in literature, but it’s less 
obtuse than it at first appears.  
 In a 1972 College English article, Darko Suvin argued that science fiction (SF) was a 
“literature of cognitive estrangement” (372).81 It follows from his argument that SF carries 
within itself its own “coherent poetics” of which estrangement is a part, as well as “exclusive 
interest in a strange newness, a novum” (373). A novum can be considered the thing which a SF 
story puts forth as the speculative core. E.g. Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed proposed a 
device for faster-than-light communication across light years called an “ansible.” Of course, an 
anisble is impossible in modern science. But in the novel, Le Guin explains how (by 
extrapolating from current scientific principles) an ansible would work. Thus, Le Guin had to 
anchor her idea in a fact (information can’t travel faster than light; gravity is a force acting all 
throughout the universe; the Einsteinian principle of simultaneity, etc.), and then push past that 
into an area of conception that broached what was known. Both cognitive estrangement and the 
novum play a part in how I’ve been describing Shklovsky’s contribution of enstrangement in 
student writing. Suvin notes, parenthetically, Shklovsky’s ostranenie and cites him as a source of 
the idea, yet, for him, still a ways below the greater influence of Bertolt Brecht.82 What’s most 
salient in Suvin’s article, though, is the following thesis. 
                                            
81 Note that Suvin spells the word without the “n” that I’ve added. The concepts are 
exactly the same, though.   
82 Brecht came after Shklovsky but still had an influence on enstrangement. For more, see 
Brecht’s “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting” and Fredric Jameson’s Brecht and Method, pp. 
39-40.  
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SF is, then a literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and 
interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment. (375) 
For Suvin, the term cognition “implies a creative approach tending toward a dynamic 
transformation rather than toward a static” (377).83 Since SF, as a genre, is cognitive 
estrangement, we have a kind of writing that (in my own redefinition) creatively makes-
unfamiliar what’s often taken-as-familiar so as to play up the dynamicism of the environment. 
The student writing that I’ve used as examples of enstrangement have, to some degrees small and 
large, worked to make dynamic what was static, to make unfamiliar what was familiar. The 
reason why the turn to SF studies makes sense at this point in the chapter (and dissertation) is the 
devotion and theorizing on the strange and the focus on making the reader of the writing work to 
establish what Suvin refers to as the novum. I would also argue that Suvin’s “cognitive 
estrangement” is part of what takes place inside the moments of enstrangement, here and 
elsewhere, in student writing. Yet his “cognitive estrangement” is still just an effect of the 
writing. What is it that is in the writing, i.e. what does the writing do that brings about Suvin’s 
idea?  
 For this, I turn to SF novelist Samuel R. Delany and his idea of “subjunctivity.” 
Traditionally, the subjunctive is a grammatical mood that denotes what’s imagined, wished, or 
has potential or possibility. Opposed to that is the indicative, which denotes facts and factual 
events, what-is-real-already. Delany offers a slightly different take on the former grammatical 
mood. He writes: “A distinct level of subjunctivity informs all the words in an s-f story at a level 
that is different from that which informs naturalistic fiction, fantasy, or reportage” (31). While 
                                            
83 This can, and should, remind the reader of Dewey’s definition of perception noted 
above. 
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Delany narrows the effects of subjunctivity to SF, I want to point out that he has later mentioned 
that different levels of subjunctivity exist, which depend on genres, tropes, and structures.84 And 
it shouldn’t be a stretch to apply subjunctivity to writing that isn’t SF, because in this instance 
student writing has all of the above: genres (inside of the genre of student writing), tropes, and 
structures. Thus: 
Subjunctivity is the tension on the thread of meaning that runs between…sound-image 
and sound-image. Suppose a series of words is presented to us as a piece of reportage. A 
blanket indicative tension informs the whole series: this happened. That is the particular 
level of subjunctivity at which journalism takes place. Any word, even the metaphorical 
ones, must go straight back to a real object, or a real thought on the part of the reporter. 
(31) 
The last moment here is most important because of Delany’s framing of subjunctivity. While for 
Delany subjunctivity is confined to SF, the grammatical mood makes a lot of sense in a 
composition and rhetoric pedagogy. How can this be? Part of the ambit of SF, according to 
Suvin, is the novum, often the engine of the SF story, the thing that requires research and 
speculation/extrapolation on the part of the author. What could this have to do with first-year 
writing or rhetoric classes? It shouldn’t be too hard to see the term novum shifting, or applying, 
to the ways we ask student writers to build, create, or fashion ideas and concepts in their writing 
                                            
84 Delany writes in “Three Letters to Science Fiction Studies” in Starboard Wine: “My 
own thinking on science fiction over the past ten years leads me to the observation that the 
differences between contemporary science fiction and other modes of writing are akin to the 
differences among, say, poetry, prose reportage, prose fiction, and drama; the differences, as I 
see it, are formally categorical. Note that all these categories may or may not manifest, faintly or 
strongly, elements of ‘narrative structure.’ What is important, however, is the different weights, 
the different demands, the different rhetorical tropes, figures, and structures with which narrative 
may be manifested in each category” (177). It is the last part—the “in each category”—that I’m 
leaning on most.  
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that go beyond the commonplace, the cliché, the “hasty conclusion” and/or those that hazard a 
breaking of clichés by enstranging them. We ask students in writing classes, whether we know it 
or not, to resist relying on or dwelling too long inside of the indicative. We are asking them to 
step into the subjunctivity that Delany describes.  
 This is not to say that we are asking students to write SF or speculative fiction or 
anything like that. Rather, the subjunctivity that works for SF can also work for writers in 
courses where the remit is Thinking, Examining, Analyzing, Concept Building, and so on. For 
example, Jerrica’s first essay seems easily, squarely in the indicative mood. Whereas her troped 
second paper is emphatically in a subjunctive mood enabled by enstrangement and constraint. To 
fixate on the indicative is to waver in language through facts-as-presently-known. The indicative 
mood, though, is only a part of the toolbox of grammar and rhetoric. The arrangement of facts is 
a partial method that needs the aid of the-hasn’t-happened-yet. What I mean by this is that 
students need facts, but they also need individual, idiosyncratic, and analytic sentences that 
broach what Delany calls the subjunctive.  
 To help contextualize this, I’d like to take as an example the first “Course Goal” in the 
University of Pittsburgh’s Seminar in Composition syllabus: “Engage in writing as a creative, 
disciplined form of critical inquiry.” I can’t state with certainty how grammatical moods play (or 
don’t play) a part in that goal, but I do know that, historically, one way we know how to 
creatively inquire is through the subjunctive in language. For example, asking, “What if…?” or 
“How should this be different…?” or “What would you think of…?” As Delany elaborates, “The 
particular subjunctive level of s-f expands the freedom of the choice of words that can follow 
another group of words meaningfully; but it limits the way we employ the corrective process as 
we move between them” (“About Five Thousand” 32). I take this to mean that one can write an 
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indicative sentence like “The bear raised up on its legs and roared,” and no one would blink. But 
a sentence that went, “The bear stood up on its legs and yelled” may be taken with more 
suspicion because of the human-sounding verbs attached to it. The “corrective process” Delany 
mentions would swiftly push those verbs aside because the overall meaning seems factual. We 
could translate it as: A bear got up on its back legs and made a loud noise. Now, in a subjunctive 
sentence, I could see it going, “The bear stood up on its legs and yelled my name.” By itself, “my 
name” is a normal phrase, as was the rest of the sentence prior to that. Put together, my 
subjunctive sentence, as Delany explains, “expand[s] the freedom of the choice of words that can 
follow another group of words meaningfully” (32). We would understand my sentence to not be 
reportage or academic research. Instead, it would be immediately recognizable as fiction or 
playful writing. And as we’ve seen, in the composition and rhetoric classroom, and in student 
writing, subjunctivity appears when students are conceptualizing or saying something beyond 
their own footing in the facts. They are reaching beyond themselves into a new conceptual space. 
They are theorizing or hypothesizing when they are in the subjunctive. They are testing out ideas 
throughout and within language. But all of these elements must come together for 


























“We do not usually know what someone will say,  
but we are prepared to interpret any of a very large  
number of things that person might say.” 
 
Donald Davidson, “The Second Person” 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: WHY COMPARE ESSAYS? A RATIONALE 
 
 
In the preceding three chapters, I’ve shown how what I’ve labeled the “misfit” rhetorical tropes 
of metalepsis, catachresis, and enstrangement appear as methods of argument (and sometimes 
disputation) in order to try and solve (or dissolve) certain problems or issues that occur in student 
writing. While this dissertation is not a quantitative analysis of writing, it does want to try and be 
as thorough and comprehensive as possible with regards to the methodologies of slow reading 
and ordinary language that was sketched out in the introduction and carried out in the subsequent 
chapters. And in order to examine whether misfit tropes show up in my courses only or if they 
also occur across a wider spectrum of student writing, I’ve chosen to examine essays from my 
English Department at the University of Pittsburgh that may best display these rhetorical 






5.1.1 How an Essay Gets Nominated or Submitted, etc. 
 
The following is from the webpage detailing the Composition Program Award Guidelines: 
 The Composition Program honors excellent undergraduate writing created in its 
classes by awarding cash prizes to winners of the Ossip Award for Excellence in Seminar 
in Composition or the Award for Advanced Composition.  
 Each year’s panel of judges looks for thoughtfully crafted essays that explore a 
subject’s complexity. 
 To showcase both the range and the quality of work valued by the Composition 
Program, prize-winning essays from recent years are published here with permission of 
the student authors (who retain copyright to their work). Each essay is accompanied by 
commentary from the judges, highlighting what they considered award worthy. It should 
be noted that most contest winners were first-year students at the time of writing and that 
papers were not revised or edited for web publication. The essays are not being offered as 
models of perfected student writing nor as templates for a successful paper; they 
represent outstanding achievement by students who submitted their work to the writing 
contest for each academic year. (“Composition”) 
What’s most interesting about this description is the lack of revision or editing and the claim that 
“essays are not being offered as models of perfected student writing nor as templates” for future 
students. The judges look for “thoughtfully crafted essays” that somehow work to dig through a 
“subject’s complexity,” but how or what such a process looks like isn’t stated outright. The 
parameters are vague enough for the judges to choose what seems most appropriate in any given 
year, and this is important because there is no set rubric. Thus, students don’t need to write 
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toward a certain audience or around a particular subject. Nor are students compelled to write 
after a proscribed style.  
 So how a teacher decides on what to nominate varies widely. If a student paper in a 
Seminar in Composition course seems suitable, then it can be submitted. If a student paper in 
Introduction to Critical Reading is a stand-out, then it, too, can be submitted. And so on. It’s the 
writing teacher’s discretion that seems to promote students’ submissions. There are perhaps, in 
any given semester at Pitt, around 100 undergraduate writing courses being offered. It’s safe to 
say that those classes are taught by a wide collection of teachers, many of which may not know 
each other, and aren’t privy to how everyone else is teaching the same or different course. The 
point here is that there’s enough difference between the courses and the teachers’ pedagogical 
interests and approaches that one could expect a collection of papers that don’t all hew to some 
rigid and identical standard. In fact, the way the courses at Pitt are spread out across the 
faculty—full-time and adjunct—it would seem to be impossible. Therefore, if I do come across 
evidence of troping with the misfit tropes as mentioned above, then some questions to be asked 
could be: How does troping make itself available to a student in these papers? Does it derive 
from the same rhetorical exigence as the ones my own students faced? And if the exigence is 




5.2 STUDENT EXAMPLES 
 
 
Among the awards submissions for 2013-2014, of which there are 65, there’s a paper titled “10 
Responses to Porchia” which begins with an aphorism from Antonio Porchia (an Italian-
Argentinian poet) that goes “Truth has very few friends and those few are suicides.” The student 
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essay (anonymously submitted and with no identification of instructor or assignment prompt) 
then proceeds to give ten numbered responses to the aphorism, almost (one could say) riffing on 
the aphorism, trying to build off of it. Here’s response number six: 
Would the opposite of this aphorism hold true? Falseness has very many friends and 
those many live as long as they can. Falseness could manipulate people into becoming its 
friends. False people could lie to people and flatter them to make it seem more likable. In 
this way, the false could have many friends. Pertaining to the second clause, perhaps the 
friends of Falseness live as long as they can because they are afraid of death. They could 
be afraid of the truth of death. They could fear the nonexistence of an afterlife, or, if 
falseness is wickedness, they could be afraid of eternal judgment for their falseness. 
Maybe the pearly gates don’t open for the false, so they avoid it for as long as they can.  
I include this excerpt because it is a candidate for the misfit trope of enstrangement. While the 
passage does not exactly describe a thing in words nor normally used to describe it, the student 
does take a parallax view on the topic, one that forces the reader to view the aphorism from an 
enstranged point of view, renewing the familiar by making it unfamiliar. Although, while this 
reversed aphorism starts off going in one direction, I think it’s interesting that the conclusion of 
the aphorism is close to the same thing either way. Truth in death. Life in falsity. But then, that’s 
the point of the misfit trope.  
 The next essay’s focus is on negotiating (and terminating) a close friendship in high 
school because of a moral deterioration through suspect actions. The following paragraphs are 
from the middle of the essay. 
 “Tell me,” she said, and I blinked hard, knowing something difficult was to 
follow, “what happened between you and Megan?”  With my eyes still closed, dreaming, 
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I said, “She died in a drunk-driving incident.”  Alex quickly corrected me, “No, she’s 
alive and well. Stupid, but well.” He was telling the truth, and I wasn’t – to some degree.  
She was dead to me.  I went through a mourning phase for her, or for whom I thought she 
was.  I knew she wasn’t perfect, but I had this image of her as someone responsible and 
rational, cautious and careful, compassionate, and yet, still fun and enjoyable. She was 
someone more like me, maybe, or what I try to be.  When the reality of her actions 
shattered this image, she, my perception of her, died.  I haven’t been able to process it 
completely – this “it” being how we’ve both changed for better and for worse. 
“No, really.  Tell me.”  I went through the whole story: how Megan had a 
Halloween party, how Alex and I went as Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera, how I told her 
in advance that I didn’t feel comfortable drinking in a church youth house, how when I 
got there no one was sober enough to get our costumes.  Megan offered to drive me home 
if I participated; I said that she couldn’t remember how to get to my house sober after all 
these years, let alone tipsy, and I left the party within an hour of arriving because I felt so 
alone in my group of friends.  I wonder if I said it with as much venom then as I did when 
I recalled my words.  “It was one thing when we’d sleepover, but another when everyone 
insisted on leaving after.  She was trying to impress her college friends.  I was the only 
one sober, and I’ve never been so sober in my whole life.” 
 Mrs. Sweet was silent.  She tipped her chair back, and closed her eyes.  I used to 
be made uncomfortable by these silences, until I had some of my own.  I realized this was 
her processing.  Sometimes she would come back from these silences with nothing to say, 
because the picture I had painted spoke for itself, saying all that was necessary.  My 
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experience was so sobering – the truth became clear, that my friends and I were no longer 
interested in the same things, that we were no longer friends.  (emphasis added) 
Here, the final instance of “sobering” is my candidate for enstrangement in the way that Anna’s 
“understanding” was troped and enstranged in the previous chapter. What this author means by 
“sobering” isn’t a reference to what we think of as physically drunk/sober, but she was 
intellectually drunk/hazy and then “brought to a reality” of some sort. That is, even while 
unaffected by alcohol in the recollection, she was still “under the influence” of a former 
friendship. It is a troping on the starting and ending points of what we ordinarily think of as 
being sober. But in this case, “being sober” means physically un-drunk. Growing sober or getting 
“sobered up” by her telling Mrs. Sweet the story clears a conceptual mist. The root of the word 
“sober” comes from the Latin “ebrius”, meaning intoxicated or drunk. Further back than Latin it 
possibly comes from Hittite for “you will drink.” A poetic definition of “ebrius” is “full.” So 
reading the line, “My experience was so sobering” can be read as “My experience was so 
emptying”—which is what comes later in the paragraph when the author describes losing her 
mutual interests and friendship. The enstrangement clicks when the reader gets that the author 
saw being sober as already-drunk-in-some-capacity-worse-than-alcohol. Her enstranged 
“sobering” is meant—again, in this context—as clearing away (or emptying) the de-intoxicated 
state we often think of. The writer is reaching for an aggressively clear-headed state of 
awareness.   
 The exigency of this essay, so far as I can tell, is one of trying to establish authority over, 
or to justify, the decision of cutting the friend out. But is it dodging or working through a 
commonplace, avoiding it? Does the enstrangement trope away from the commonplace? Well, is 
it commonplace to write a reflection essay on a time when you had to make a difficult decision; 
 192 
or had to make a major life choice; or construct writing that follows the traditional 
bildungsroman? It can all be commonplace, yes. But it then depends on how the authors handles 
it. And I’d argue that this author swerves past a potential cliché pitfall in that last sentence purely 
by the use of “sobering” in the way she does. (This is what I’d argue and be prepared to say to 
the student if they were my student.) To be fair, the last sentence does also take part in 
anagnorisis (as we saw in the second chapter), in the recognition of how all past actions (the 
author’s misjudgment of her friend) had been flawed up to that point. Yet the use of “sobering” 
forgives that potential rhetorical habit.  
 I’d like to, here in this last chapter, make an uncommon plea for anagnorisis, despite my 
seeming put downs and reading too much of it into the student writing in this dissertation. 
Anagnorisis may seem like a moment that forces its Ancient Greek dramatic goo over all 
assignments, a bane to writing, but that’s not so. Many of these essays are written in the first-
person point of view, and as such, are to be taken seriously, especially when claims about change 
or difference or transformation appear. In an essay titled “First Person Authority,” philosopher of 
language Donald Davidson tries to make clear how it is we think we’re dead positive about our 
own self-ascribed “belief, desire, or intention to [our] present self” and how it doesn’t hold that 
others can do the same when trying to assign similar beliefs, desires, or intentions to us (xiii). 
Davidson goes on: “Though there is first person authority with respect to beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes, error is possible; this follows from the fact that the attitudes are 
dispositions that manifest themselves in various ways, and over a span of time. Error is possible; 
so is doubt. So we do not always have indubitable or certain knowledge of our own attitudes [Cf. 
with Cavell in Introduction]. Nor are our claims about our own attitudes incorrigible. It is 
possible for the evidence available to others to overthrow self-judgments” (4). I expect, as a 
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reader of first-year writing, to see a lot of these self-assessment and self-aware moments where 
the writer breaks through to a (potentially, self-described) new level of realization about 
themselves, the world, or others. I’m not denigrating that rhetorical move. If anything, I 
encourage it. But I do think it would be a failure on my part, as a writing teacher, to let students 
persist in the commonplace moves that keep those anagnoristic moments stale and hackneyed as 
weekday sitcom plotlines. So I take Davidson’s point above two ways: first, I find him saying 
that we can never be entirely certain, or held to, our beliefs, desires, or intentions, because we 
change over time and thus, our self-claims can be wrong in light of new ideas, materials, or 
“evidence” in the future. This evidence can be given to us by someone else, and though 
Davidson doesn’t suggest it, I would say that the other person can often be the future self (see the 
example above). Second, such an explanation goes a long way to making sense of why so many 
students write about these transformative times in their lives. And why the kind of reading I’ve 
giving to these student essays is even possible—because, as Davidson writes, “claims about our 
own attitudes [aren’t] incorrigible.”  
 In an essay titled, “A Heartless Home and Many Homeless Hearts” (the title itself a 
chiasmus), the writer focuses on the reading of an Edward Said essay called, “States.” This title 
of the essay is, in itself, a troping: chiasmus. There is an ability to see one subject/topic/object 
from another (opposite?) position. Thus the criss-crossing of action of chiasmus. But the subtle 
nod to an interest in troping, and perhaps a peek at the writer’s argumentative method, the misfit 
trope I’ve located here is metalepsis. Specifically, the version M2—reversal of cause and effect. 
The metaleptic feeling starts early, with the writer setting it up. I excerpt the essay a few pages 
in, where the writer is discussing the complexity of Palestinian cultural heritage and expression.  
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Exile, I believe, has forced the Palestinian people to change.  They were forced to 
exchange their homes for mere shelters, their entire homeland of Palestine for random 
areas of land to live, and a pure authentic lifestyle for one marbled by the cultures of the 
nations in which they sought refuge.  The combination of authentic Palestinian objects, 
speech, and practices with those of other societies creates an interesting blend of culture 
for the new generation by which to define itself in exile.   
We see the writer beginning to examine and parse the history of the Palestinian people, how 
they’re “marbled”—an interesting term, considering the solidity, and inflexibility, of marble, to 
say nothing of its ability to be carved into beautiful objects. Though we should stop and look at 
this verb closely. Here we may have yet another metaleptic moment of M2. The way the writer 
describes the Palestinian lifestyle, they suggest that it has been “marbled” by those on the 
outside, by “the cultures of the nations in which they sought refuge.” True enough. But who has 
the agency here? The Palestinians or the nations welcoming them? The way the line is written 
seems to suggest that the Palestinians are absorbing the cultures of the exile countries, and the 
marbling is being done to them. “Marbled” is intriguing here simply because it’s a medium in 
which to make things, to carve things, to extract shape and form, much as an exiled culture can 
undergo shaping, forming. The writer chooses the object as a verb and makes it the way toward 
agency. As an analogous example, one might not say that  
They were forced to exchange their homes for mere shelters, their entire homeland of 
Palestine for random areas of land to live, and a pure authentic lifestyle for one 
clayed/wooded/pigmented by the cultures of the nations in which they sought refuge.   
Oddly, “pigmented” works. These certain terms are doing double-duty. They take the effect—
marble, pigment—and make them a cause, a source of activity. They trope directionality and 
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linearity by making the inert forms the source of action, the verbs. But then the writer turns to a 
picture from Said’s essay of an exiled bride and groom, dressed in European garb, surrounded by 
their homeland’s cultural objects.  
If the bride and groom are unwelcome in Palestine, but ostracized everywhere they go, 
what are they to do?  If a joyous occasion such as a wedding is dampened to such a great 
extent by the anxiety of deciding where to flee to next, what is the purpose of even 
“celebrating” it?  This, to me, is an example of death in life.  When you find little to 
enthusiastically celebrate and take comfort it, your existence—both physical and 
metaphysical—seems meaningless.  The absence of a hospitable homeland then prompts 
the generation of the twenty-first century to ask itself both if establishing a new homeland 
is possible and if that new way of life should replace that of their parents’.  (emphasis 
added) 
The bolded sentence is the core of the metaleptic moment that the writer’s built up to. “Death in 
life” is pure metalepsis, switching cause and effect, and in this instance, as they rightly note, 
creates a paradox. How can there be death in life? Exactly through the example—and some 
rhetorical work done earlier—of the exiled newlyweds. The writer continues to explain that the 
new, younger generation should work to redescribed (and potentially usurp) the traditional, older 
generation. To remake their present and recreate their past to fit their needs. This is the version 
of metalepsis known as M3, the transumption of new terms for old, making the past seem the 
inheritor of the present, and not the other way around.  
 Reflecting on this essay, it does seem that the topic/subject almost invites the use of 
metalepsis as a rhetorical tool to trope and move through the argument. Since what’s at stake is 
the reversal and wrangling of past with present, and with the paradox of refugees in exile, 
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metalepsis seems necessary to try and get at and make sense of the issue. This doesn’t mean it’s 
the only way of getting and making sense of an issue (or any issue), but that metalepsis, in this 







What should be immediately evident after just four examples is how troping does exist outside of 
my classroom. To be honest, it would’ve been more shocking to not find any kind of troping in 
the award essays. But I want to re-ask questions some questions I’ve asked throughout the 
dissertation in response to these outside student papers.  
1. How does troping make itself available to a student in these papers? It’s not 
absolutely correct to phrase it as “make itself available” because troping, as we’ve seen, 
doesn’t necessarily work like that. I should’ve phrased it, What conditions are sufficient 
but not necessary for troping? In some situations, like the first one, the student is 
purposely trying to see the aphorism from a different perspective. “Would the opposite of 
this aphorism hold true?” What seems to be sufficient conditions for troping is either a 
prompt from the teacher asking for a skewed perspective or a work that indicates 
“permission” like “dispute” or a phrase like “how can you make sense of…” But even 
here, I’m not content in saying that there are neutral and objective conditions that make 
troping a “thing” to be done in a particular situation. Linguistic troping doesn’t seem to 
operate that way. It’s not a one for one action. Instead, we should look at each case, as 
I’ve done here, and try to work backwards through the writing to see how the troping is 
situated in the paper and how it operates on the rest of the work, or doesn’t. The key point 
 197 
with every instance of troping, should a teacher pursue it—and I think they should—
would be to make revision the endpoint. A program for more work, etc.  
2. Does it derive from the same rhetorical exigency as the ones my own students faced? 
Again, the question should be re-framed. It should be, What are the exigencies that these 
student papers display and work with, against? And as above, each case should be taken 
individually. It seems, from the ones I’ve seen here, that troping appears where tension 
arises. In the Said paper, the topic was contentious and political, and the student was 
trying to say something elegant or interesting about a marbled culture or about how 
people exiled are existing in a death in life. In that instance, the moments of troping were 
well-placed to move the reader, this reader, into a place where their overall argument can 
be accessed more strangely, and yet more true (to revisit Wallace Stevens).  
At this point, I also want to re-visit a quote from Stanley Cavell in my Introduction to better 
grasp what I think is going on here.  
[The word “ordinary”] reminds us that whatever words are said and meant are said and 
meant by particular men, and that to understand what they (the words) mean you must 
understand what they (whoever is using them) mean, and that sometimes men do not see 
what they mean, that usually they cannot say what they mean, that for various reasons 
they may not know what they mean, and that when they are forced to recognize this they 
feel they do not, and perhaps cannot, mean anything, and they are struck dumb. 
(“Avoidance” 270)  
I don’t think, necessarily, either the students or myself are “struck dumb.” I do think we’re struck 
into a different language game, or a different relationship to the writing being read. And this is 
why the teacher-student relationship with regard to writing is so important. When Shelley Reid 
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proposed that we see teachers as solvers of student writing problems, this chapter should remind 
us how that can happen in specific rhetorical ways. As a teacher of writing, I’m attuned to, and a 
firm believer in, the troping of language as a evergreen starting point for writing instruction in 
college. Moreover, troping is a way into the hard and difficult work of revision. What I’ve been 
most enamored by reading these student papers from outside of my classes is how spontaneous 
and emphatic the language use is. I’m interested in the subtle moves and textures of the language 
that students are knowingly and unknowingly playing around in and manipulating. And, finally, 
I’m drawn to how they’re performing their writing, by side-stepping (in some small fashion) 
cliché and commonplace opinions.  








































In the book Teaching Queer, during a discussion about interfering with the act of student 
composition, Stacey Waite says that “if composition teachers want students to resist reliance on 
cliché, to push on the already available ways of thinking and writing about a given matter, it 
becomes our burden to write assignments that interfere with the processes of reading and 
writing” (108) and by this interference create a detour in the usual lines of expression and 
analysis that make up the commonly shared efforts of student writers. Waite goes on to write that 
teachers should create “assignments that interrupt even students’ vision of themselves” (108). 
This is not an easy task, nor is it one that many teachers or students may be comfortable with.  
 I don’t know if I’m up to the challenge of wholesale changing a student’s vision of their 
self. (That seems so drastic for a composition course.) If anything, I’m trying to encourage 
writers to change their performance on the page. Waite’s claim sticks with me, though, since 
what I’ve been investigating and calling for in this dissertation is a seeking out and acceptance of 
an “interference” in writing. If the misfit tropes are anything, they are interfering with the 
“typical” approaches or methods of writing. True, they are part of the larger stable of rhetorical 
tropes, schemes, and figures that have been catalogued for 2,000 years. Yet I’m not entirely sure 
that crafting interfering assignments will be the solution to more troping, or more instigations of 
troping. In reality, I never wrote an assignment that “aimed” to encourage troping. There may’ve 
 200 
been attitudes or certain terms I used (e.g. “dispute”), but even in assignments that I wrote where 
I aimed for a version of utter clarity, students still found ways to trope.  
 What I’m saying is that troping seems, at many points in this dissertation, and in student 
writing in general, to be an unconscious artifact. And what I want to emphatically state here in 
the conclusion is this: troping cannot be relied on. That may appear radically deflationary to my 
argument, but it’s what is left standing. With honesty, I don’t think that’s bad. Because writing 
teachers already know that certain effects of writing can’t be counted on to perform on 
command. Even after pointing it out to a writer, there’s no way for a student to definitively lay 
claim to troping’s efficacy. When Richard Poirier writes in his books about Emerson’s troping 
on certain terms like “nature,” “work,” and “action,” in the end, we are really just convinced by 
Poirier’s arguments for Emerson’s language than we are about Emerson’s actual motivations. 
And that’s fine. That’s what strong and compelling reading is all about, anyway. Moreover, 
obviously, I can’t claim that troping happens in every instance of student writing when a writing 
problem arises. There is, I’m sure, an argument (or arguments) out there that even in my 
examples here, there was no problem to solve or work through.  Troping just happened, some 
may say.    
 But, as Poirier writes, this is exactly the thing: “The only remedy…[is] to be found in 
language itself, by continuous acts of troping, syntactical shiftings, rhetorical fracturings of the 
direction set down by the grammar of a sentence. Even these, however, can turn into habits of 
conformity” (Renewal 33). We are left with a tool unable to fix itself. Troping then becomes in 
this instance a “program for more work” a phrase borrowed from William James in his essay 
“What Pragmatism Means”. Poirier digs into this essay, in conjunction with his own thoughts on 
the work of turning language, in his series of lectures, Poetry and Pragmatism, and says this: 
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“James is…attacking our tendency to sell ourselves short, to circumscribe ourselves by a 
dependence on abstractions. We seek dependence, [James] says, ‘in the shape of some 
illuminating or power-bringing word or name’” (92). James follows this up with, “You must 
bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your 
experience. It appears less as a solution, then, as a program for more work, and more particularly 
as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed” (qtd. in Poirier 92, 
emphasis in original). Troping can never be a solution to anything, and so I cannot sell it as a 
panacea. Jeez, I can’t even sell it as a celebrity workout tape. It is only, perhaps much to the 
chagrin of my students, an impetus to even more (and likely harder) work. Work, work, work. 
Revising, re-seeing, re-thinking, re-cognizing. Re-tooling, re-setting, remembering, re-selling. 
Everything again, forever.  
 I repeat: I don’t want to change selves; I want to change language on the page. This is 
why, as I’ve said elsewhere, that when I start each new semester, I tell my students the 
following: “I can’t promise that you’ll change the way you write by the end of the semester. In 
fact, I don’t care if you change the way you write. All I want you to know is why and how you 
write the way that you write.” The aim is to make their performances on the page self-aware and 
self-reflexive. To make their performances on the page living selves. (That’s different than 
wanting to change metaphysical selves.) The whole aim of the course is to make myself 
dispensable; to make myself unneeded for their own self-analysis and improvement of their 
writing. The aim is to have my classes poking at the language of their work and asking more of it 
than they did before: where does this etymology go? how does this pun give me access to a 
network of meanings? can a comic stance on a dramatic topic allow for flexibility and pliancy?  
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 One of the questions I asked in the Introduction was, “What does the act of troping say 
about the kinds of commonplaces that exist in student writing?” One doesn’t cause the other or 
vice versa. What’s compelling about both commonplaces and troping in the same piece of 
writing is how close together they can be, how they can affect each other. Let me offer a 
penultimate example of student writing as a way to exemplify my point. The student paper was 
found in the University of Pittsburgh archives, from an English course back in 1948—70 years 
ago. The author is Leah T. Turets. Leah’s paper is a theme. (Because it’s a theme, I encourage 
the reader to consider how Leah approached her subject—i.e. through description, evaluation, 
and parenthesis.) There is no title, and there was no assignment included with it. I found it in a 
box belonging to the former English chair Professor Percival Hunt. There are a few words and 
sentences that either Leah or Prof. Hunt struck out, but I will keep them in with the strikeout 
lines.  
 My grandmother was a frail little woman. I usually think of her in her favorite 
chair, her big book sunk in her lap, its rubbed leather binding only a little browner than 
the brittle pages she murmured over. Her lips would quiver with the soft sound of her 
prayers and her fingers, thin, the skin taut and glossy over the knobby bones, would move 
a little as she followed the faded print. I never think of her as doing things—I seldom 
heard her express a preference or an opinion, and never a demand. But she often used one 
word which summed up what she most admired in people. It is a word which is not 
quickly translated. It means “gentle behaviour” or “seemly conduct”, it includes 
“kindness” and “courtesy” and takes into account the motive of a person and his rearing, 
too: it was “menschlichkeit”. When she spoke it the word carried her warm approval and 
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gained the overtones which it has for me. I often find myself (listening in memory for the 
sound of her voice) trying the word to see if what I have done can stretch to fit it.  
As a pure description, I think this is quite good. Her observational eye is keen and sharp, and the 
choreography of her prose is deft. For example, the placement of “thin” and the extended 
description of the grandmother’s fingers in the sentence, “Her lips would quiver with the soft 
sound of her prayers and her fingers, thin, the skin taut and glossy over the knobby bones, would 
move a little as she followed the faded print.” The whole theme is typical in subject: The 
Grandmother. Or, Reflection on a Family Member. I’ve read plenty of pieces by students that are 
about family members, especially grandparents. It is a commonplace, a recognizable topoi. Leah 
writes that “menschlikeit” cannot be “quickly translated” when it seems she may be better off 
with “easily translated.” But the notion of speed is all throughout this theme (“I never think of 
her as doing things”). I have, more than any contemporary essay or theme, a solid idea, a very 
vivid image, of what Leah Turets’s grandmother looked, acted, and sounded like. But none of 
this is what I’m concerned with. It’s the last sentence.  
 I’m not sure what’s going on in that last sentence, but I know it is troping. In that 
sentence—“I often find myself (listening in memory for the sound of her voice) trying the word 
to see if what I have done can stretch to fit it”—I keep reading over and over, slowly (like 
Walker Gibson’s dumb reader) to figure out what “stretch” is doing. Listening to the voice of the 
line starting, then offering that almost clichéd parenthetical, and closing on her inabilities rather 
than her certainties. Often we say that a term/word stretches to fit a concept, but here Leah is 
stretching her actions to fit a term. It is an unusual use. If it’s troping, then what kind? I wonder, 
is it catachresis? Perhaps she’s pushed the fabric-based metaphor of “trying out a word” too far 
to the point of breaking down. But it doesn’t seem like a great example of catachresis. There is 
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no one place to frame the metaphor, unless we consider the whole sentence as one, and that 
seems unlikely. I turn to enstrangement and think maybe this is what’s happening to “stretch”—
but it’s not the best example, either. If what she’s making strange is “stretch” couldn’t she also 
be enstranging “listening” since she’s seeking her memory for sounds? The use could, in some 
sense, be considered metalepsis. She’s reversing the order of stretching. How does one 
retroactively stretch an action in the past to fit a conceptual term in the present?  
 Again, her usage is unusual. Her language game is creating new rules. It doesn’t 
necessarily fit my misfit tropes perfectly, but it is still troping and it is still misfit. She is being 
painted by a picture. I am searching this written memory for the sound of her voice.  
 Leah’s theme leads me to revisit another question I asked in the Introduction: “What do 
the use of misfit tropes say about how troping is instigated?” I will have to reframe this question 
because at the end of this project I’m not sure that troping is “instigated.” (As I stated in chapter 
5.) Instead, I think troping is an element of language use that takes a certain method of reading to 
bring forth and elaborate upon. Stanley Cavell summarizes the poised and revolving nature of 
language in his book, In Quest of the Ordinary. His argument is both exhilarating and sobering.  
…you always tell more and tell less than you know. Wittgenstein’s Investigations draws 
this most human predicament into philosophy, forever returning to philosophy’s 
ambivalence…as between wanting to tell more than words can say and wanting to evade 
telling altogether—an ambivalence epitomized in the idea of wishing to speak “outside of 
language games,” a wish for (language to do, the mind to be) everything and nothing. 
Here I think again of Emerson’s wonderful saying in which he detects the breath of virtue 
and vice that our character “emits” at every moment, words so to speak always before 
and beyond themselves, essentially and unpredictably recurrent, say rhythmic, fuller of 
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meaning than can be exhausted. So that it may almost be said of every word and phrase in 
the language what William Empson has said of metaphors, that they are pregnant…(83)  
Yes, oh ganesha, yes, pregnant. “But pregnant with what?” is the question. Just meaning? All of 
the student essays, papers, and pieces in this dissertation are pregnant with meaning, more 
meaning than the students or the writings themselves know what to do with. The students are 
meaning all over the place. I prefer, then, to read the student writing and language use as 
pregnant with mutability, with potential. Cavell’s suggestion that words are “fuller of meaning 
than can be exhausted” should be a boon for writers in composition—especially for teachers of 
writing. Yet how to get at these pregnant moments, these tropings, these voicings, these 
performances on the page?  
 In the Preface to his first major collection of essays, The Performing Self: Compositions 
and Decompositions in the Languages of Contemporary Life, Richard Poirier writes about the 
conflict of the writer in the writing itself. 
When a writer is most strongly engaged by what he is doing, as if struggling for his 
identity within the materials at hand, he can show us, in the mere turning of a sentence 
this way or that, how to keep from being smothered by the inherited structuring of things, 
how to keep within and yet in command of the accumulations of culture that have 
become a part of what he is. Much of cultural inheritance is waste; it always has been. 
But only those who are both vulnerable and brave are in a position to know what is waste 
and what is not. (xxi) 
I wrote earlier in this project that students may be troping in order to escape the voices of past 
schooling that heavily haunt their heads. Those voices are just as much a product of cultural 
inheritance as anything else, and surely are waste. My teachings and suggestions, too, as I’ve 
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said, could and will likely turn to waste for students. Another accumulation, another thin 
lamination on top of their written history. What I’ve been arguing for and trying to show 
throughout this dissertation is how and why we should be reading student writing a certain way, 
for certain tropings and energies and performances that help students slip the moorings of first-
year writing’s unfortunate but inevitable trappings—those of commonplace responses, cliché, 
Colesian Themewriting, teacher flattery, and the undercutting of their own points. In my eyes, 
the job of a writing teacher is to help solve writing problems and then make ourselves 
unnecessary henceforth. It is also to focus on the trope’s performances, what they do with 
language and why. I want to end this conclusion by fencing with a few more quotes from Poirier, 
both from the Preface of The Performing Self.  
Performance comes to fruition at precisely the point where the potentially destructive 
impulse to mastery brings forth from the material its most essential, irreducible, clarified, 
and therefore beautiful nature. (xxii)  
Troping may not exactly be a “destructive impulse to mastery,” but I do think that when students 
are twisting a sentence this way and that, they are “bring[ing] forth from the material its most 
essential, irreducible, clarified, and…beautiful nature.” When Leah Turets wrote about her 
grandmother that “I often find myself (listening in memory for the sound of her voice) trying the 
word to see if what I have done can stretch to fit it” I read a sentence that pauses, proceeds, 
reconsiders, and ends by hanging fire. The same is equally true for “cupcake world,” “torching 
paragraphs,” and Jerrica’s essay about persuasion and utopia, and all the other examples. My 
readings of these writings are idiosyncratic, and purposely so, and should be held up against the 
students’ self-interpretations and self-directions. Theirs are the final word. Exactly so, there can 
be no law in place about how a troping takes place or how the misfit tropes should go. When I 
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judge that anagnorisis is the impetus for a misfit trope, it is the best reading on offer to me in that 
moment, for that paper. For perspective, Poirier declares, “Writing is a form of energy not 
accountable to the orderings anyone makes of it and specifically not accountable to the liberal 
humanitarian values most readers want to find there” (xxiii). In other words, I can only make 
sense of the performance of the writing and the tropes and work from that unique stage of 
composition. I cannot expect, like Waite, for the changing of a Self or a Disposition. Also, I 
cannot expect that change to make a dent in a revision. More importantly, student writing isn’t 
accountable to me. Not like that. It is only accountable to the student writer who is to take hold 
and charge it. I possess the function of a reverberator, to ask questions like, “Why and how do 
you write the way that you write?” and “Is this the way you want to sound?” My function is to 
elaborate on and spin out the implications of sounding a certain way or what a student could do 
or has done with the voicings and performative leaps of linguistic power. I didn’t want to 
taxonomize student writing in this dissertation, and I’m afraid (at certain points) that I have. I’ve 
singled out certain tropes to lay over and read student writing with, but I’d rather see their work 
as Poirier does below. I want to end with a warning and explanation from Poirier, one that I think 
holds hands with this conclusion’s epigraph. 
Efforts to institutionalize the study of literature [in this case, student writing, too]…have 
all had the result of suppressing the kind of energy I try to locate in the word 
“performance.” It is an energy in motion, an energy which is its own shape, and it seldom 
fits the explanatory efforts either of most readers or even of most writers. If Faulkner, for 
example, really meant to summarize himself in the tedious, and loud, ironies of his 
Christian symbolisms in The Sound and the Fury or Light in August, he would be a writer 
not worth trouble. In the act of reading him, however, anyone responsive to the local 
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power of his writing soon recognizes that Faulkner needed his structurings the way a 
child might need a jungle gym: as a support for exuberant, beautiful, and testing flights. 
(xxiii)  
The assignments we give are the structurings for the students’ “testing flights” for their rhetorical 
configurations and refigurations, as are their own structures that become the essays and papers 
they turn in. If I was truly to think that Jerrica in chapter 4 or the writer of the “Care” essaylette 
in chapter 1 meant to “summarize” themselves in the ways that they did, then, yes, perhaps, 
they’d not be worth the trouble. True, they are not Faulkner. But still, in my acts of reading, I can 
see that the forms of the writing and the tropings within were the basis for their effects.  
 The title of this dissertation comes from a line in a Gertrude Stein book called How to 
Write. (Surely one of the best jokes ever.) In the midst of her typical associative language, my 
title appears, itself, alone, a solo paragraph. “Resemble assemble reply.” The sentence can be 
taken two ways (well, more than two), two that keep popping up in my vision.  
 First, the sentence can be a standard method of writing.  
 Resemble what you want to sound like. Assemble accordingly. Then reply to whatever 
you see.  
 Or: the sentence can be a warning.  
 What do you want to resemble? How will you assemble it? How will you reply?  
 Resembling anything can be dangerous, and so I’m quick to point out to students and 
writers that the impulse to pick what’s closest or what’s convenient or familiar can lead to less 
than satisfying results, if what’s wanted is writing that does something other than act dutifully 
and upright with no reason why.  
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 The three misfit tropes discussed at length in this dissertation represent (synecdochally) 
just a fraction what’s available within troping. But they are the ones that I saw and read 
repeating. It is my hope that those who read this, and who are in a position to teach reading or 
writing, when poised and attentive, can help writers go on to the next draft knowing their 
rhetorical moves. Again, if we’re to be solvers of writing problems, then it only makes sense to 
show our students that they’re writers performing exuberant acts of troping, and that it’s 
incumbent upon them to have, so long as they can stand it, the last word.  
 I want to close with a student paper, give it the last word. It’s an essay written by Sarah 
Frank, a former student of mine at the Community College of Allegheny County for an English 
Composition II course. She wrote about the similarities between Henry David Thoreau’s 
experience of success and failure while farming beans in Walden and the act of writing. It is a 
performance, to be sure.  
 And I know what you’re about to ask. I don’t know if it tropes.  
 But it does sing.  
 
 
You Can’t Reinvent the Wheel Bean Plant 
Henry David Thoreau did not grow beans to make money.  Sure, he sold his beans for profit to 
purchase necessities. But his goal was not to make money to save money to spend money.  His 
goal was survival without an abundance of “things” or human interaction.  Not “survival” in the 
sense that he had to fight for his life, but for true living and experience despite the lack of 
material objects and societal interference.  His daily activities were performed for self 
betterment.  He acquired an intimate connection between the earth and the core of his being, in 
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an attempt to reach self-actualization.  The record of his experience, Walden, muses about the 
value of others’ opinions, and whether or not their priorities are legitimate.  When tending to his 
bean field, passers-by comment on his abnormal cultivation techniques, insinuating that it 
“wasn’t good enough” because it did not conform to traditional farming practices, therefore 
making it less valuable because it was less profitable because it was less efficient.  Thoreau 
questions “… who estimates the value of the crop which nature yields in the still wilder fields 
unimproved by man?” (174).  He ridicules their belief that his efforts were worth nothing.  To 
him, his bean plants’ connection with their “wild and primitive” (174) state was a thing of 
beauty.  “Half-cultivated” was not a dirty word, but an admirable one.  His precious beans were 
not “savage” or “barbarous,” they were “cheerful” and “powerful.”  Though the virtues 
embedded in the seeds of his labor and the beans themselves “did not come up” (181), Thoreau 
did come to a realization.  It was not he, but nature itself that caused his beans to grow. 
He did provide aid in the way of hoeing, but it was the clouds that provided the rain that watered 
the soil, and it was the sun that provided the light for photosynthesis, and it was the forces of 
nature that provided the exact circumstances for the miracle of life.   
Thoreau learned all he could from his beans and resolved to “not plant beans… with so much 
industry” (181) again.  Though he did not reach his goal, Thoreau tried.  His whole point was 
that he tried.  He believed that doing things (such as farming) the same way over and over again, 
without recourse or consideration, was wasted energy.  Why do something that you already know 
the outcome of?  Been there, done that.  Thoreau believed that one’s energy should concern the 
creation of a “new generation of men,” a generation that would generate new ideas and crave 
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new adventures.  The funny thing is, concerning reading and writing, Thoreau believed we had 
much to learn from the classics.  But without the basics, there cannot be new growth.  A bean 
plant cannot grow without water, sunshine, and soil just as a human cannot experience new 
things without an income from raising said beans.  In the same sense, one cannot create a new 
story about a hero if “hero” itself is not defined; nearly all of today’s heroes are based on the 
great Beowulf.  If you understand the origin, you can comprehend the possibilities.  Thoreau’s 
attempt to understand the beans as much as they understood him resemble the process of trying 
to understand one’s own writing.  There’s a difference between understanding what you 
just wrote and understanding what you just wrote. There’s a difference between writing an essay 
and letting the essay write itself. Letting your words reflect your primal instincts and beliefs 
allows you to connect with what you’re writing.  Letting your beans rely on their environment 
allows them to connect with their humble, uncultivated beginnings.  Let your beans 
be.  Appreciate them for what they are.  Let them do their thing while you go out and explore 
what you do not yet know.  The beans don’t need you, the classics don’t need you, they already 
know what they’re doing — metaphorically, at least.  Don’t waste time writing the same things 
over and over again or planting your beans 
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the same way over and over again.       The point is to push your boundaries as a human being, 
whether it be secluding        yourself in a forest or traveling          the world or writing a novel. 
Thoreau thinks that you should  
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